Representing others' actions: just like one's own?

Previous research has shown that observing others' actions can affect individual performance of the same actions. In the present study, we developed a new paradigm to investigate whether and how complementary actions at the disposal of another agent are represented and influence one's own actions. A spatial compatibility task was distributed among two people so that each participant took care of one of two responses. The identical task was performed alone and alongside another participant. There was a spatial compatibility effect in the group setting only. It was similar to the effect obtained when one person took care of both responses. This result suggests that one's own actions and others' actions are represented in a functionally equivalent way.     

Perceiving by proxy: Effect-based action control with unperceivable effects

Anticipations of future sensory events have the potential of priming motor actions that would typically cause these events. Such effect anticipations are generally assumed to rely on previous physical experiences of the contingency of own actions and their ensuing effects. Here we propose that merely imagined action effects may influence behaviour similarly as physically experienced action effects do. Three experiments in the response–effect compatibility paradigm show that the mere knowledge of action–effect contingencies is indeed sufficient to incorporate these effects into action control even if the effects are never experienced as causally linked to own actions. The experiments further highlight constraints for this mechanism which seems to be rather effortful and to depend on explicit intentions.     

Ideomotor effects of pitch on continuation tapping

The ideomotor principle predicts that perception will modulate action where overlap exists between perceptual and motor representations of action. This effect is demonstrated with auditory stimuli. Previous perceptual evidence suggests that pitch contour and pitch distance in tone sequences may elicit tonal motion effects consistent with listeners' implicit awareness of the lawful dynamics of locomotive bodies. To examine modulating effects of perception on action, participants in a continuation tapping task produced a steady tempo. Auditory tones were triggered by each tap. Pitch contour randomly and persistently varied within trials. Pitch distance between successive tones varied between trials. Although participants were instructed to ignore them, tones systematically affected finger dynamics and timing. Where pitch contour implied positive acceleration, the following tap and the intertap interval (ITI) that it completed were faster. Where pitch contour implied negative acceleration, the following tap and the ITI that it completed were slower. Tempo was faster with greater pitch distance. Musical training did not predict the magnitude of these effects. There were no generalized effects on timing variability. Pitch contour findings demonstrate how tonal motion may elicit the spontaneous production of accents found in expressive music performance.     

The temporal dynamics of effect anticipation in course of action planning

“Strong” versions of the ideomotor theory of action control claim that anticipations of the environmental effects that actions bring about are mandatory for response selection. This is considered to be the one and only way of how actions can be voluntarily selected. We studied this notion in a series of four experiments where we adapted the flanker paradigm to investigate the involvement of effect codes in the preparation of motor responses. Participants first learned that their responses to stimulus letters were contingently followed by the presentation of a new letter on the screen. In the second phase of the experiments, the action-demanding letters were presented together with the effects of the correct response, effects of other responses, or neutral letters. Varying the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target stimuli and the flanking effect stimuli provides the opportunity to investigate the temporal dynamics of the activation of effect codes. Hence, flanker stimuli were presented before, simultaneously with, or after the onset of the target. The results indicate that effect-related information from the flanker stimuli is involved in the preparation process, but mainly in later phases of response preparation. The observed pattern of results suggests that, at least under conditions where responses are determined by stimuli, effect codes are activated in course of response planning to enable the evaluation of the executed response and the monitoring of response execution, but they do not automatically activate the responses themselves.     

Movements or targets: What makes an action in action–effect learning?

According to ideomotor theory, actions become linked to the sensory feedback they contingently produce, so that anticipating the feedback automatically evokes the action it typically results from. Numerous recent studies have provided evidence in favour of such action–effect learning but left an important issue unresolved. It remains unspecified to what extent action–effect learning is based on associating effect-representations to representations of the performed movements or to representations of the targets at which the behaviour aimed at. Two experiments were designed to clarify this issue. In an acquisition phase, participants learned the contingency between key presses and effect tones. In a following test phase, key–effect and movement–effect relations were orthogonally assessed by changing the hand–key mapping for one half of the participants. Experiment 1 showed precedence for target–effect over movement–effect learning in a forced-choice RT task. In Experiment 2, target–effect learning was also shown to influence the outcome of response selection in a free-choice task. Altogether, the data indicate that both movement–effect and target–effect associations contribute to the formation of action–effect linkages—provided that movements and targets are likewise contingently related to the effects.     

Ideational action impairments in Alzheimer's disease

We report data from a group of patients with mild Alzheimer's disease on a range of tasks requiring either stored semantic knowledge about objects (e.g., naming object use) or the execution of action to objects (e.g., miming and using objects). We found that the patients were impaired at miming in response to objects, even when they could describe the object's function. On the other hand, copying gestures was not impaired relative to naming gestures, indicating that an ideomotor deficit in action execution, per se, was unlikely to explain the impairments in object use. We suggest instead that the patients had an impairment in stored motor programmes for action, over and above their deficits in semantic knowledge. Despite this, the patients were better at using than at miming to objects, consistent with the view that proprioceptive input (when using objects) can directly constrain selection of the appropriate motor programme for action.     

Perception in action: multiple roles of sensory information in action control

Perceptual processes play a central role in the planning and control of human voluntary action. Indeed, planning an action is a sensorimotor process operating on sensorimotor units, a process that is based on anticipations of perceptual action effects. I discuss how the underlying sensorimotor units emerge, and how they can be employed to tailor action plans to the goals at hand. I also discuss how even a single action can induce sensorimotor binding, how intentionally implemented short-term associations between stimuli and responses become autonomous, how feature overlap between stimulus events and actions makes them compatible, and why action plans are necessarily incomplete.

Time to update our suggestibility scales

Oakley and colleagues (2021) suggest that a classic scale – HGSHS:A, aiming to measure hypnotic suggestibility – can be used to measure direct verbal suggestibility (DVS). According to the authors, DVS is a trait that can be measured both with and without hypnosis. I find this initiative highly welcome. However, I wish to give several examples why it is time to develop entirely new scales instead. Rather than trying to explain more phenomena with a single scale or concept, researchers should take a cue from research that points to a far more nuanced picture of suggestibility than a construct like DVS allows. There may be no single, unified phenomenon that can be measured with a single scale. The old, time-tested scales should be treated neither as sacred nor final. They require up-to-date, critical analysis of what exactly they measure, with an eye to how they can be further improved.     

Connecting action control and agency: Does action-effect binding affect temporal binding?

The sense of agency, i.e., the notion that we, as agents, are in control of our own actions and can affect our environment by acting, is an integral part of human volition. Recent work has attempted to ground agency in basic mechanisms of human action control. Along these lines, action-effect binding has been shown to affect explicit judgments of agency. Here, we investigate if such action-effect bindings are also related to temporal binding which is often used as an implicit measure of agency. In two experiments, we found evidence for the establishment of short-term action-effect bindings as well as temporal binding effects. However, the two phenomena were not associated with each other. This finding suggests that the relation of action control and agency is not a simple one, and it adds to the evidence in favor of a dissociation between subjective agency and perceptual biases such as temporal binding.     

Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface

Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain–computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.