Staying Together: A Bidirectional Delay–Coupled Approach to Joint Action

To understand how individuals adapt to and anticipate each other in joint tasks, we employ a bidirectional delay–coupled dynamical system that allows for mutual adaptation and anticipation. In delay–coupled systems, anticipation is achieved when one system compares its own time‐delayed behavior, which implicitly includes past information about the other system’s behavior, with the other system’s instantaneous behavior. Applied to joint music performance, the model allows each system to adapt its behavior to the dynamics of the other. Model predictions of asynchrony between two simultaneously produced musical voices were compared with duet pianists’ behavior; each partner performed one voice while auditory feedback perturbations occurred at unpredictable times during live performance. As the model predicted, when auditory feedback from one musical voice was removed, the asynchrony changed: The pianist’s voice that was removed anticipated (preceded) the actions of their partner. When the auditory feedback returned and both musicians could hear each other, they rapidly returned to baseline levels of asynchrony. To understand how the pianists anticipated each other, their performances were fitted by the model to examine change in model parameters (coupling strength, time‐delay). When auditory feedback for one or both voices was removed, the fits showed the expected decrease in coupling strength and time‐delay between the systems. When feedback about the voice(s) returned, the coupling strength and time‐delay returned to baseline. These findings support the idea that when people perform actions together, they do so as a coupled bidirectional anticipatory system.     

Les théories implicites de l’intelligence : une question de perspectives ?

IntroductionImplicit theories of intelligence are beliefs that people form regarding the malleability of intelligence. The so-called “growth” and “fixed” mindsets respectively view intelligence as a characteristic that can or cannot be changed. Psychology, as a science, also offers diverging responses. The developmental and differential traditions in the study of intelligence merely provide different answers because they do not focus on the same sources of variability nor on the same dimensions of intelligence.ObjectivesThe research question that guided the present studies was: Are people's naïve theories influenced by the same factors that drive developmental and differential psychologists to different conclusions?MethodIn Study 1, we first assessed participants’ (n = 509) reference norm orientation (i.e. whether they tend to focus on individual or social comparison), using a task in which they had to predict the school results of an hypothetical child. Then we administered a French version of Dweck's (2007) mindset scale. In study 2, we first asked participants (n = 530) to choose between two definitions of intelligence focusing either on its fluid or crystalized dimensions. Then we administered the French Mindset Scale and asked participants to justify their conclusion.ResultsBoth variables of interest (reference norm orientation and preferred definition of intelligence) had a significant effect on the participant's incremental beliefs.ConclusionThe results of the two studies as well as the qualitative analysis of participants’ arguments suggest that mindsets, like scientific theories, partly stem from the fact that the same question regarding intelligence malleability can be approached with two different perspectives.     

HOW CULTURE MADE US UNIQUELY HUMAN

This article argues that understanding human uniqueness requires recognizing that we are a cultural species whose evolution has been driven by the interaction among genes and culture for over a million years. Here, I review the basic argument, incorporate recent findings, and highlight ongoing efforts to apply this approach to more deeply understand both the universal aspects of our cognition as well as the variation across societies. This article will cover (1) the origins and evolution of our capacities for culture, (2) examples of specialized mental abilities such as those related to mechanical causality, prestige, and cooperation, and (3) recent efforts to apprehend our capacities for abstraction. I close by discussing common canards that generate confusion in mapping what makes us human.     

Ordinance influences individuals' perceptions towards prospects of social circumstance but not the status quo: An experimental field study on sexual minorities issues in Japan

Scientific evidence shows that institutional decisions can change individuals' private attitudes towards relevant issues. However, little is known about their effect on individuals' perceptions of social norms. This intriguing question has gained the attention of scholars. Nonetheless, the findings are primarily observed only in samples of the Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic countries, leading to doubts about their generalisability. This study experimentally tested residents' (N = 411) reactions to the new Tokyo ordinance prohibiting discrimination against sexual minorities enacted on October 5, 2018, and tested whether it dispelled self–other discrepancies regarding tolerance towards sexual minorities (i.e., pluralistic ignorance). The results showed that exposure to information about enactment increased future perceptions of support and understanding of sexual minorities. By contrast, private attitudes, perceptions of current social norms, and willingness to speak out did not change. Willingness to speak out was indirectly enhanced through increased perceptions of gaining future support. Furthermore, Tokyo residents overestimated other residents' negative attitudes towards sexual minorities. However, even when informed of the new ordinance, this self–other discrepancy in intolerance towards sexual minorities was not corrected. These findings suggest that institutional decisions can shape the perception of social norm change in the future beyond Western countries.     

