Why using “consciousness” in psychotherapy? Insight,metacognition and self-consciousness

Since its early development, clinical psychology has questioned the impact of “consciousness” on the determination of human responsibility across psychiatric disorders. In recent years, specific clinical approaches have focused on “consciousness” work that could play a key role in psychotherapy. We focused our research on clinical psychology's consciousness-related concepts of insight, self-consciousness, and metacognition. Insight and metacognition, for example, have prompted increased interest in schizophrenia (SZ), bipolar disorder (BD), and, more recently, borderline personality disorder (BPD) treatments as representative of the latest advances in the cognitive and behavioral therapy field. Here we review cognitive, social, and clinical psychology research measuring “consciousness” in BPD, SZ, and BD, exploring the implications of different conceptualizations of consciousness-like concepts for treatment adherence, symptom evolution, and related aspects of psychotherapy. Our results show the overall relevance of using measures of clinical and cognitive insight, emphasizing the more central role of cognitive insight and metacognition in psychotherapy, as it appears that consciousness can remain useful if understood as a cognitive skill. The inclusion of a conceptualization of self-consciousness is important in order to address the social component of psychotherapy, as it does in biopsychosocial approaches. We discuss the implications of such results for global efficacy, for the relevance of the “consciousness” concept to clinical psychology, and for the potential need to keep operationalizing different conceptualizations of it in psychotherapy. We open the debate on the definition of consciousness to motivational aspects of change and to general considerations of both legal and ethical aspects.     

No indication that the ego depletion manipulation can affect insight: a comment on DeCaro and Van Stockum (2018)

Abstract

Recently, DeCaro and Van Stockum have suggested that ego depletion following intensive self-control can improve insight problem-solving; this finding was interpreted in terms of insight relying on decreased control over attention and memory. However, DeCaro and Van Stockum used three variants of the single matchstick arithmetic problem. Experiment 1 involved low sample and non-standard problem application, while the more powered Experiment 2 yielded a surprisingly low solution rate. These facts made both studies problematic and called for their replication. In the two present studies, the DeCaro and Van Stockum ego-depletion manipulation and their matchstick problems were administered to a total of 316 people. Furthermore, various other insight problems, subjective ratings of insight experience, analytical problems and executive control tests were applied. The key result was that no reliable effect of ego depletion could be found for any of these measures.     

Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization.     

A processing fluency-account of funniness: Running gags and spoiling punchlines

Earlier theories on humour assume that funniness stems from the incongruity resolution of the surprising punchline and thus an insight into the joke's meaning. Applying recent psychological theorising that insight itself draws on processing fluency being the ease and speed with which mental content is processed, it is predicted that increasing the fluency of processing the punchline of a joke increases funniness. In Experiments 1 and 2, significant nouns from the punchlines or from the beginnings of jokes were presented before a joke was rated in funniness. Pre-exposing punchline words 15 minutes and even only 1 minute before the eventual joke led to increased funniness ratings. In contrast, pre-exposing punchline words directly before a joke led to decreased funniness ratings. Furthermore, pre-exposing the beginning of a joke 1 minute before the joke had no effects on funniness. Experiment 3 ruled out exposure-facilitated punchline anticipation as alternative mechanism, and Experiment 4 replicated this fluency effect with typing font as manipulation. These findings also show that pre-exposing a punchline, which in common knowledge should spoil a joke, can actually increase funniness under certain conditions.     

Brief encounters and available places to land

In this paper the author addresses the process of ending in brief therapy. While recognizing the importance of attending to the symbolic meaning of the ending itself and the need to interpret this as it manifests in the transference, he points out the limitations of such an approach. He highlights the significance of the environment of interpersonal relationships and family systems and the wider communities in which the client lives. He suggests that the therapist needs to assess the extent to which these can provide an environment that facilitates the client's development and working through as the therapy ends. The therapist needs to establish whether the patient will have an available place to land, and one that provides sufficient security and safety for the client's onward journeying and exploration without the therapist. The author's conceptualization of 'landing at the end of brief therapy' links together Malan's triangles of insight with Sullivan's concept of the ordinary solution and selective inattention and Gustafson's concept of dilemmas to add depth to the therapeutic effectiveness with which the practitioner can approach brief therapy in general, and the ending in particular. The article concludes with a case example that illustrates these themes.     

