Rhetoric and “doing philosophy”

By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic.     

Premissary relevance

Premissary relevance is a property of arguments understood as speech act complexes. It is explicable in terms of the idea of a premise's lending support to a conclusion. Premissary relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set which authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition which is true— that is to say, which can be justified. The study of the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes may contribute to the task of identifying authoritative warrants.     

Fallacies in pragma-dialectical perspective

In the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacies are considered incorrect moves in a discussion for which the goal is successful resolution of a dispute. Ten rules are given for effective conduct at the various stages of such a critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation, concluding). Fallacies are discussed as violations of these rules, taking into account all speech acts which are traditionally recognized as fallacies. Special attention is paid to the role played by implicitness in fallacies in everyday language use. It is stressed that identifying and acknowledging fallacies in ordinary discussions always has a conditional character. Differences between the pragma-dialectical perspective, the Standard Treatment, and the formal logic approach to fallacy analysis are discussed.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.     

Detection of words versus good old counting: A note on Mizrahi and Dickinson, “The analytic-continental divide in philosophical practice”

In a recent Metaphilosophy article, Moti Mizrahi and Michael Dickinson argue against characterizing the divide between analytical and continental philosophy as a divide in the use of arguments. This hypothesis is rejected on the basis of a text-mining approach. The present paper argues that the results they extracted do not answer the questions they set out to answer as well as would have been possible. This is due to Mizrahi and Dickinson's choice to disregard duplicate occurrences of argument word pairs, their main indicator for the occurrence of arguments in articles. This paper reconstructs their method by now also counting duplicates. A small corpus (n = 436) of recent (2015–2021) analytical and continental articles is used to rerun the experiment; the results oppose Mizrahi and Dickinson's and suggest that arguments (as operationalized by Mizrahi and Dickinson) occur more in analytical articles. The paper argues that part of the discrepancy derives from the specific methodological choices they made.     

Argument as a formulation-decision-decision... sequence

Problems with regard to the analysis of argumentative partly discourse arise from definitorial disconformity. In this article, Informal argument is taken as the primary definition to study the basic structure of argument from a fragment of an Agatha Christie novel. Bilmes' account of the notions of Formulation (F) and Decision (D+/D-) are adapted to describe the relations of opposition which are displayed in informal argument. The minimal structure of argument is represented by the formula F/D-/D-, in which F is a speaker's personal composition of a fact, the first D- is the disconfirming uptake of it by another speaker and the second D- is the completing disconfirming uptake by the initial speaker. Some of the speaker's possibilities to initiate an argument by expressing a Formulation are explored, as well as the social and cultural norms which play a role in argument-initiation and the concepts of win and loss.     

Arguers as editors

People use editorial criteria to decide whether to say or to suppress potential arguments. These criteria constitute people's standards as to what effective and appropriate arguments are like, and reflect general interaction goals. A series of empirical investigations has indicated that the standards fall into three classes: those having to do with argument effectiveness, those concerned with personal issues for arguer and target, and those centered on discourse quality. The essay also sketches the affinities certain types of people have for the different criteria.     

On the processing of arguments

This paper is concerned with the processing of informal arguments, that is, arguments involving probable truth. A model of informal argument processing is presented that is based upon Hample's (1977) expansion of Toulmin's (1958) model of argument structure. The model postulates that a claim activates an attitude, the two components forming a complex that in turn activates reasons. Furthermore, the model holds occurrence of the reason, or possibly the claim and the reason, activates values. Three experiments are described that provide support for the model.This research was supported by the Mellon Foundation and by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the Department of Education via an award for the Center for the Study of Learning to the Learning Research and Development Center. The contents of the paper are not necessarily the position of any of these organizations.     

Apocalyptic Argument and the Anticipation of Catastrophe: the Prediction of Risk and the Risks of Prediction

This essay proposes to extend the model of apocalyptic argument developedin my recent book Arguing the Apocalypse (OLeary, 1994) beyond the study ofreligious discourse, by applying this model to the debate over awell-publicized earthquake prediction that caused a widespread panic in theAmerican midwest in December, 1990. The first section of the essay willsummarize the essential elements of apocalyptic argument as I have earlierdefined them; the second section will apply the model to the case of the NewMadrid, Missouri, earthquake prediction, in order to demonstrate thatcertain patterns of reasoning characteristic of religious apocalyptic arepresent in the discourse over an anticipated local disaster. My ultimatepurpose is to show that predictions of global and local catastrophe mayserve as extreme cases that will illuminate the dynamics of predictiveargument in general. Thus my argument will seek to undercut Daniel Bellsdistinction between prophecy and prediction (Bell, 1973) by establishingthat these discourses share identifiable formal and substantivecharacteristics, and depend for their rhetorical effect on anxiety, hope,far, and excitement as modes of temporal anticipation.