Dysmorphic concern and behavioural impairment related to body image in adolescents

This study examined a moderated mediation model testing whether dysmorphic concern is related to behaviour altered to change appearance. This relationship is potentially mediated by depressive symptomatology (dysphoria and self-esteem) and ideas of reference about “laughing, commenting” and “attention, appearance,” and each mediated relationship moderated by sex. The sample was made up of 3377 adolescents from 12 to 18 years old (M_age = 14.52; SD = 1.65, 56.5% girls). The results showed that dysphoria and ideas of reference about “laughing, commenting” and “attention, appearance” partially mediated the relationship between dysmorphic concern and behavioural impairment related to body image. The relationship with dysphoria was moderated by sex, such that the mediation effect was stronger in girls than in boys. This result implies that girls who are worried about some characteristic of their appearance and show dysphoria are at greater risk of altered behaviour involving avoidance or controlling their appearance than boys. In addition, a possible risk of body dysmorphic disorder (3.45% of the sample) was found, with very prominent hiding behaviour using clothing or control behaviours, such as frequent weighing and looking at oneself in the mirror too much. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

从“孔子学院”看汉语和中国教育的国际化认同

教育无国界是有识之士的共识,也是不可逆转的潮流。中国采取在世界各地建立孔子学院的形式加大吐人对汉语和中国的教育的认识,文章从孔子学院在世界各地的运作形式,阐述了孔子学院发展近四年多来对世界的影响和世界对汉语和中国教育的国际化认同以及对有关的问题进行了反思。     

Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to Ideas

Adults apply ownership not only to objects but also to ideas. But do people come to apply principles of ownership to ideas because of being taught about intellectual property and copyrights? Here, we investigate whether children apply rules from physical property ownership to ideas. Studies 1a and 1b show that children (6–8 years old) determine ownership of both objects and ideas based on who first establishes possession of the object or idea. Study 2 shows that children use another principle of object ownership, control of permission—an ability to restrict others’ access to the entity in question—to determine idea ownership. In Study 3 , we replicate these findings with different idea types. In Study 4 , we determine that children will not apply ownership to every entity, demonstrating that they do not apply ownership to a common word. Taken together, these results suggest that, like adults, children as young as 6 years old apply rules from ownership not only to objects but to ideas as well.     

Historical Perspectives on Global Ecology

A historical perspective can shed light on the dilemmas and dimensions of current ecological predicaments. Consideration of long-term trends in economic, demographic, and energy history show just how peculiar, disruptive, liberating, and unsustainable modern times have been. The current era of ecological tumult derives its impetus from many sources, not least the near-stasis in ideas and politics. It is the big ideas, like nationalism, communism, or the premium placed on economic growth, rather than explicitly environmental ideas, that most affected environmental policy and outcomes in the 20th century, and will likely continue to do so in the 21st.     

Socio-Cultural Learning as a 'Transcendental Fact': Habermas's Postmetaphysical Perspective

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false judgment. However, in this paper I argue that Leibniz can distinguish between a perception and a judgment in their semantic aspect. The sense in which a perception turns out to be false (or true) for Leibniz is different from the sense in which a judgment turns out to be false (or true). This is because, while a perception, understood in Leibniz's terms, lacks truth-conditions, a judgment, in being representational, has such conditions. Thus while a perception remains true always, a judgment can be false. Pointing to the equivocal use of 'false' in (a) and (c) above, I conclude that (c) does not follow from (a) and (b).     

Descartes' Causal Principle and the Case of Body-to-Mind Causation1

It is a common view that Descartes' causal principle is to be understood in light of a similarity condition that accounts for how finite causes (as opposed, or in addition, to God) contribute to an explanation of their effects. This paper challenges this common view and offers a sui generis reading of Descartes' views on causation that has also the advantage of solving the two exegetical issues of whether Descartes thought of the body-to-mind relation in occasionalist or causal terms and of whether Descartes regarded sensory ideas innate or caused by bodies.     

Hume’s naturalistic theory of representation

Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds.