The borderlands of waking: Quantifying the transition from reflective thought to hallucination in sleep onset

We lose waking consciousness spontaneously and regularly over the circadian cycle. It seems that every time we fall asleep, reflective thinking gradually gives way to our interactions with an imaginary, hallucinatory world that brings multimodal experiences in the absence of adequate external stimuli. The present study investigates this transition, proposing a new measure of hallucinatory states. Reflective thinking and motor imagery were quantified in 150 mentation reports provided by 16 participants after forced awakenings from different physiology-monitored time intervals after sleep onset. Cognitive agency analysis and motor agency analysis – which are objective (grammatical–semantic) tools derived from linguistic theories – show (i) a decrease in reflective thinking which sleepers would need to acknowledge the hallucinatory quality of their state, and (ii) an increase in motor imagery, indicating interactions with a hallucinatory world. By mapping these spontaneous changes in human consciousness onto physiology, we can in the long run explore the conditions of its decline, and possibilities for treatment.     

Paranoid delusions and threatening hallucinations: a prospective study of sleep paralysis experiences

Previously we reported a three-factor structure for hallucinations accompanying sleep paralysis (SP). These earlier analyses were, however, based on retrospective accounts. In a prospective study, 383 individuals reported individual episodes online providing further evidence for the three-factor structure as well as clearer conceptually meaningful relations among factors than retrospective studies. In addition, reports of individual episodes permitted a more fine-grained analysis of the internal structure of factors to assess predictions based on the hypothesis that a sensed or felt presence (FP) is a core experience affecting other SP hallucinations. Results were generally consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, associations among, and temporal stability of, sensory hallucinations were largely explained by their common association with FP. The findings are consistent with REM initiation of a threat activated vigilance system with pervasive effects on the SP experience and suggest a potential model for the thematic organization of nightmares and dreams more generally.     

Auditory Verbal Experience and Agency in Waking,Sleep Onset,REM, and Non‐REM Sleep

We present one of the first quantitative studies on auditory verbal experiences (“hearing voices”) and auditory verbal agency (inner speech, and specifically “talking to (imaginary) voices or characters”) in healthy participants across states of consciousness. Tools of quantitative linguistic analysis were used to measure participants’ implicit knowledge of auditory verbal experiences (VE) and auditory verbal agencies (VA), displayed in mentation reports from four different states. Analysis was conducted on a total of 569 mentation reports from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, non‐REM sleep, sleep onset, and waking. Physiology was controlled with the nightcap sleep–wake mentation monitoring system. Sleep‐onset hallucinations, traditionally at the focus of scientific attention on auditory verbal hallucinations, showed the lowest degree of VE and VA, whereas REM sleep showed the highest degrees. Degrees of different linguistic‐pragmatic aspects of VE and VA likewise depend on the physiological states. The quantity and pragmatics of VE and VA are a function of the physiologically distinct state of consciousness in which they are conceived.     

Mental time travel to the future might be reduced in sleep

We present a quantitative study of mental time travel to the future in sleep. Three independent, blind judges analysed a total of 563 physiology-monitored mentation reports from sleep onset, REM sleep, non-REM sleep, and waking. The linguistic tool for the mentation report analysis is based on established grammatical and cognitive-semantic theories and has been validated in previous studies. Our data indicate that REM and non-REM sleep must be characterized by a reduction in mental time travel to the future, which would support earlier physiological evidence at the level of brain function.     

As we fall asleep we forget about the future: A quantitative linguistic analysis of mentation reports from hypnagogia

We present a quantitative study of mental time travel to the past and future in sleep onset hypnagogia. Three independent, blind judges analysed a total of 150 mentation reports from different intervals prior to and after sleep onset. The linguistic tool for the mentation report analysis grounds on established grammatical and cognitive-semantic theories, and proof of concept has been provided in previous studies. The current results indicate that memory for the future, but not for the past, decreases in sleep onset – thereby supporting preliminary physiological evidence at the level of brain function. While recent memory research emphasizes similarities in the cognitive and physiological processes of mental time travel to the past and future, the current study explores a state of consciousness which may serve to dissociate between the two.     

Does upper-body elevation affect sleepiness and memories of hypnagogic images after short daytime naps?

The present study aimed to examine the effects of a somatosensory stimulus on sleepiness and memories of hypnagogic imagery during short daytime naps. Participants experienced two daytime nap conditions: (1) a somatosensory stimulus was created by raising the upper part of the bed 20 min after turning off the light and (2) a somatosensory stimulus was not created; the angle of the upper part of the bed remained flat. Approximately 20 min and 30 s after turning off the light, participants were awakened and questioned regarding their subjective sleepiness and the presence or absence of hypnagogic imagery. Results showed that subjective sleepiness following the nap was reduced only in the raised condition, and hypnagogic imagery in the raised condition was lower than that in the flat condition. These findings may provide insight on developing new techniques for improving subjective conditions after awakening.