Poverty, Patriotism, and National Covenant: Jonathan Edwards and Public Life

In this essay I address three ways in which Edwards can inform Christian understanding of public life. First I show how Edwards provides both philosophical and theological rationales for social engagement and thereby resists the separation of religion from public life, and use his consideration of poverty as an illustration. Part II examines Edwards's dialectical treatment of patriotism, demonstrating both its importance to the Christian life and its susceptibility to deceptive accommodation to culture. Finally, in Part III I discuss Edwards's use of "national covenant," which despite its temptation to chauvinism Edwards used to undermine national pride. In the conclusion I assess what we can use from Edwards for contemporary Christian understandings of public life.     

Central deafness and subcortical motor aphasia

Clinical and autopsy studies were made on a right-handed man who had central deafness and subcortical motor aphasia, and the literature on central deafness and on subcortical motor aphasia was analyzed. Central deafness is due to bilateral destruction of the primary auditory cortex. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish from word deafness and from auditory agnosia, which are due to pathology in other parts of the temporal lobes. There is almost always some preserved hearing in central deafness, possibly from some auditory pathway other than the classical pathway. In this patient the subcortical motor aphasia was due to bilateral destruction of the motor cortex for the mouth and throat. In some other cases subcortical motor aphasia was due to the same pathology that usually causes Broca's aphasia; in these cases the unexpected preservation of writing was perhaps related to some difference in how language functions were organized in the brain.     

The Intrinsic Value of Sport: A Reply to Culbertson

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, ‘Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?’ objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism – these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term ‘intrinsic’ is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones.     

CONSENT,CONVERSION, AND MORAL FORMATION: Stoic Elements in Jonathan Edwards's Ethics

The contemporary revival of virtue ethics has focused primarily on retrieving central moral commitments of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and the Neoplatonist traditions. Christian virtue ethicists would do well to expand this retrieval further to include the writings of the Roman Stoics. This essay argues that the ethics of Jonathan Edwards exemplifies major Stoic themes and explores three noteworthy points of intersection between Stoic ethics and Edwards's thought: a conception of virtue as consent to a benevolent providence, the identification of virtue as a singular and transformative good, and an account of moral formation as simultaneously self‐directed and received. Common ground between Edwards and the Stoics illustrates the value of recognizing Stoic moral thought as a philosophical framework that can enhance and undergird Christian ethicists' understandings of moral development and the nature of virtue.     

THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION IN JONATHAN EDWARDS'S MORAL THOUGHT: The Nature of True Virtue Reconsidered

This essay provides an interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's moral thought that calls attention to the motif of perception in his conception of true virtue. The aim is to illumine the extent to which Edwards's virtue ethics can be included in and contribute to prevailing approaches to virtue in contemporary theological ethics. To advance this proposal, this essay attends to the question of moral agency that Edwards's reflections on charity, the new spiritual sense, and religious affections raise. This procedure offers an acute sense of the significance of perception for Edwards's virtue ethics, which in turn allows for a constructive Edwardsean entry into current theological discussions on the narrative character of virtue.     

A realist social ontology of religion

Jonathan Z. Smith famously pointed out that the concept of ‘religion’ is not universal but emerged only in the modern West. Several scholars have drawn from Smith the non-realist implication that the existence of religion apart from that concept is an illusion. The word ‘religion,’ they say, does not refer to something out there in the world. In this article, the author argues that Smith’s point is open to a realist interpretation according to which religion exists in the world, as a transhistorical and transcultural reality, even apart from the concept. To make this case, the author outlines and responds to non-realist positions that draw on genealogical, deconstructive, and linguistic arguments, as well as to the alternative proposal that ‘religion’ is simply a heuristic device. In short, the goal of this article is to argue that a realist social ontology provides the better understanding of the central theoretical term in our field.     

A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF EVOLUTION AND PARTICIPATION

Recent controversies surrounding the discernment of design in the natural world are an indication of a pervasive disquiet among believers. Can God as creator/sustainer of creation be reconcilable with the belief that God's work is indiscernible behind secondary evolutionary causes? Christian piety requires that the order experienced in the natural world be evidence of God's love and existence. Theistic evolutionary models rarely examine this matter, assuming that God is indiscernible in the processes and order of the world because only secondary causes can be examined. This leaves antievolutionary perspectives to interpret and address the problem of seeing God in the world. I examine these issues in order to gain more credibility for the religious longing to discern God in nature while at the same time affirming the indubitable truth of an evolutionary history. I argue that God's trinitarian nature, hiddenness, and incarnation give us reason to believe that God's presence in the natural world will be discernible, but only within the natural processes, and thereby only in an obscured fashion. I also argue that newer understandings of evolutionary mechanisms are more consistent with theological appropriation than are strictly Darwinian ones.     

APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL?

This paper examines Pfadt and Wheeler's (1995) suggestions that the methods of statistical process control (SPC) be incorporated into applied behavior analysis. The research strategies of SPC are examined and compared to those of applied behavior analysis. I argue that the statistical methods that are a part of SPC would likely reduce applied behavior analysts' intimate contacts with the problems with which they deal and would, therefore, likely yield poor treatment and research decisions. Examples of these kinds of results and decisions are drawn from the cases and data Pfadt and Wheeler present. This paper also describes and clarifies many common misconceptions about SPC, including W. Edwards Deming's involvement in its development, its relationship to total quality management, and its confusion with various other methods designed to detect sources of unwanted variability.     

Age,sex, training,and the measurement of field dependence

This study was designed to: (a) examine the effects of age and sex on a person's susceptibility to field dependence training; (b) determine whether the field dependence phenomenon is a function of “cognitive style” or of a person's general inability to make correct judgments in the face of too much confusing and inaccurate information. Traditional Rod and Frame scoring is based on the latter assumption. Interpretation of results, however, has traditionally been based on the “cognitive style” assumption. Results indicate that Rod and Frame results are not a function of cognitive style. This seems particularly true of two aspects of the field dependence phenomenon: (a) the sex difference effect and (b) the correlation between Rod and Frame and Embedded Figures results. Age, more than sex, may be a function of both cognitive style and general ability to perceive the upright. A training effect was not demonstrated. Hypotheses were put forward to explain the nature of field dependence, the magnitude of field dependence errors, and the lack of a training effect.