Towards structural systematicity in distributed,statically bound visual representations

The problem of representing the spatial structure of images, which arises in visual object processing, is commonly described using terminology borrowed from propositional theories of cognition, notably, the concept of compositionality. The classical propositional stance mandates representations composed of symbols, which stand for atomic or composite entities and enter into arbitrarily nested relationships. We argue that the main desiderata of a representational system—productivity and systematicity—can (indeed, for a number of reasons, should) be achieved without recourse to the classical, proposition‐like compositionality. We show how this can be done, by describing a systematic and productive model of the representation of visual structure, which relies on static rather than dynamic binding and uses coarsely coded rather than atomic shape primitives.     

Shame and the virtual gaze: Supporting children's encounters in online worlds

As the virtual gaze of another becomes an increasingly prevalent feature in children's lives, this paper aims to explore some of the emotional complexities of the emerging physical/virtual landscape of children's experience. Based on an analysis of the emotion of shame, the paper explores the new challenges that children face both now and in the future in their virtual encounters and relations with others. It is argued that virtual spaces bring new dimensions to emotional experience, at times making it more difficult to realise the productive potential of shame. This is because the gaze or imagined gaze of another, as invoked through the experience of shame, occurs in conditions of uncertainty, has no boundaries and may arise at any time in the future. These insights are significant if we are to support children in building a capacity to restore the self and be resilient in these new spaces of social encounter.     

Offline: The possible effects of Internet-related behavior on work values,expectations, & behavior among Ultra-Orthodox millennials

ABSTRACT

This work examines differences in the work-related values, expectations, and behaviors between millennials who are significant users of technology and social media, and those who are not. We delineate the development of millennial behavior using a unique group of millennials, those in the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish (known as “Haredi”) community in Israel. Due to religious and community norms, many Haredi millennials were shielded from digital technology, and particularly the Internet and the various technologies associated with it, such as text messaging and social media. Those who were raised and remained in Haredi communities did not encounter the Internet with any regularity as children. Many as adults are still unfamiliar with social media. Thus, this community presents a unique natural experiment, comparing Haredi millennials who are immersed in social media with those who are not.     

Kindergarten self-control mediates the gender reading achievement gap: A population-based cohort study

Could superior self-control explain the gender difference in reading achievement favoring girls? To test this idea, we drew on a unique population-based sample (N = 11,336) where self-control was measured in kindergarten using a multimethod battery of assessments. Girls showed substantially higher levels of self-control in kindergarten (β = 0.47) and outperformed boys on standardized tests of reading achievement in third/fourth grade (β = 0.20). Further, kindergarten self-control prospectively predicted reading achievement throughout elementary school (β = 0.37). Connecting these findings, our mediation analyses revealed that the female self-control advantage in kindergarten could account for subsequent gender differences in reading achievement. Our results suggest that early gender differences in self-control may represent a key pathway through which gender disparities in reading skills, vocabulary knowledge, and reading comprehension occur.     

Individual differences in reverse Hindsight bias: I never thought something like chernobyl would happen. Did I?

Hindsight bias was studied in the context of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which took place on April 26th 1986. An individual difference factor which relates to the motivation to process information, need for cognition, was expected to moderate the occurrence of hindsight bias. Probability estimates of many casualties due to the use of nuclear power in The Netherlands were obtained from 212 individuals two months before the accident in Chernobyl. These estimates were compared with similar estimates made in hindsight by the same individuals five months after the accident. Loglinear Analyses reveal a systematic hindsight bias. However, the direction of the bias was contrary to expectations. In hindsight, individuals gave lower probabilities than they actually did two months before the Chernobyl accident. These results reveal a reverse hindsight bias. As hypothesized, need for cognition moderates hindsight bias: individuals low and medium in need for cognition express a systematic reverse hindsight bias, while individuals high in need for cognition do not. High need for cognition individuals also show higher literal consistency between the two measurements, which supports a memory explanation of the moderating effect of need for cognition.     

Purposive behaviour in cognition and perception: Considerations of awareness in memory

The responses to the original article by Rönnberg (1990a) provoked interesting and thoughtful points of view that are covered by Gärling (1990), Hjelmquist (1990), Montgomery (1991), and Runeson (1990). These articles do not merely present a different outlook but also provide concepts that are certainly worthy of consideration and add more substance to the general topic under discussion. The purpose of this commentary is to seek an understanding of the ideas presented by the above authors within a synthesis of our views of current conceptualizations in cognition and perception. Each of the original criteria (Rönnberg, 1990a) will be treated in turn.     

Provision of step-level public goods with continuous contribution

Twelve groups of five subjects each participated in a nonco-operative game in which each member of a group receives the same endowment and must then decide independently and anonymously how much of it to contribute to the group benefit. Regardless of the size of his or her contribution, each member receives the same reward if, and only if, the sum of contributions is equal to or larger than a prespecified provision threshold. The results show that the level of contribution depends on the provision threshold, and that it increases when contributions are not restricted to be all-or-none. We present, discuss, and competitively test two models for this class of social dilemmas, one postulating maximization of expected utility and the other yielding an equitable solution.     

A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

The social phobia and anxiety inventory: Construct validity

The Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI) is a new instrument composed of social phobia and agoraphobia subscales. The latter scale is used to detect social anxiety that may result from agoraphobia. The SPAI's construct validity was assessed through several procedures. First, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to validate the existence of the two subscales. Second, exploratory factor analyses examined the underlying structure of the social phobia subscale. Third, a Q factor procedure determined if different anxiety diagnostic groups could be differentiated by their SPAI response pattern. The results confirmed the utility of the two SPAI subscales and identified a number of dimensions contained within the social phobia subscale which differed depending upon the specific subject sample. In addition, the complaints of social phobies appeared more homogeneous than those of an agoraphobic comparison group. The results are discussed in terms of construct validity and the sensitivity of the SPAI to various dimensions of social phobia fears.This study was supported in part by NIMH Grants 41852, 30915, 18269, and 16884.