《尚书》、《左传》、《国语》的心理学思想研究

《尚书》、《左传》、《国语》是我国最古老的三部文献。我国古代的心理学思想有不少都可以在其中找到源头。本文主要讨论：《尚书》的五行观念、人贵论和人性论思想、认知心理思想、个性心理思想、心理测验思想;《左传》的情感心理思想、病理心理思想、文艺心理思想;《国语》的缺陷心理思想。     

Ethical issues at the university-industry interface: A way forward?

This paper forms an introduction to this issue, the contents of which arose directly or indirectly from a conference in May 2001 on Corruption of scientific integrity? — The commercialisation of academic science. The introduction, in recent decades, of business culture and values into universities and research institutions is incompatible with the openness which scientific and all academic pursuit traditionally require. It has given rise to a web of problems over intellectual property and conflict of interest which has even led to corporate sponsors’ suppressing unfavourable results of clinical trials, to the detriment of patients’ health. Although there are those who see the norms of science developing to recognise the importance of instrumental science aiming at specific goals and of knowledge judged by its value in a context of application, none justifies the covert manipulation of results by vested interest.Public awareness of these problems is growing and creating a climate of opinion where they may be addressed. We suggest a way forward by the introduction of nationally and internationally-accepted guidelines for industrial collaboration which contain proper protections of the core purposes of universities and of the independence of their research. Some codes suggested for this purpose are discussed. We note that some universities are moving to adopt such codes of conduct, but argue the need for strong support from the government through its funding bodies.     

Interference control in adolescents with Mild-to-Borderline Intellectual Disabilities and/or behavior disorders

The aim of this study was to investigate interference control in adolescents with Mild to Borderline Intellectual Disability (MBID) by addressing two key questions. First, as MBID is often associated with comorbid behavior disorders (BD), we investigated whether MBID and BD both affect interference control. Second, we studied whether interference control deficits are associated to problems in everyday executive functioning. Four groups of adolescents with and without MBID and/or BD performed the Eriksen flanker task, requiring participants to respond to a central target while ignoring interfering flanking stimuli. Their teachers rated behavior on the Behavior Rating Inventory Executive Function (BRIEF). We found pronounced effects of MBID but not BD on flanker interference control. In contrast, we observed pronounced effects of BD, but not MBID, on the BRIEF. In addition, flanker interference scores and BRIEF scores did not correlate. These results are taken to suggest that adolescents with MBID are characterized by deficits in interference control that do not become manifest in ratings of everyday executive functioning. In contrast, adolescents with BD are not characterized by deficits in interference control but do show elevated ratings of deficits in everyday executive function.     

Factor structure of the construct of adaptive behavior in children with and without intellectual disability

Although the presence of significant limitations in adaptive behavior constitutes one of the three necessary criteria for diagnosing intellectual disability, adaptive behavior structure has always been the subject of considerable controversy among researchers. The main goal of this study is to extend previous research results that provide further support to a multidimensional structure of conceptual, social, and practical skills compared to the unidimensional structure. One-factor and 3-correlated factors models as measured by 15 observable indicators were analyzed by means of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), as well as their relationships with one second-order factor (i.e., adaptive behavior). To that end, 388 children with and without intellectual disabilities were assessed with the Diagnostic Adaptive Behavior Scale (DABS). Results of CFA indicated that the 3 first-order factors solution provides the best fit to the data. Reliability and validity of the multidimensional model were also analyzed through different methods such as the composite reliability and the average variance extracted. Finally, implications of these findings and possible directions for future research are discussed.     

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p , not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p ? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.     

Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy

This article defends the view that an adequate response to some central epistemological problems requires us to find a role for emotions and other affective states in epistemic evaluation and also to invoke virtuous traits of character in order to explain how these affective evaluations are regulated. The argument is based on the need for some epistemic evaluations to possess a kind of immediacy, if we are not to face a worrying regress. The closing sections support the claim that epistemic evaluation depends upon appropriate character traits though a discussion of what is involved in being observant .     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.