Mood and memories of parental rearing styles: A comparison of mood effects on questionnaire-cued and free recall of autobiographical memories

The relationship between memories of childhood experiences (e.g., adverse parenting) and adult depression often found raises questions of interpretation. On the one hand, both laboratory studies and clinicians' experiences suggest that subjects in a depressed mood frequently show a negative bias in perceptions and memories. Negative childhood memories in depressed persons might, therefore, be interpreted as epiphenomena of depressed mood instead of etiological factors. On the other hand, memories of childhood experiences seem remarkably stable across changes in depressed mood, especially when memories are elicited by means of standardized questionnaires. In the mood and memory literature several explanations for this stability are offered. For one thing, highly structured cues to elicit memories (such as in questionnaires) are hypothesized to be less susceptible to mood bias than unstructured memory cues (such as in free recall procedures). On the other hand, resource allocation theorists suggest that childhood memories, being well established and rehearsed, are relatively impervious to mood bias no matter how they are elicited. In this study we examined whether different methods of eliciting childhood memories (i.e., free recall and questionnaire-cued) are differentially susceptible to mood bias. To this aim, we used a mood induction procedure to induce depressed, neutral, and elated mood and assessed childhood memories both before and after the mood induction using both questionnaires and free recall to elicit memories. Results suggested that memories elicited by means of free recall as well as by means of questionnaire-cued recall were susceptible to depressed and elated mood bias. The implications for research addressing the link between childhood experiences and depression are discussed.     

Increase in physiological inhibitory control results in better suppression of unwanted memories

Forgetting or suppressing a memory with unwanted content is just as important as remembering a desirable one. In addition to emphasizing the role of inhibitory control in memory suppression processes, neuropsychological studies have indicated that an intentional inhibition targeting a brain area may exert its inhibitory effects in seemingly unrelated areas through a common inhibitory network. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether the suppression of unwanted memories can be strengthened by recruiting an inhibitory task that can be simultaneously performed with a memory suppression task. Therefore, we manipulated the level of urinary urgency-induced inhibition of participants (N = 180) and test its effect on the suppression of unwanted memories using a Think/No-Think (T/NT) task. The results of our study indicated that individuals with high levels of urinary urgency demonstrated greater memory suppression compared to those with low urinary urgency. Findings and their implications are discussed within the context of cognitive and clinical perspectives, and recommendations are made for future research.     

Elucidating the mental processes underlying the direct retrieval of autobiographical memories

The literature on autobiographical memory retrieval has directed much attention to the concepts of direct retrieval (fast, automatic retrieval) and generative retrieval (slower, deliberative/strategic retrieval). Among the many findings reported on these phenomena, their relative prevalence has stood out as a central feature in many studies, with most studies reporting the frequency of direct retrieval as equal to or exceeding generative retrieval. In this study, we used the retrieve-aloud procedure (a method where participants verbalize their thoughts while retrieving) to delve more deeply into the nature of reports of ubiquitous direct retrieval. We hypothesized that much of the direct retrieval reported in literature is not bona fide direct retrieval (i.e., seemingly automatic retrieval), but is a combination of other retrieval processes, including generative-like retrieval processes. Our results supported this view, showing that less than one-half of all of the observed direct retrievals were bona fide direct retrieval, while the rest were a form of generative retrieval, or fell somewhere in between direct and generative retrieval. We argue that the results suggest that the prevalence of direct retrieval may be overestimated in the literature, and we further propose an alternative classification schema for direct retrievals.     

Paths from core belief disruption to post-traumatic stress symptoms and post-traumatic growth among Korean undergraduates: The mediating role of rumination

The post-traumatic growth (PTG) model proposes that cognitive processing is a key mechanism that leads to growth in the aftermath of traumatic events. Building upon the PTG model, the present study examined the paths from the disruption of core beliefs to post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) and PTG via intrusive and deliberate rumination. The sample includes 370 Korean undergraduate students who reported at least one highly stressful experience in their lifetime. Structural equation modeling demonstrated that disruption of core beliefs predicted PTG both directly and indirectly through multiple pathways: via deliberate rumination, intrusive rumination, and the path from intrusive to deliberate rumination. The disruption of core beliefs positively predicted PTSS only through intrusive rumination. No bivariate relationship was found between PTSS and PTG. These findings support the different roles of intrusive rumination and deliberate rumination in mediating the paths from disruption of core beliefs to PTSS and PTG. Implications and limitations of this study were discussed.     

