Critique,rhétoricité, communicabilité

La critique et la théorie littéraires contemporaines présentent un paradoxe: elles notent, par la référence à la rhétorique, la rupture de la propriété argumentative ou persuasive de l'oeuvre; elles préservent cependant l'hypothèse d'une propriété conversationnelle du littéraire — hypothèse qui n'est pas véritablement explicitée. Ce paradoxe, essentiellement lisible dans la déconstruction, l'est aussi dans les propositions de Sartre, dans la pensée du dehors de Foucault, dans le dialogisme de Bakhtine. Le paradoxe revient, de fait — telle est la thèse de cet article — à énoncer une propriété rhétorique et persuasive de l'oeuvre, au moyen d'une référence à la rhétorique d'abord confondue avec la tropologie et avec l'effacement du jeu persuasif. Cette ultime propriété rhétorique et persuasive est identifiable par l'alliance de lasuspension, qui caractérise le texte littéraire dès lors qu'il est placé sous le signe de la rupture de l'argument et de la persuasion, et du jeu anaphorique, lui-même indissociable du questionnement que suscite la suspension. A partir du constat de ce questionnement, il convient de dire que le texte littéraire est ce qui fait fond à la disparité du doxique, et que celui-ci apparaît comme le répondant provisiore et variable de lacasuistique que constitue le texte littéraire.     

Sartre and Bergson: A Disagreement about Nothingness

Abstract

Henri Bergson's philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre's central argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre's argument is in part a response to Bergson's dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in Creative Evolution (1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are precisely those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre's account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful.

My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre's and Bergson's discussion of nothingness: here I point to some important aspects of Sartre's early philosophy, including some features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson's positive influence on his thought.     

Swimming and Skiing: Two Modes of Existential Consciousness

The philosophical argument between Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus can be summarised in their conflicting accounts of skiing and swimming. For Sartre skiing exemplifies the struggle of existence and the angst of the alienated ego. For Camus, swimming represents some glimmering of collective harmony, the possibility of transcendence. Sartre's thinking is inflected by quantum theory and the ‘steady state’, whereas Camus is more of a wave theorist, with a lingering nostalgia for the ‘primeval atom’ and a fondness for peak experiences. Put together their separate ways of analysing consciousness suggest a two-phase account of cognition.     

Believers and Their Disbelief

Several recent Roman Catholics who were known for their devotion have left accounts of their troubled faith. I consider three of these: St. Therese of Lisieux, Mother Teresa of Calcutta, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Then I tell of the troubled atheism of Jean‐Paul Sartre. Finally, I use texts of Sartre and Teilhard to understand the unsettled nature of belief.     

The Phenomenology of Falling Ill: An Explication,Critique and Improvement of Sartre’s Theory of Embodiment and Alienation

In this paper I develop a phenomenology of falling ill by presenting, interpreting and developing the basic model we find in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1956). The three steps identified by Sartre in this process are analysed, developed further and brought to a five-step model: (1) pre-reflective experience of discomfort, (2) lived, bodily discomfort, (3) suffered illness, (4) disease pondering, and (5) disease state. To fall ill is to fall victim to a gradual process of alienation, and with each step this alienating process is taken to a new qualitative level. Consequently, the five steps of falling ill have not only a contingent chronological order but also a kind of logical order, in that they typically presuppose each other. I adopt Sartre’s focus on embodiment as the core ground of the alienation process, but point out that the alienation of the body in illness is not only the experience of a psychic object, but an experience of the independent life of one’s own body. This facticity of the body is the result neither of the gaze of the other person, nor of a reflection adopting the outer perspective of the other in an indirect way, but is a result of the very otherness of one’s own body, which addresses and plagues us when we fall ill. I use examples of falling ill and being a patient to show how a phenomenology of falling ill can be helpful in educating health-care personnel (and perhaps also patients) about the ways of the lived body.     

"我思":从笛卡儿到萨特

Cogito, as the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysical system, initiated the modern philosophy of consciousness, becoming both the source and subject of modern Western philosophical discourse. The philosophies of Maine de Biran, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others developed by answering the following questions? Is consciousness substantial or not? Does consciousness require the guarantee of a transcendental subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a being-for-others? Outlining the developmental history of the idea of Cogito from Descartes to Sartre is important for totally comprehending the evolution and development of Western philosophy.     

On Being One's Own Person

The aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical account of our sense that some people are more their own person than others. I begin by exposing the weaknesses in three possible accounts, which I label the "interventionist", the "existentialist" and the "ideal" accounts. I then go on to argue that the distinguishing feature of those who are their own person is that their natural inclinations are accurately expressed in their behaviour.     

精神自由与心灵自由——庄子与萨特自由精神之比较

庄子和萨特虽然都不约而同地呼唤自由,但他们关于自由的理念却是有很大的区别的。庄子的精神自由是消极的,萨特的心灵自由是积极的。庄子认为要想实现自由理想,就要顺任自然、“洗心去欲”;萨特则认为“人命定是自由”,实现自由理想,就是要让人认识到自己是自由的,勇于自我选择、自我造就、自我实现。     

Analytic philosophy and continental philosophy The Campbell Thesis revised

Humanism is most commonly used as a prefabricated answer, covering the injunction to place man at the centre of our preoccupations, not to succumb to the risk of subordinating him to anything else, when dealing with nature, history, economics or politics, with means and with ends. In this sense humanism is supposed to be the remedy for all evils. But this sort of answer is only possible against a background where the question of humanism is forgotten. To return to the question of humanism is to open a line of questioning about the presuppositions of a thinking which makes man the centre of nature and of history. But if we bring these presuppositions to light, will humanism still be able to remain an acceptable answer? Shouldn't we, on the contrary, call it radically into question? – as the instrument, or the mask, of a project for domination – a project of which man has forever sought to be the vector. Levinas showed the invalidity of the conception of humanism which is dominant in the philosophical tradition, not in order to give way to the shortcomings of anti-humanism, but to re-found humanism in a different way.