Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

Do medical decision analyses' largest gains grow from the smallest trees?

Some decision analysts recommend reserving their models for careful, complete study of complex problems. Others believe simple problem analyses provide the greatest gains. To clarify these issues, I tested: (1) whether simple published analyses compared to complex ones, produced results as non-intuitive; and (2) whether non-intuitiveness represented analytic gain (or equivalently, intuitive loss). Very limited data also examined (3) the gain from adding model intricacy for a given problem vs. selecting more complex problems for analysis. To assess two non-intuitiveness measures, 75 subjects (33 physicians and 42) non-physicians stated their intuitive preferences in 40 (22 published and 18 unpublished) medical dilemmas. For both physicians and non-physicians, simpler models (those with lees than 30 terminal branches in the decision tree) had about one third the non-intuitiveness of more complex ones. Three tests also supported the premise that analyses outperform intuition, therefore that on average the formers' non-intuitiveness reflects less analytic gain. In addition, for different models of the same problem, tree complexity did not correlate with gain. Thus, simpler trees may not generally gain less because they inadequately describe problems. Instead, simpler analyses may represent simpler problems, with more similar intuitive and formal solutions. If so, these findings may help us avoid some costly but unnecessary simple analyses.     

French Adaptation and Validation of The Bullying Attitude Questionnaire in a sample of Primary School Teachers

IntroductionTeachers are the most likely people to intervene in bullying situations in primary schools. An effective and inexpensive way to measure the quality of their interventions during these incidents is the hypothetical scenario. However, there is no such validated measurement tool available in French.ObjectiveThe study objective was therefore to translate, adapt, and validate The Bullying Attitude Questionnaire among francophone primary school teachers.MethodThe participants were 37 female primary school teachers who completed the adapted version of The Bullying Attitude Questionnaire, translated in French by bilingual experts, as well as other scales used as external criteria.ResultsThe translated and adapted version of The Bullying Attitude Questionnaire showed good concurrent validity. Moreover, previous study conclusions using the same measurement tool were replicated in this study.ConclusionHypothetical scenarios represent a convenient way to measure the quality of teacher's interventions in bullying situations. In line with previous studies, teachers tend to perceive relational aggression as less severe than physical and verbal aggression. In such situations, they are less empathetic toward the victims, less upset with the perpetrator, and less likely to intervene.     

Introducing ethics across the curriculum at South Dakota school of mines and technology

This paper describes how the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at South Dakota School of Mines and Technology has chosen to integrate ethics into their curriculum. All university freshmen engineering students are introduced to ethics through the presentation of ethical dilemmas. During this exercise, students are forced to argue both sides (‘for’ and ‘against’) of a hypothetical ethical engineering dilemma. It provides a setting for great discussion with the desired outcome that they learn to carefully analyze a situation before they draw conclusions. In the sophomore year, students are introduced to methods to use the fundamental principles, the fundamental canons, and the suggested guidelines for use with the fundamental canons of ethics when analyzing appropriate action to be taken when confronted with ethical dilemmas. We currently use the ‘sophomore’ method for seniors because the sequencing is just beginning. Next year the seniors will do more indepth analysis of ethical case studies. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, February 24–27, 2005.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.     

When to cooperate and when to compete: Emotional intelligence in interpersonal decision-making

This study examined the relationship between emotional intelligence (EI), assessed with an ability test, and interpersonal decision-making using the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). Previous research found that individuals who self-report high EI tend to cooperate more than others in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We relativize these findings by showing that individuals scoring high on an ability measure of EI choose effective strategies to deal with three different PDG conditions during real interactions. This suggests that emotionally intelligent individuals are not rigidly predisposed to cooperate regardless of others’ behavior. Instead, EI is associated with the capacity to respond flexibly to others’ strategies and to the interaction context in order to maximize long-term gains – even when this means competing rather than cooperating.     

Admissions of racism in discourse on migration in Greece: Beyond the norm against prejudice?

The turn to language in social psychology is closely related to the study of prejudice as racist discourse has been the subject matter of some of the ground‐breaking discourse analytic work. A widely accepted argument was that there seems to be a norm against prejudice informing Western societies: people commonly engage in denials of prejudice when they make negative comments about minorities. Recent work has argued that, due to ideological shifts in the wider societal context or because denying prejudice may not be people's only rhetorical concern, it is possible to find people admitting prejudice. We examine how people in Greece, Greek majority and immigrants, formulate admissions of racism in interviews on migration and citizenship in Greece. Drawing on Ideological Dilemmas and Critical Discursive Social Psychology, we argue that these admissions ironically operate within the norm against prejudice and discuss our findings in relation to the wider socio‐political Greek context.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.     

Preferences for leadership in social dilemmas: Public good dilemmas versus common resource dilemmas

It has been argued that a structural solution to social dilemmas is to install a leader, but here we consider the possibility that group members will oppose giving up their decisional freedom. Previous studies have shown that feedback indicating collective failure results in a stronger preference for the leadership option. We argue that preferences for the leadership option depend not only on the feedback group members receive, but also on the type of dilemma they are facing. The results of our experiment, in which we manipulated dilemma type as well as feedback, corroborate our reasoning. The distribution of initial property in public good and common resource dilemmas helps to explain these findings.