The salience of the self in responses to inequity

Previous research has shown that people strive to conform with the standards of significant others in distributive justice. The present research was concerned with the role of attention to the self in the same paradigm. If people are motivated to personally evaluate their own behavior as fair, then self-focus should result in heightened attempts to redress an overpayment inequity. After the subject's criterion of a fair wage was assessed, they were paid either that amount or double it. Orthogonal to this manipulation, subjects were either made objectively self-aware (OSA) or not, by the presence or absence of a mirror. Consistent with the hypothesis, overpaid OSA subjects did more work, but of a poorer quality, than overpaid not-OSA subjects. This was taken as evidence of more zealous attempts to restore a sense of equity, implicating a greater personal need to eliminate the injustice when the discrepancy between pay level and a personal standard of fairness was made more prominent to the self.     

Across-reinforcement blocking effects in a mediational test of the CS's general signaling property

Rats received Pavlovian aversive (shock) conditioning in which white noise was established for independent groups as a CS+, CSo, or CS−. Then, in an easy (light-dark) T-maze discrimination, the CS was presented either immediately following choice (Locus 1) or at the food cup in the goal (Locus 3), contingent upon either a food-reinforced (right) or nonreinforced (wrong) response. When presented at Locus 3, the CS+ facilitated and the CS− retarded learning for CS/right subjects, with these effects being exactly reversed but somewhat less pronounced for CS/wrong subjects. However, when the CS was presented at Locus 1, the CS+ and CS− effects for both response contingencies were attenuated. These findings oppose an interpretation of the CS's function as a general cue or transformed signal for the presence or absence of the new appetitive reinforcer and argue instead for across-reinforcement blocking effects: By signaling in the presence of food reinforcement an outcome (safety or shock) which is consonant with or discrepant from the “good” outcome obtained, the CS− blocks (retards) and the CS+ counterblocks (enhances) the association of food reinforcement and the S^D; conversely, in the presence of nonreinforcement (a “bad” outcome), the CS− counterblocks and the CS+ blocks inhibitory conditioning to the S^Δ. As in Kamin's (1968) original research, such effects are attenuated when the CS is presented early in the compound, distal to the reinforcer.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a new anti-causalist dawn

There is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. Frankfurt's counterexample to the Principle works only if we do not understand action as Frankfurt does in his guidance account. If, on the other hand, we understand agency in terms of the agent's guidance, then his counterexample to the Principle fails because, then, counterfactual scenarios of Frankfurt-type counterexamples are such that what happens does not count as the relevant agent's action. So Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not show that the agent could not have avoided acting as she did: so they fail to offer a scenario in which the agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not have avoided acting as she did. Therefore, Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not challenge the Principle, according to which ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise’. The importance of this inconsistency goes far beyond the issue of coherence within Frankfurt's philosophy. I shall argue that this inconsistency represents an important anomaly within the causalist/compatibilist framework; so that we should start to seriously consider having to move on from the established paradigm.     

Identification and Responsibility

Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority and authenticity real-self theories are unable to accommodate cases in which the agent neither identifies nor disidentifies with his action and yet seems morally responsible for what he does. Third, authority and authenticity real-self theories are vulnerable to counterexamples in which the provenance of the agent's real self undermines responsibility.     

Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition

ABSTRACT

In ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Harry Frankfurt argues that a successful analysis of the concept ‘human’ must reveal something that distinguishes humans from non-humans, as well as indicate something informative about ‘those attributes [of ourselves] which are the subject of our most humane concern.’ In this paper, I present an analysis of Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ as it is employed within his Ethics. I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ satisfies Frankfurt’s desiderata because I show that Spinoza’s concept of ‘human’ is, at core, a version of Frankfurt’s own. I argue that Spinoza’s account of human bondage and human freedom indicate that Spinoza sees humans as beings that possess higher-order volitions, and that comments Spinoza makes throughout his corpus shows that he views beings that lack higher order desires to be, in an important sense, non-human. The analysis here sheds light upon the community of entities that Spinoza’s Ethics is written for, as well as upon issues concerning the nature of Spinoza’s Free Man.     

Harry Potter and Contemporary Magic: Fantasy Literature,Popular Culture,and the Representation of Religion

This article discusses the reasons for the religious reactions to the Harry Potter novels, arguing that the books contribute to, and reflect, the reconfiguration of religion in contemporary society. The article analyses the media qualities of fantasy literature and the specific representation of magic in the novels and argues that these aspects form an important part of the reasons for the religious reactions. Fantasy literature and other popular culture that represents and mediates religious expressions and phenomena actively contribute to the reconfiguration of, and communication about, religion in contemporary society and are thus of consequence for what we understand ‘religion’ to be in the study of religions.     

Do intuitions about Frankfurt-style cases rest on an internalist prejudice?

“Frankfurt-style cases” (FSCs) are widely considered as having refuted the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) by presenting cases in which an agent is morally responsible even if he could not have done otherwise. However, Neil Levy has recently argued that FSCs fail because (i) our intuitions about cases involving counterfactual interveners (CIs) are inconsistent (we accept that the mere presence of CIs is enough to make us gain but not lose responsibility-underwriting capacities), and (ii) this inconsistency is best explained by the fact that our intuitions about such cases are grounded in an internalist prejudice about the location of mental states and capacities. In response to this challenge, we argue that (i) there is no inconsistency in our intuitions about cases involving CIs, as soon as we draw the comparison properly, and that (ii) intuitions about such cases do not rest on an internalist prejudice, but on a more basic distinction between two kinds of dispositions. Additionally, we discuss some methodological issues that arise when comparing intuitions about thought experiments and end with a discussion of the implications of our argument for the reliability of intuitions about FSCs.