Experiences with social support among older adult women participating in gay square dancing

LGBTQI2S+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning, intersex, and two-spirit, etc.) individuals face unique challenges to physical activity participation, such as discrimination and exclusion. Square dance is a form of collaborative group dancing and while traditionally a heteronormative form of dance, gay square dance is typically open to everyone, regardless of sexual orientation. Square dancing offers opportunities to belong to a community of others engaged in the same activity, which older adults often find satisfying. The aim of this research was to understand how older adults who identify as women experience social support in the context of participating in gay square dance and the role previous experiences of social exclusion play in influencing these experiences. Fourteen self-identified women (age range 55–79 years; n = 11 White, n = 1 Black, n = 2 Jewish) belonging to a gay square dance club participated. Participants self-identified as heterosexual (n = 7), lesbian (n = 3), pansexual (n = 1), bisexual (n = 1), or did not identify with existing terminology (n = 2). Interviews were conducted during a gay square-dancing festival and thematically analyzed. Findings highlighted that participants experienced acceptance which affirmed their sense of self and enabled their authentic selves. To foster a sense of belonging and close relationships, specific actions (e.g., demonstrative welcoming of newcomers, mutual support) were taken by other participants in the group. Physical touch is an inherent part of square dancing, which took on different meanings for participants and was overall perceived as safe. Inclusive groups like gay square dance clubs are an important and consistent means where older adult women can experience meaningful social relationships and interactions.     

Behavioral consequences of intergroup sensitivity

Communication of criticism between groups is important to productive societal discourse, but may serve to inflame conflict. The defensive rejection of intergroup, relative to intragroup, criticism (intergroup sensitivity effect [ISE]) may contribute to such divides. The ISE has been observed in self-report measures, but such measures are weak and biased predictors of actual (divisive) behavior. We review recent research demonstrating that the ISE does have costly behavioral consequences. We next consider the debate concerning whether the ISE reflects defense of a valued social identity or enforcement of a conversational norm. We therefore review recent evidence for an ISE among individuals lacking identification with the target of the criticism. Third, we examine how the ISE may affect a variety of behaviors relevant to societal divisions, including political reconciliation, environmental sustainability, and vaccination. Lastly, we outline future research that can clarify the underlying mechanisms of the ISE and promote conciliatory intergroup behavior.     

Argument as a formulation-decision-decision... sequence

Problems with regard to the analysis of argumentative partly discourse arise from definitorial disconformity. In this article, Informal argument is taken as the primary definition to study the basic structure of argument from a fragment of an Agatha Christie novel. Bilmes' account of the notions of Formulation (F) and Decision (D+/D-) are adapted to describe the relations of opposition which are displayed in informal argument. The minimal structure of argument is represented by the formula F/D-/D-, in which F is a speaker's personal composition of a fact, the first D- is the disconfirming uptake of it by another speaker and the second D- is the completing disconfirming uptake by the initial speaker. Some of the speaker's possibilities to initiate an argument by expressing a Formulation are explored, as well as the social and cultural norms which play a role in argument-initiation and the concepts of win and loss.     

Contrary-to-duty obligations

We investigate under what conditions contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures lacking temporal and action elements can be given a coherent reading. We argue, contrary to some recent proposals, that CTD is not an instance of defeasible reasoning, and that methods of nonmonotonic logics are inadequate since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violation of primary obligations. We propose a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and CTD obligations are obligations of different kinds: a CTD obligation pertains to, or pre-supposes, a certain context in which a primary obligation is already violated. This framework is presented initially as an extension of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), a normal modal logic of type KD, and is illustrated by application to a series of examples. The concluding section is concerned with some resemblances between CTD and defeasible reasoning. We show first that the SDL-based framework contains a flaw and must be adjusted. A discussion of possible adjustments, including an alternative treatment in terms of a preference-based semantics, reveals difficulties that are reminiscent of problems in defeasible reasoning and intensional accounts of defeasible conditionals.