"Princess Alice is watching you": children's belief in an invisible person inhibits cheating

Two child groups (5-6 and 8-9 years of age) participated in a challenging rule-following task while they were (a) told that they were in the presence of a watchful invisible person (“Princess Alice”), (b) observed by a real adult, or (c) unsupervised. Children were covertly videotaped performing the task in the experimenter’s absence. Older children had an easier time at following the rules but engaged in equal levels of purposeful cheating as the younger children. Importantly, children’s expressed belief in the invisible person significantly determined their cheating latency, and this was true even after controlling for individual differences in temperament. When “skeptical” children were omitted from the analysis, the inhibitory effects of being told about Princess Alice were equivalent to having a real adult present. Furthermore, skeptical children cheated only after having first behaviorally disconfirmed the “presence” of Princess Alice. The findings suggest that children’s belief in a watchful invisible person tends to deter cheating.     

Do chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) understand single invisible displacement?

Previous research suggests that chimpanzees understand single invisible displacement. However, this Piagetian task may be solvable through the use of simple search strategies rather than through mentally representing the past trajectory of an object. Four control conditions were thus administered to two chimpanzees in order to separate associative search strategies from performance based on mental representation. Strategies involving experimenter cue-use, search at the last or first box visited by the displacement device, and search at boxes adjacent to the displacement device were systematically controlled for. Chimpanzees showed no indications of utilizing these simple strategies, suggesting that their capacity to mentally represent single invisible displacements is comparable to that of 18-24-month-old children.     

A critique of humanitarian reason: agency,power, and privilege

This paper offers a critical analysis of the work of western humanitarian NGOs operating in the African continent. We argue that in most cases, NGOs and their supporters are deaf to the actual wants, needs, and desires – or, in other words, the agency – of those they are trying to aid. We do this by first offering a series of ways of understanding the ideological commitments that inform the work of many humanitarian NGOs and those who donate to them. In this, we expose the reasons leading to the failure of such individuals and organizations to recognize and take account of the agency of those they seek to help. Second, we offer evidence of the problematic outcome of this failure when coupled with a lack of recognition of the wider context of many of the conflicts that lead to the suffering of those that such NGOs intend to aid. In doing this, we expose the ways in which an NGO's own position can reinforce and contribute to the continuance of this suffering. This, we argue results from the simplified, inaccurate, and de-politicized ways in which NGOs tend to portray the problem of suffering both to those they solicit for donations and in their own conception of the problems and the ‘moral’ role that the organization itself plays in its work.     

Mind perception of God in Japanese children

There is a theoretical debate regarding whether children represent God with reference to a human. Most previous studies have assessed this issue focusing on knowledge/omniscience in western children. This study used a theoretical framework characterising mental capacities in terms of motivational/emotional (experience) and cognitive (agency) mental capacities and tested whether Japanese children discriminated between God, a human, a baby and an invisible agent according to these capacities. Three‐ to 6‐year‐old children were asked about the experience and agency of the agents. The results revealed that children discriminated God from a human in terms of mental capacities including experience and agency in 3‐year‐old children. On the other hand, 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children, but not 3‐year‐old children, discriminated a human from a baby and an invisible person. The results suggest that the Japanese children's representations of God differed from their representation of a human during preschool years.     

Mapping the contours of faith in the land of separation: spiritual geographies for children

According to Jean Piaget, children begin to develop a concept of an object, such as that it has sides that are not visible from the child's perspective or that it is likely to be where one saw it last, in early infancy. By the close of the prelinguistic phase at about 2 years old, the child has developed a mature object concept, one that comprehends the object as a continuing entity even when it is not visible. Many children's picture books demonstrate Piaget's concept of object permanence through narrative and image. This paper offers a close reading of three classics, Goodnight moon, Harold and the purple crayon and Where the wild things are, in an explanation of how children are able to develop faith in an invisible, omnipresent deity.     

Explaining the Durable Effects of Verbal Person‐Centered Supportive Communication: Indirect Effects or Invisible Support?

Researchers have documented benefits from receiving supportive messages high in verbal person‐centeredness (VPC), but the processes through which such messages produce longitudinal effects remain unclear. This study evaluated two perspectives (i.e., indirect effects and invisible support) that address how supportive messages can produce durable effects and tested sex differences in those effects. 255 dyads completed a laboratory‐based interaction in which level of VPC and sex of the support provider were manipulated. 3 weeks later, support receivers evaluated the conversations and their stressor. Variations in VPC produced durable effects both when messages were positively evaluated initially and when they were evaluated as supportive by providers or third‐party observers but judged low in supportiveness by receivers. Provider sex moderated the results.     

Invisible displacement understanding in domestic dogs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis familiaris</Emphasis>): the role of visual cues in search behavior

Recently, (Collier-Baker E, Davis JM, Suddendorf T (2004) J Comp Psychol 118:421–433) suggested that domestic dogs do not understand invisible displacements. In the present study, we further investigated the hypothesis that the search behavior of domestic dogs in invisible displacements is guided by various visual cues inherent to the task rather than by mental representation of an object’s past trajectory. Specifically, we examined the role of the experimenter as a function of the final position of the displacement device in the search behavior of domestic dogs. Visible and invisible displacement problems were administered to dogs (N = 11) under two conditions. In the Visible-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visible whereas in the Concealed-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visibly occluded behind a large rigid barrier. Our data supported the conclusion that dogs do not understand invisible displacements but primarily search as a function of the final position of the displacement device and, to a lesser extent, the position of the experimenter.     

A Perception-Action Coupling Type of Control in Long Jumping

The authors' goal was to identify the control mechanisms used by long jumpers (N = 6) to precisely position their foot at the board. In addition to the intertrial method usually used in previous research, an original method based on a trial-by-trial analysis was also implemented. If the approach to the board in long jumping encompasses two distinct sequences separated by a key step that marks the initiation of visual control, then a trial-by-trial analysis should reveal those sequences, regardless of the amount of adjustment: The step number at which regulation is initiated should be the same irrespective of the amount of adjustment. If, in contrast, a perception-action coupling mechanism operates, then the step number at which regulation is initiated should be a function of the amount of adjustment: A linear relation between those 2 variables should emerge. The results of the present study are compatible with continuous control mechanisms based on a perception-action coupling.     

Technology as prospective ontology

Starting from common-sense notions of ‘furniture of the world’ a process ontology is developed in which prospective is an integral part. Technology as configurations that work (precariously) embodies expectations which structure further development. Examples (a cloned puppy, hotel keys, DC airplanes, stem cells, and overpasses on Long Island) are used to develop the notion of material narratives that are “written”, not just by engineers and designers/producers, but also by users: “reading” implies some further “writing”. In contrast to prevailing notions of technological control (through manipulation of building blocks), the “writing” of nanotechnology is modulation of the invisible and impredictable - an extreme example of unruly technology and repair work after the fact, where in practice control is a gesture not so different from magic. Because ontology cannot be other than prospective, it is political throughout. Thus, prospective technology highlights ontological politics.