极权主义和政治现代性--读《极权主义的起源》

阿伦特的《极权主义的起源》是要揭示一种特殊的现代政治现象的起因和条件,探讨极权主义这个现代特有的现象的深层历史原因及其结构因素。正因为如此,她的许多观点和分析至今仍有重要的意义。极权主义是反犹主义、民族国家的衰落、种族主义、为扩张而扩张、资本和暴徒联盟结合在一起的产物。极权主义就是从根本上消灭人性,它反映了“我们世纪的危机”,揭示了西方文明及其价值体系的崩溃。     

Views and Counterviews

Jim Childs, The ELCA and Sexuality: Update Number 1 , p.245
Steve Lenius, Regarding "Bishops, Genes, and Sex" by Jarmo Tarkki in Dialog 40:3 (Fall 2001): 233–235. , p.246     

Terrorism and the Uses of Terror

“Terrorism”' is sometimes defined as a “form ofcoercion.” But there are important differences between ordinary coercion and terrorist intimidation. This paper explores some of those differences, particularly the relation between coercion, on the one hand, and terror and terrorization, on the other hand. The paper argues that while terrorism is not necessarily associated with terror in the literal sense, it does often seek to instill a mental state like terror in the populations that it targets. However, the point of instilling this mental state is not necessarily coercive or intimidatory: one can try to instill terror as an act of punishment, or as an expressive or therapeutic act, or because one values the political consequences that might follow, or because one thinks terror is preferable, from an ethical point of view, to the inauthentic complacency that characterizes the targeted population at present. Though this paper asks questions about the definition of “terrorism,” these questions are not asked for their own sake. The quest for a canonical definition of “terrorism” is probably a waste of time. But asking questions which sound like questions of definition is sometimes a fruitful way of focusing our reflections on terrorism and organizing our response. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Cognitive Theory and Phenomenology in Arendt’s and Nussbaum’s Work on Narrative

In this essay I compare Nussbaum’s and Arendt’s approach to narrativity. The point of the comparison is to find out which approach is more adequate for practical philosophy: the approach influenced by cognitive theory (Nussbaum) or the one influenced by hermeneutic phenomenology (Arendt). I conclude that Nussbaum’s approach is flawed by methodological solipsism, which is due to her application of cognitive theory.

Public Space

“Public space” is the space where individuals see and are seen by others as they engage in public affairs. Hannah Arendt links this space with “public freedom.” The being of such freedom, she asserts, depends on its appearing. It consists of “deeds and words which are meant to appear, whose very existence hinges on appearance.” Such appearance, however, requires the public space. Reflecting on Arendt’s remarks, a number of questions arise: What does the dependence of freedom on public space tell us about the nature of freedom? How does public freedom relate to the freedom of a private individual? Does the latter also depend on its appearing? Which is generatively prior: freedom or public space, i.e., the actions that publicly manifest freedom or the space required for their appearance? How does public power shape this space? In this article, I approach these questions through a phenomenological study of public space.     

Individualization,singularization and e-ducation (between indifference and responsibility)

It is commonly supposed that acting and judging ought to rest on a community-wide, binding definition of what is right and respectable, that is, a substantial consensus. Such consensus is thought possible only when we engage shared values and criteria, when we use knowledge and abilities appropriated through education. On this view, education deals with the reproduction of consensus and, hence, with the passing on of traditions and norms. On my view, we need to question the framework in which the debate over social erosion takes place. I take a cue from remarks of Hannah Arendt and question the presupposition that acting and judging in a right way requires both common values and the appropriation of what we call knowledge of criteria and principles. I do not suggest that knowledge has nothing to do with acting and judging. Rather, I wish to draw attention to (Arendt's concept of) thinking as a condition for acting and judging. Here, thinking has nothing to do with knowledge or with appropriation. Rather, it has to do with living-together with somebody. Educa-tion for thinking is, then, a public thinking which leads out of the serf and into communal responsibility. On this treatment, the educator is to be a faithful guardian of this calling out into responsibility.     

Did Jesus Discover Forgiveness?

This essay explores Hannah Arendt's claim that Jesus was the “discoverer” of forgiveness. It assesses Charles Griswold's view that person‐to‐person forgiveness is in evidence in Greek culture and practice before Jesus. The essay refines Griswold's view and suggests that person‐to‐person forgiveness is a cultural universal. The essay makes observations about the significance of the different words that denote person‐to‐person forgiveness; it also explores the implications of reading the New Testament writings on person‐to‐person forgiveness in the chronological order in which they were written. From a close reading of the early New Testament documents, the essay makes two suggestions about the Western tradition of forgiveness. First, it suggests that Paul the apostle is the first to identify person‐to‐person forgiveness as a moral virtue. Second, it suggests that in the Synoptic tradition, Jesus is the first to identify person‐to‐person forgiveness as a discrete category of behavior distinct, for example, from pardoning, excusing, waiving, or ignoring the wrongs of others.     

Radical Intersubjectivity: Reflections on the “Different” Foundation of Education

This article addresses the question how educational theory can overcome the assumptions of the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness, a tradition which can be seen as the foundation of the modern project of education. While twentieth century philosophy has seen several attempts to make a shift from consciousness to intersubjectivity (Dewey, Wittgenstein, Habermas) it is argued that this shift still remains within the humanistic tradition of modern thought in that it still tries to define, still tries to develop a theory about the human subject. Foucault's thesis of the end of man is interpreted as an attempt to move beyond humanism, an attempt motivated by a sincere concern for the humanity of the subject. Starting from the question as to who comes after the subject, several answers to this question, which all share an interest in the question as to where the subject comes into presence, are discussed (referring to the writings of Tschumi, Arendt and Levinas). In the concluding section it is argued that one way to move beyond the humanistic tradition of modern thought is to conceive of the subject in terms of responsibility and ethics (Levinas) and to conceive of the very task of theory in terms of justice, and not in terms of truth. This, so it is argued, should be the final concern for educational theory and curriculum theory.     

Catching my breath: In full flight over the prairies

The author places her tenure submission package into a laundry basket and sets it aloft with helium balloons. Awaiting news, she contemplates curricular encounters and choices of action that have shaped her journey through the academy. She comes to recognize that as educators, we must learn to stop and call ourselves into deep listening and mindful action. What matters is that we attend with hospitality and welcome what and who comes into our presence, as if responding to an unexpected stranger knocking at the door, “who is there?” and open ourselves to the possibilities awaiting us across the threshold.     

Arendt and the Shadow of the Other

In this essay I argue that despite Arendt's dislike of psychology, she, like all political theorists, relies on a particular understanding of human nature. Her account, which can be discovered with a careful reading of her work, including Eichmann in Jerusalem , The Human Condition and The Origins of Totalitarianism , resonates with the explicitly psychoanalytic one of Jessica Benjamin. When the two accounts are considered together one can find the outline of a very interesting conception of the self which is neither the deconstructed, discontinuous self of postmodernism nor the strongly unified, rational subject of liberalism. This account also points to a way of under18 standing both the allure of evil and the political remedies that can stymie its realization.