Analogical problem solving

The use of an analogy from a semantically distant domain to guide the problemsolving process was investigated. The representation of analogy in memory and processes involved in the use of analogies were discussed theoretically and explored in five experiments. In Experiment I oral protocols were used to examine the processes involved in solving a problem by analogy. In all experiments subjects who first read a story about a military problem and its solution tended to generate analogous solutions to a medical problem (Duncker's “radiation problem”), provided they were given a hint to use the story to help solve the problem. Transfer frequency was reduced when the problem presented in the military story was substantially disanalogous to the radiation problem, even though the solution illustrated in the story corresponded to an effective radiation solution (Experiment II). Subjects in Experiment III tended to generate analogous solutions to the radiation problem after providing their own solutions to the military problem. Subjects were able to retrieve the story from memory and use it to generate an analogous solution, even when the critical story had been memorized in the context of two distractor stories (Experiment IV). However, when no hint to consider the story was given, frequency of analogous solutions decreased markedly. This decrease in transfer occurred when the story analogy was presented in a recall task along with distractor stories (Experiment IV), when it was presented alone, and when it was presented in between two attempts to solve the problem (Experiment V). Component processes and strategic variations in analogical problem solving were discussed. Issues related to noticing analogies and accessing them in memory were also examined, as was the relationship of analogical reasoning to other cognitive tasks.     

Cognitive reference points in judgments of symbolic magnitude

Research on speeded symbolic magnitude comparisons indicates that decisions are made more quickly when the magnitudes of the stimuli being compared are relatively close to an explicit or implicit reference point. Alternative explanations of this phenomenon are tested by seeking similar effects in nonspeeded rating tasks. In accord with the predictions of discriminability models, rated magnitude differences between stimuli in the vicinity of a reference point are expanded relative to differences between stimuli far from it. The inferred locations of cities along a west-east axis varies systematically depending on which coast, Pacific or Atlantic, is specified as the reference point. Scales derived from the rating data are correlated with the pattern of reaction times obtained in a comparable speeded comparison task. In addition, the distance between the cities nearest the locale of our subjects is subjectively stretched. Reference point effects are also observed when the form of the comparative specifies an implicit reference point at either end of a continuum of subjective size; however, these effects are very small and do not clearly support a discriminability interpretation. Stronger evidence for discriminability effects is obtained when an explicit reference point is established at an arbitrary size value. An implicit scaling model, related to range-frequency theory, is proposed to account for the influence of reference points on relative discriminability of stimulus magnitudes. The implicit scaling model is used to develop an account of how symbolic magnitudes may be learned and of how habitual reference points can produce asymmetries in distance judgments.     

Schema induction and analogical transfer

An analysis of the process of analogical thinking predicts that analogies will be noticed on the basis of semantic retrieval cues and that the induction of a general schema from concrete analogs will facilitate analogical transfer. These predictions were tested in experiments in which subjects first read one or more stories illustrating problems and their solutions and then attempted to solve a disparate but analogous transfer problem. The studies in Part I attempted to foster the abstraction of a problem schema from a single story analog by means of summarization instructions, a verbal statement of the underlying principle, or a diagrammatic representation of it. None of these devices achieved a notable degree of sucess. In contrast, the experiments in Part II demonstrated that if two prior analogs were given, subjects often derived a problem schema as an incidental product of describing the similarities of the analogs. The quality of the induced schema was highly predictive of subsequent transfer performance. Furthermore, the verbal statements and diagrams that had failed to facilitate transfer from one analog proved highly beneficial when paired with two. The function of examples in learning was discussed in light of the present study.