What constitutes globalised evidence? Cultural tensions and critical reflections of the evidence-based movement in New Zealand

The evidence-based movement (EBM) is grounded in a well-intentioned desire to ensure resources are invested in high quality initiatives that generate the intended impact. Nevertheless, recent critiques contest the appropriateness of translating an approach rooted in a medical model to socially complex initiatives. Globalised notions of evidence can also be damaging for programs operating in small, culturally diverse countries with limited resources. Given these polemic views, our aim was to examine local perceptions of the EBM in New Zealand, a small, vibrant, bicultural society with a mix of homegrown and imported programs. Using a snowball sampling approach, 79 professionals working in the education and social sectors completed an anonymous online survey that contained a series of closed and open-ended questions. The results show that although participants positively endorsed a variety of quality evidence markers, traditionally positivist methodological leanings received lower and more varied endorsements compared to more inclusive and pluralistic approaches. Many also expressed concern that the EBM emphasises a narrow and colonised view of evidence that does not align with Māori and Pacific worldviews, and undermines innovation. We discuss the implications as an avenue for advancing intervention and social programming research in an increasingly multicultural and globalised world.     

ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

This essay presents an analysis of different processes of machine learning: supervised, unsupervised, and semisupervised, through the prism of the epistemologies of several prominent Islamic philosophical schools. I discuss the way each school conceptualizes the ontological absolute (immortality, death, afterlife) and the way this shapes their respective epistemologies. I present an analysis of the different machine learning processes through the prism of the epistemological constructs of each of these philosophic traditions. I conclude with the argument that more scholars from the Islamic philosophical tradition should engage in the debates about the development of artificial intelligence and its implications, given that many Muslim countries are among the leaders in this development and its application in everyday life.     

Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus

Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.     

Does the philosophy of medicine exist?

There has been a great deal of discussion, in this journal and others, about obstacles hindering the evolution of the philosophy of medicine. Such discussions presuppose that there is widespread agreement about what it is that constitutes the philosophy of medicine.Despite the fact that there is, and has been for decades, a great deal of literature, teaching and professional activity carried out explicitly in the name of the philosophy of medicine, this is not enough to establish that consensus exists as to the definition of the field. And even if consensus can be obtained as to what constitutes the philosophy of medicine, this does not mean that it exists as a field.     

The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals

Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. However, there are cases in which one's ideal counterpart cannot have one's information, knowledge, or evidence. In these situations, agents cannot compare themselves to their ideal counterpart.     

Reviews

Russell,Robert John, Murphy, Nancey and Peacocke, Arthur R. (eds) Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action
Tigue, John W. The Transformation of Consciousness in Myth: Integrating the Thought of Jung and Campbell     

Are Science and Religion in Conflict?

The widely held legend of historical conflict between science and religion cannot be sustained on the basis of research. Different sciences show different relationships to religion; the physical sciences show rapprochement, whereas the human sciences often are antagonistic to religion. Reconciling science and religion by regarding each as applicable to a different domain is rejected in favor of seeing them as complementary perspectives on the same phenomena. The science and theology of human nature represents a fruitful arena for the development of this approach. A key general requirement is the epistemological reconciliation of science and religion.     

Postmodernism: What One Needs to Know

This essay is an introduction to postmodernism and deconstruction as they relate to the special challenges of scholarship and teaching in the science and religion multidiscipline.     

Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fallacies

In Biro and Siegel (1992) we argued that a theory of argumentation mustfully engage the normativity of judgments about arguments, and we developedsuch a theory. In this paper we further develop and defend our theory.