Exogenous verbal response inhibition in adults who do and do not stutter

IntroductionBehavioral and questionnaire-based studies suggest that children who stutter (CWS) exhibit poorer response inhibition than children who do not stutter (CWNS). However, the behavioral findings in adults who stutter (AWS) are less unequivocal and mainly based on manual response inhibition. Further study is therefore needed, especially given the lack of studies on verbal response inhibition among these groups.MethodsThirteen AWS and 14 adults who do not stutter (AWNS) participated in a verbal stop signal task (SST) in which they were asked to read aloud six Chinese characters as fast as possible during the go-signal and ignore-signal trials and refrain from naming them during the stop-signal trials.ResultsThe two groups showed a comparable response reaction time in the go-signal and ignore-signal trial conditions. Furthermore, there were no significant differences in terms of the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) and accuracy. However, a significant positive correlation was found between SSRT and the frequency of stuttering in conversation but not in reading.ConclusionCurrent findings seem to provide additional support that exogenously triggered response inhibition among AWS does not differ from AWNS. The association between stuttering frequency and SSRT seems to suggest that individuals with more severe stuttering in conversational speech have reduced exogenous response inhibition. However, this finding needs to be further explored in future studies using different measures of stuttering severity.     

Psychological underpinnings of akrasia: A new integrative framework based on self-regulation vulnerabilities and failures

Akrasia is intentional behavior against one's better judgment. This concept has a rich history in Western philosophy, but it does not feature prominently in the psychological literature. After a brief conceptual review, I propose here a new integrative theoretical framework that draws on motivation science to explicate its psychological underpinnings. Leveraging cybernetic big five and regulatory mode theories, I argue that the self-regulation processes underlying key personality structures can explain why regulatory vulnerabilities can lead to various kinds of akratic failures. For example, I elucidate how maladjusted extraversion associated with a chronic malfunctioning of the assessment and locomotion modes could lead to hedonic dysregulations typical of a specific form of akratic behavior characterized by excessive self-indulgence. This new framework marries multiple disciplines and recomposes the fragmentation of the philosophical speculation on akrasia, suggesting pathways towards potential psychological interventions to mitigate its maladaptive consequences.     

The Role of Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Pragmatic Computations

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Some and possibly all dogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not all dogs are mammals,” known as a scalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.     

Driver conflict response during supervised automation: Do hands on wheel matter?

Securing appropriate driver responses to conflicts is essential in automation that is not perfect (because the driver is needed as a fall-back for system limitations and failures). However, this is recognized as a major challenge in the human factors literature. Moreover, in-depth knowledge is lacking regarding mechanisms affecting the driver response process. The first aim of this study was to investigate how driver conflict response while using highly reliable (but not perfect) supervised automation differ for drivers that (a) crash or avoid a conflict object and (b) report high trust or low trust in automation to avoid the conflict object. The second aim was to understand the influence on the driver conflict response of two specific factors: a hands-on-wheel requirement (with vs. without), and the conflict object type (garbage bag vs. stationary vehicle). Seventy-six participants drove with highly reliable but supervised automation for 30 min on a test track. Thereafter they needed to avoid a static object that was revealed by a lead-vehicle cut-out. The driver conflict response was assessed through the response process: timepoints for driver surprise reaction, hands-on-wheel, driver steering, and driver braking. Crashers generally responded later in all actions of the response process compared to non-crashers. In fact, some crashers collided with the conflict object without even putting their hands on the wheel. Driver conflict response was independent of the hands-on-wheel requirement. High-trust drivers generally responded later than the low-trust drivers or not at all, and only high trust drivers crashed. The larger stationary vehicle triggered an earlier surprise reaction compared to the garbage bag, while hands-on-wheel and steering response were similar for the two conflict object types. To conclude, crashing is associated with a delay in all actions of the response process. In addition, driver conflict response does not change with a hands-on-wheel requirement but changes with trust-level and conflict object type. Simply holding the hands on the wheel is not sufficient to prevent collisions or elicit earlier responses. High trust in automation is associated with late response and crashing, whereas low trust is associated with appropriate driver response. A larger conflict object trigger earlier surprise reactions.     

寻找镜中的自我：精神分裂症患者的视觉观点采择

精神分裂症患者的视觉观点采择影响其必要的社交活动和生活质量。本文通过对精神分裂症患者视觉观点采择的研究进行梳理,总结出相关的心理特点：精神分裂症患者的视觉观点采择过程受损,表现出自我中心性和他人中心性。在神经生理上表现出与视觉观点采择相关的脑区激活减弱。可能的原因是患者认知功能中反应抑制能力和心理旋转能力的受损所致,建议采用认知干预疗法可能会改善患者的视觉观点采择能力。目前的研究论证了精神分裂症患者视觉观点采择过程的损伤,对于不同水平的视觉观点采择下精神分裂症患者的认知模式还未有明确的定论,未来的研究可以从该角度入手,更加明确精神分裂症患者不同水平视觉观点采择的特点和神经生理活动。     

The Relationship between Emotional Intelligence and Domain-Specific and Domain-General Creativity

The Amusement Park Theory of Creativity, which represents both domain-specific and domain-general perspectives of creativity, calls for more research on how individual difference constructs are related to creativity at all ends of the domain-specificity and general spectrum. Toward this goal, this study examined emotional intelligence (using the Emotional Intelligence Scale) in relationship with both a domain-general measure (the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults) and a domain-specific measure (Kaufman Domains of Creativity Scale) in a sample of 281 Chinese undergraduates. Although emotional intelligence demonstrated no relationship with divergent thinking, it did positively predict all five domains of creativity on the self-report measure (ranging from .52 to .77). These findings add to the nuanced relationship between emotional intelligence and creativity and serve as a call for more work of this nature.     

Consequences of agreement versus disagreement on physical disgust: How do people perceive the cleanliness and morality of someone who expresses inappropriate disgust

We examined how people perceived a person who expressed inappropriate physical disgust—a person who was either under-disgusted by physically disgusting stimuli or over-disgusted by neutral stimuli. Participants formed an impression of a target after receiving information on how s/he rated disgusting (Studies 1, 2) or neutral (Studies 2, 3) pictures, and disgusting or angering scenarios (Study 4). Studies 1, 2 and 4 found that a target person who failed to experience disgust was seen as disgusting, immoral (but only to the extent that s/he was also seen unclean), and not socially desirable. A target who rated neutral stimuli as disgusting was not judged as disgusting but was nevertheless judged as immoral and not socially desirable (Studies 2, 3). Our results show that a target whose judgments of physical disgust deviate from one's own by showing either too much or too little disgust is perceived to be immoral.