How the Anthropocene Changes Religious Ethics

Humans are remaking the planet, with the planetary human imprint so profound that all planetary systems are being changed: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere and cryosphere (water and ice), the lithosphere (Earth's crust), and the biosphere (the community of life). The changes are so deep and far reaching that a new geological epoch, the first effected by humans, has set in, the Anthropocene. It succeeds the only geological epoch human civilizations have known, the late Holocene. The tattoo of the Holocene, climate stability, is replaced by climate volatility, mass eco-social uncertainty, and extinction. Because the Anthropocene is itself the outcome of cumulative human choices, everything in response also turns on ethics. In this case, that entails rethinking and reforming human responsibility. This essay pursues that, after making the case for climate and the Anthropocene as a new prism for Religious Ethics, one that changes the work of Religious Ethics itself.     

Technology and the Polytheistic Mind: From Global to Planetary Theologies

Abstract: Assuming that human beings are, among other things, techno‐sapiens, natural‐cultural; and that technology‐nature‐culture are a part of the same emergent process of life (e.g., Martin Heidegger, Donna Haraway, Phil Hefner), this paper argues for a move from global to planetary technologies. According to Gayatri Spivak, the process of globalization is the imposition of sameness over the face of the globe. In contrast, she argues, what we need is a planetary vision of the world: one that pays attention to multi‐perspectivalism and difference; and connects peoples, places, and things through those differences rather than in spite of them. In this article I argue that theological technologies of monotheism have tended to support globalization. As such, I explore the possibilities for polytheistic (or at least) polydox theological technologies of planetary becoming.     

Behavioral ethics for Homo economicus,Homo heuristicus,and Homo duplex

In this article we explore how assumptions about human nature may influence the ways one might try to promote ethical behavior in organizations. We summarize two common views of human nature in organizational research—Homo economicus and Homo heuristicus. We then extend these views by putting forward a third view of human nature initially proposed by Emile Durkheim—Homo duplex—which describes human beings as moving back and forth between a lower (individual) and higher (collective) level. We suggest that the Homo duplex view is uniquely equipped to account for variables of interest to organizational scholars because of its attention to a fundamental tension: People in organizations can be both selfish and groupish, and the balance between those tendencies influences the ethical profile of the organization in complex ways. We end with a discussion of the theoretical implications of the Homo duplex view for behavioral ethics researchers.     

Three Pervasive Presuppositions about Human Life and Ethics Strongly Warrant Analysis

Common philosophical discussions concerning the ethics of human interaction with the biosphere and universe have been significantly informed by certain presuppositions: (1) nature is conquerable; (2) human cultural and social (contrasted with moral) progress is somewhat like a thing, beyond human control, and is inevitable and benevolent; and (3) Homo sapiens is the superior life‐form. Although arguments, such as whether humans should conquer nature, founded upon these presuppositions have sometimes been challenged, each of these three presuppositions wants direct analysis. The three have become so ingrained in professional and everyday discourse that they have mythic proportions, as though beyond question. Because of the weightiness of the relevant philosophical issues, they merit overt analysis. Although they are independent and may be analyzed separately, this article treats them as whole, as they often work together in arguments. After finding substantial problems, the article suggests alternative ways of building sustainable presuppositions in similar territory.     

The Image of God as Techno Sapiens

Suppose there comes a day when Homo sapiens has evolved into or been overtaken by techno sapiens. Will it then still make sense to speak of human beings as created in the image of God? What is the relevance of asking such a question today? I offer a sketch of the present state of development and discussion in artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (AL) and discuss some implications for the human condition. Taking into account both reality and fiction in AI and AL, I hold that, regardless of the degree of realization, issues related to technological evolution inform the cultural agenda—at least the European–American one. I comment on antireductionist arguments and on arguments from philosophy and (history of) culture. I argue in favor of a consonance between neurotechnology and the Christian gospel in terms of realizing the marks of messianic life. However, issues of justice, reason versus nature, and perfection and finitude versus imperfection and immortality call for further illumination. Even though no principal opposition seems to exist between technological evolution and possible interpretations of the concept of the image of God (imago dei), a number of significant dissimilarities need to be addressed, such as the differences between technical improvement and forgiveness or transformation and between immortality and resurrection. The role of irregularity, disturbance, and error for creative processes in nature and culture is an exciting topic in science and technology as well as in theology.     

EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS CAPACITY IN THE GENUS HOMO: COGNITIVE TIME SEQUENCE

Intrigued by the possible paths that the evolution of religious capacity may have taken, the authors identify a series of six major building blocks that form a foundation for religious capacity in genus Homo. Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens idaltu are examined for early signs of religious capacity. Then, after an exploration of human plasticity and why it is so important, the analysis leads to a final building block that characterizes only Homo sapiens sapiens, beginning 200,000–400,000 years ago, when all the other cognitive and neurological underpinnings gradually came together. Because the timing of cognitive evolution has become an issue, the authors identify the time periods for these building blocks based on findings from modern cognitive science, neuroscience, genomic science, the new cognitive archaeology, and traditional stones‐and‐bones archaeology. The result is a logical, and even a likely story 55–65 million years long, which leads to the evolution of religious capacity in modern human beings.     

Humans (Homo sapiens) fail to show an inequity effect in an “up-linkage” analog of the monkey inequity test

Brosnan and de Waal (Nature 425:297–299, 2003) claimed that if a capuchin sees another capuchin receiving a superior food, she tends to reject an inferior, previously acceptable food. They related this phenomenon to human inequity aversion. This phyletic extension is “down linkage,” because nonhuman research is interpreted in terms of human research. The present experiment makes an “up-linkage” test of this claimed connection by attempting to reproduce the capuchin-inequity effect in humans. In Experiment 1’s equity condition, a subject and an adjacent confederate each clicked a computer mouse to mark the number “7” from a random numbers table, earning 0.5 yen per mark. In the inequity condition, the confederate’s pay rate was twice that of the subject. There was no between-condition difference in quitting times or likelihoods. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 except, before beginning, the subject and confederate clicked a mouse over a rapidly switching message that said they would earn either 0.5 or 1 yen per marked seven. For the equity condition in this rigged test, subject and confederate stopped the message at 0.5 yen, while in the inequity condition, these values were 0.5 and 1 yen, respectively. Now, inequity-condition subjects quit sooner than equity-condition subjects. Experiment 1 found no inequity effect, but Experiment 2 did. These results show that: (a) a sense of control/responsibility may be critical to an inequity effect and (b) the inequity effect putatively present in capuchins cannot be reproduced in an up-linkage human analog of that research, thereby calling this linkage into question. This report exemplifies that up- and down-linkage tests are often requisite to establish commonality of psychological process between nonhuman primates and humans.     

THE HUMAN HEARTH AND THE DAWN OF MORALITY

Stunned by the implications of Colagè's analysis of the cultural activation of the brain's Visual Word Form Area and the potential role of cultural neural reuse in the evolution of biology and culture, the authors build on his work in proposing a context for the first rudimentary hominin moral systems. They cross‐reference six domains: neuroscience on sleep, creativity, plasticity, and the Left Hemisphere Interpreter; palaeobiology; cognitive science; philosophy; traditional archaeology; and cognitive archaeology's theories on sleep changes in Homo erectus and consequences for later humans. The authors hypothesize that the human genome, when analyzed with findings from neuroscience and cognitive science, will confirm the evolutionary timing of an internal running monologue and other neural components that constitute moral decision making. The authors rely on practical modern philosophers to identify continuities with earlier primates, and one major discontinuity—some bright white moral line that may have been crossed more than once during the long and successful tenure of Homo erectus on Earth.     

GOD VERSUS TECHNOLOGY? SCIENCE,SECULARITY, AND THE THEOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract. In debate with John Caiazza, we clarify the meaning of the terms technology and secular, arguing that technology is not really secular. Only when combined with antireligious secularism do we get the modern techno‐secular worldview. Science is not secular in the strong sense, nor does its practice automatically lead to the techno‐secular. As a complete worldview, techno‐secularism is antireligious, but it also is dehumanizing and destructive of our environment. Religion may provide a transcendent source for a humanizing morality that might move technology in a more ecofriendly, humane direction. The alternative is not a happy one for our posthuman technological future.     

RISK AND SACRAMENT: BEING HUMAN IN A COVID-19 WORLD

In this article we examine the changing relationship to risk as revealed by the covid-19 pandemic and the ways this has, and may in future, alter sacramental practice, considering the radical effects this could have on traditional Christian practice. We consider the cultural trends that may lie behind this developing approach to risk, examining this in the context of an emergent transhuman identity that is technologically moderated and seeks to overcome risks of human mortality.