Confidence depends on level of aggregation

The credible intervals that people set around their point estimates are typically too narrow (cf. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). That is, a set of many such intervals does not contain the actual values of the criterion variables as often as it should given the probability assigned to this event for each estimate. The typical interpretation of such data is that people are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments. This paper presents data from two studies showing the typical levels of overconfidence for individual estimates of unknown quantities. However, data from the same subjects on a different measure of confidence for the same items, their own global assessment for the set of multiple estimates as a whole, showed significantly lower levels of confidence and overconfidence than their average individual assessment for items in the set. It is argued that the event and global assessments of judgment quality are fundamentally different and are affected by unique psychological processes. Finally, we discuss the implications of a difference between confidence in single and multiple estimates for confidence research and theory.     

Depressive symptoms are associated with unrealistic negative predictions of future life events

This study examined the relationship between depressive symptoms and bias in the prediction of future life events. Responding to internet announcements, 153 participants varying widely in self-reported depression symptom severity estimated the probability of 40 events occurring over the succeeding 30 days. After the 30-day period, participants reported which events occurred. Optimistic/pessimistic biases were related to level of depressive symptoms. A non-significant optimistic bias characterized participants with low depressive symptoms whereas a significant pessimistic bias characterized participants with high depressive symptoms. Those reporting mild symptoms did not exhibit a systematic pessimistic or optimistic bias. General imprecision in predictions for undesirable events was associated with depressive symptoms. These findings suggest that depression is associated with pessimistic bias rather than accuracy in judgment.     

Persistence during extinction: Are judgments of persistence affected by contingency information?

The partial reinforcement extinction effect (PREE), defined as increased behavioral persistence following intermittent reward, is considered an important outcome of instrumental learning contingencies, both inside and outside the laboratory. Since adults have a rich experience with situations in which desired outcomes depend on instrumental responding, we asked whether that experience affects judgments of persistence when relevant contingency information is manipulated. Subjects read simple scenarios with information about behaviors generated by high vs. low reward rate, and then judged the resultant persistence of these behaviors under no-reward conditions. Studies 1 and 2 found no evidence that persistence judgments were affected by contingency information in naive subjects. Studies 3 and 4 compared groups with and without explicit knowledge about behavioral psychology and thus tested possible effects of that knowledge for persistence more directly. Judgments in naive subjects were not reliably influenced by reward rate information, but subjects possessing expert knowledge demonstrated judgments that were reliably affected by contingency information. The results indicate that people do not generate generalized knowledge from normal experience with occasional vs. regular reward. Possible explanations and implications of these findings are discussed.     

Logic and Aggregation

Paraconsistent logic is an area of philosophical logic that has yet to find acceptance from a wider audience. The area remains, in a word, disreputable. In this essay, we try to reassure potential consumers that it is not necessary to become a radical in order to use paraconsistent logic. According to the radicals, the problem is the absurd classical account of contradiction: Classically inconsistent sets explode only because bourgeois classical semantics holds, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that both A and A cannot simultaneously be true! We suggest (more modestly) that there is, at least sometimes, something else worth preserving, even in an inconsistent, unsatisfiable premise set. In this paper we present, in a new guise, a very general version of this preservationist approach to paraconsistency.     

A Theoretical Framework for Analysing the Notion of Relative Importance of Criteria

Multiple-criteria decision aid almost always requires the use of weights, importance coefficients or even a hierarchy of criteria, veto thresholds, etc. These are importance parameters that are used to differentiate the role devoted to each criterion in the construction of comprehensive preferences. Many researchers have studied the problem of how to assign values to such parameters, but few of them have tried to analyse in detail what underlies the notion of importance of criteria and to give a clear formal definition of it. In this paper our purpose is to define a theoretical framework so as to analyse the notion of the importance of criteria under very general conditions. Within this framework it clearly appears that the importance of criteria is taken into account in very different ways in various aggregation procedures. This framework also allows us to shed new light on fundamental questions such as: Under what conditions is it possible to state that one criterion is more important than another? Are importance parameters of the various aggregation procedures dependent on or independent of the encoding of criteria? What are the links between the two concepts of the importance of criteria and the compensatoriness of preferences? This theoretical framework seems to us sufficiently general to ground further research in order to define theoretically valid elicitation methods for importance parameters.     

Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction

‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James Dreier, David Brink, and others.

Is Psychology Based on a Methodological Error?

It is believed a proven fact that variables in social and personality psychology match to normal distribution with its single peak. Multiple peaks are explained by independent variables. However, after a comprehensive data analysis of more than 8.000 patients and on the basis of a bio-psycho-social model with 27 scales, we arrived at the conclusion that normal distribution and the psychometric error theory cannot withstand critical analysis in large samples. Beyond the “truth” that is proved by distribution-dependent statistical inferences, there exists another “truth” that is denied by the empirical doctrine. This “truth” is influenced by compensatory belief systems and explains paradoxes in quality of life research. We hypothesize that items, referred to life risks are micro-stressors, triggering self-regulatory processes as a humanly inherent response, deeply anchored in human evolution. Especially when exposed to threatening experiences, self-focused attention generates amplified multimodal distributions and subverts the methodological premises by an ambivalence-bias between thrill and threat, hopes and fears, pleasure and pain, success and failure, etc. In this article we want to focus attention to the incommensurability between test theoretical axioms and the way people usually respond to self-focused items. We discuss basic distribution patterns and approach to an evolutionary theory of fluctuation of validity.

Self-enhancement and theory-based correction processes

Two studies examined bias correction by manipulating a perceived chronic judgmental bias (i.e., overestimator/underestimator) using a modified dot estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants corrected for this perceived estimation bias by making adjustments away from the arbitrary feedback about their personal bias tendencies. In Experiment 2, the perceived desirability of the same estimation bias was manipulated. Results indicated that self-enhancement concerns impacted perceivers’ motivation to correct, at a cost to accuracy. These studies expand our current understanding of theory-based correction by including self-enhancement motives as causes of correction, demonstrating that such corrections can decrease rather than increase judgment accuracy, and illustrating the usefulness of a new perceived bias manipulation in theory testing.     

Cognitive-behavioral therapy and decision science

In recent decades cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and decision science (DS) have emerged within the field of psychological science. Though these are two vastly different areas of study, they are similar in that they address human information processing, cognition, behavior, and the link between them. In this article, we provide brief summaries of CBT and decision science, discuss their similarities and differences, and discuss how future research can identify ways in which these fields can inform each other. Several CBT techniques that might be of use to the efforts of the decision science field to prevent cognitive biases are suggested. Research that integrates these two fields may lead to the improvement of both.