Self-regulatory driving behaviours amongst older drivers according to cognitive status

Self-regulation of older drivers was explored according to their cognitive status in this pilot study by examining situations commonly avoided by older drivers. In addition, the role of driver insight on self-regulation was examined via passenger reports. Telephone interviews were conducted comprising 49 drivers aged 65 years and above and 40 passengers who acted as informants. Self-regulation was found to be common, with the majority of drivers (71.4%) reporting sometimes or always avoiding one of seven driving situations. However, drivers with cognitive impairment reported self-regulating more often than drivers without cognitive impairment. The largest discrepancy between passenger and driver reports of self-regulation behaviours was found for the drivers with cognitive impairment. These results possibly reflect a decreased awareness of self-regulatory driving behaviours in this subgroup of older drivers and may suggest that other external factors are contributing to self-regulation in older drivers with cognitive impairment. A discussion of these factors is provided with the aim of maintaining mobility and enhancing quality of life in this growing segment of the driver population.     

Cognitive events in a problem-solving task: a qualitative method for investigating interactivity in the 17 Animals problem

Outside the cognitive psychologist's laboratory, problem-solving is an activity that takes place in a rich web of interactions involving people and artefacts. This interactivity is constituted by fine-grained action–perception cycles, and it allows a reasoner's comprehension of the problem to emerge from a coalition of internal and external resources. Taking an ecological approach to problem-solving, this paper introduces a qualitative method, Cognitive Event Analysis, for studying the fine-grained interactivity between a problem-solving agent and his/her environment. To demonstrate the potential of this method, it is used to study a single subject solving the so-called 17 Animals problem using a material model. The fine-grained procedure allows tracking the solution to a serendipity that was brought about because of the participant's aesthetic considerations and a change in her perceptual figure-ground configuration. While a qualitative single-case method cannot prove specific models of problem-solving, it questions prevalent mentalist models, and it generates new hypotheses on insight problem-solving, because it allows the researcher to attend to outliers and to variability on a fast and fine-grained between-measurement timescale.     

Learning of novel semantic relationships via sudden comprehension is associated with a hippocampus-independent network

Sudden comprehension—or insight—during problem-solving can enhance learning, but the underlying neural processes are largely unknown. We investigated neural correlates of learning from sudden comprehension using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a verbal problem-solving task. Solutions and “solutions” to solvable and unsolvable verbal problems, respectively, were presented to induce sudden comprehension or continued incomprehension. We found activations of the hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), amygdala, and striatum during sudden comprehension. Notably, however, mPFC and temporo-parietal neocortical structures rather than the hippocampus were associated with later learning of suddenly comprehended solutions. Moreover, difficult compared to easy sudden comprehension elicited midbrain activations and was associated with successful learning, pointing to learning via intrinsic reward. Sudden comprehension of novel semantic associations may constitute a special case of long-term memory formation primarily mediated by the mPFC, expanding our knowledge of its role in prior-knowledge-dependent memory.     

The contributions of convergent thinking,divergent thinking,and schizotypy to solving insight and non-insight problems

The ability to generate diverse ideas (divergent thinking) is valuable in solving creative problems (e.g., insight problems); yet, however advantageous, this ability is insufficient to solve the problem alone and requires the ability to logically deduce an assessment of correctness of each solution (convergent thinking). Positive schizotypy may help isolate the aspects of divergent thinking prevalent in insight problem solving. Participants were presented with a measure of schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences), divergent and convergent thinking tasks, insight problems, and non-insight problems. We found no evidence for a relationship between schizotypy and insight problem solving. Relationships between divergent thinking and insight problem solving were also surprisingly weak; however, measures of convergent thinking had a stronger relationship with problem solving. These results suggest that convergent thinking is more important than divergent thinking in problem solving.     

Covert shifts of attention function as an implicit aid to insight

Previous research shows that directed actions can unconsciously influence higher-order cognitive processing, helping learners to retain knowledge and guiding problem solvers to useful insights (e.g. Cook, S. W., Mitchell, Z., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2008). Gesturing makes learning last. Cognition, 106, 1047-1058; Thomas, L. E., & Lleras, A. (2007). Moving eyes and moving thought: on the spatial compatibility between eye movements and cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 663-668). We examined whether overt physical movement is necessary for these embodied effects on cognition, or whether covert shifts of attention are sufficient to influence cognition. We asked participants to try to solve Duncker’s radiation problem while occasionally directing them, via an unrelated digit-tracking task, to shift their attention (while keeping their eyes fixed) in a pattern related to the problem’s solution, to move their eyes in this pattern, or to keep their eyes and their attention fixed in the center of the display. Although they reported being unaware of any relationship between the digit-tracking task and the radiation problem, participants in both the eye-movement and attention-shift groups were more likely to solve the problem than were participants who maintained fixation. Our results show that by shifting attention in a pattern compatible with a problem’s solution, we can aid participants’ insight even in the absence of overt physical movements.