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard.     

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.     

No evidence for overgeneral memories in borderline personality disorder

The hypothesis that borderline personality disorder (BPD) is related to overgeneral memories was tested in a mixed sample of 39 patients. A memory test with emotional cue words and the instruction to produce specific autobiographical memories was used. Specificity was judged by an independent rater. Regression analyses indicated that age and major depressive disorder were related to the production of less specific memories, whereas educational level and presence of personality disorder were positivily related to number of specific memories. Borderline personality disorder, anxiety disorders and childhood traumas were not related to number of specific memories.     

Effects of suppressing neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects: beyond frequency

Recent cognitive-behavioral theories on obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) show that deliberate attempts to suppress intrusive and undesirable thoughts lie at the genesis of clinical obsessions. In this paper the results of an experimental study on the suppression of neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects are presented. Eighty-seven university students performed in three experimental periods: (1) base-line monitoring, (2) experimental instruction, and (3) monitoring. For each of these periods, the frequency of the occurrence of a "white bear" thought or a personally relevant intrusive thought was registered. Half of the subjects received instructions to suppress the target-thought in period 2, and the other half were instructed to only monitor the target-thought in each of the experimental periods. Several measures were also obtained before and after the experiment: annoyance caused by the intrusion, suppression effort, subjective success, and evaluative appraisals of the target-thought. The results showed neither immediate nor delayed frequency increases of the target thought. However, evidence was found that deliberate thought suppression efforts, regardless of their content, had greater negative consequences than did non suppression. These results are discussed in relation to the recent cognitive proposals about OCD.     

The Meta-Cognitive Beliefs Questionnaire: development of a measure of obsessional beliefs

A 67 item self-report questionnaire called the Meta-Cognitive Beliefs Questionnaire (MCBQ) was developed to assess endorsement of beliefs about the importance of control and negative consequences associated with unwanted, ego-dystonic intrusive thoughts, images and impulses. The MCBQ and a battery of questionnaires that assessed symptoms and cognitions of worry, obsessive-compulsive disorder, anxiety, and depression were administered to large samples of undergraduate students. Beliefs about control of intrusive thoughts and perceived negative consequences due to uncontrolled mental intrusions had a unique significant relationship with obsessions, and to a lesser extent, worry. These findings are consistent with current cognitive behavioral theories that suggest an important role for meta-cognitive beliefs in the pathogenesis of obsessions.     

Depressed mood mediates the relationship between rumination and intrusions

Research suggests that rumination is a causal factor for intrusive memories. These are disturbing autobiographical memories that pop into one's mind involuntarily, spontaneously, and repetitively. A three‐wave longitudinal study was conducted to replicate this finding and to test whether one route via which rumination leads to (an increase in) intrusive memories is via depressed affect. Secondary school students (n = 72) filled out self‐report questionnaires measuring their level of rumination, depressive symptoms (DS), and intrusive memories. These were administered at three different points, with 3 weeks in between each measurement. Two types of rumination were measured, that is, depressive rumination and rumination in response to intrusions. Both bootstrapping analyses and cross‐lagged analyses yielded evidence for DS as a partial mediator of the relationship between rumination and intrusion frequency. Both depressive rumination and rumination about the content of intrusive memories seemed to be maladaptive: They may exacerbate negative emotions, which in turn trigger intrusive memories. Ruminative thinking also directly led to (an increase in) intrusive memories. These findings might suggest that people suffering from intrusive memories may benefit not only from therapies directly aimed at reducing intrusions but also from therapies aimed at reducing rumination and DS.