Picture memory: How the action schema affects retention

When an action scene is viewed, an action schema guides the formation of an episodic representation. Within episodic memory, items of high relevance to the theme of the action schema are represented in a prototypical form closely connected to the action theme. In contrast, items of low relevance are represented in detail but their representation is unconnected to that of the action. The action schema is used as a retrieval framework for both recalling and recognizing whether or not an item was depicted in a scene (i.e., item presence), but is not used for recognition of figurative detail (i.e., item appearance). Four experiments confirmed these hypotheses. Children, aged 7- and 9-years, and adults organized pictured scenes around themes from action schemata. The appearance of high relevant items was recognized poorly, while their presence was recalled well. Memory for the presence of high relevant items surpassed that for low relevant items even when recognition of item names was assessed. Conversely, the appearance of low relevant items was recognized accurately, but memory for their presence was difficult to retrieve.     

On Similarity Coefficients for 2×2 Tables and Correction for Chance

This paper studies correction for chance in coefficients that are linear functions of the observed proportion of agreement. The paper unifies and extends various results on correction for chance in the literature. A specific class of coefficients is used to illustrate the results derived in this paper. Coefficients in this class, e.g. the simple matching coefficient and the Dice/Sørenson coefficient, become equivalent after correction for chance, irrespective of what expectation is used. The coefficients become either Cohen’s kappa, Scott’s pi, Mak’s rho, Goodman and Kruskal’s lambda, or Hamann’s eta, depending on what expectation is considered appropriate. Both a multicategorical generalization and a multivariate generalization are discussed.     

Influence of sex-role identity on two indices of social anxiety

The present study was conducted to determine the relationship between sex-role identity and two measures of self-reported social anxiety. The Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI), Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SAD), and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE) were administered to 23 male and 26 female undergraduate students. Generally, sex role was associated with social anxiety for women, but not for men. Androgynous women reported the least anxiety, sex-role stereotyped women reported a moderate amount, and undifferentiated women reported the most anxiety of all groups. Results were interpreted in light of conflicting hypotheses of androgyny rather than masculinity being associated with greater adjustment and the value of a situational analysis of behaviors associated with sex-role orientation.     

Transfer of the signaling properties of aversive CSs to an instrumental appetitive discrimination

Rats received Pavlovian conditioning in which, based on a shock US, white noise was established for different groups as an aversive CS+, CSo, or CS?. Then, half of each group received the CS contingent upon either the food-reinforced or nonreinforced response in an easy, choice discrimination. Correct responses, i.e., number of reinforcements, to criterion showed that a CS+ for the reinforced response facilitated learning, whereas a CS? retarded learning; conversely, a CS+ for the nonreinforced response retarded learning, whereas a CS? facilitated learning. The same contingency difference occurred with errors to criterion for CS? subjects but was obscured for CS+ subjects apparently by an avoidance-producing effect of the CS+. In support of the generality of the transfer effect, Z-score transforms of the correct-response data showed that the magnitude of transfer was comparable to that obtained in more difficult discriminations. Collectively, the findings indicate that an aversive CS can function as a transformed signal for the presence (CS+) or absence (CS?) of an appetitive reinforcer and that the signal's control of behavior is via a within-chain mediational process.     

Blockchain Identities: Notational Technologies for Control and Management of Abstracted Entities

This paper argues that many so‐called digital technologies can be construed as notational technologies, explored through the example of Monegraph, an art and digital asset management platform built on top of the blockchain system originally developed for the cryptocurrency bitcoin. As the paper characterizes it, a notational technology is the performance of syntactic notation within a field of reference, a technologized version of what Nelson Goodman called a “notational system.” Notational technologies produce abstracted entities through positive and reliable, or constitutive, tests of socially acceptable meaning. Accordingly, this account deviates from typical narratives of blockchains (usually characterized as Turing or state machines), instead demonstrating that blockchain technologies are effective at managing digital assets because they produce abstracted identities through the performance of notation. Since notational technologies rely on configurations of socially acceptable meaning, this paper also provides a philosophical account of how blockchain technologies are socially embedded.     

Sport,nature and worldmaking

Many philosophers of sport maintain that athletics can contribute to our understanding of ourselves and the environments in which we live. It may be relatively easy to offer accounts of how athletes might acquire self-knowledge through sport; however, it is far more difficult to see how sport could add to the general understanding of human individuals, cultural frameworks or the material world. The study of sport as a way of worldmaking is helpful in understanding how sport can contribute to the pursuit of knowledge in such areas.

The position I present is based on arguments made by Gunter Gebauer in his 1993 presidential address to the Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport, ‘Sport, theater, and ritual: Three ways of worldmaking’, and in my explanation and interpretation of Gebauer's position, I rely heavily on Nelson Goodman's Ways of worldmaking. Gebauer's work is focused on traditional sports, and he argues that such sports create worlds that represent fundamental attitudes and values of the cultures that produce them. I argue that alternative sports are well suited to create new and original worlds that instantiate value systems in opposition to mainstream culture. I argue further that nature sports such as climbing and surfing represent relationships between humans and natural features, and that such sports, as a subcategory of alternative sports, are in a position to create new and original frameworks that can help us to better comprehend our relationships with natural environments.     

Goodman’s “New Riddle”

First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman’s infamous “grue” paradox is presented. Then, Goodman’s argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman’s “grue” argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the “New Riddle” is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed (especially, from a Bayesian inductive-logical point of view). Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman’s problem, and the “problem of old evidence”. Several other novel aspects of Goodman’s argument are also discussed (mainly, from a Bayesian perspective).     

Zu Einem Methodologischen Interpretationskonstruktionismus

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level.     

MUSIC AND METAPHYSICS

Abstract: In this article, I assume that musical works are abstract types, and I raise and address a new question concerning musical ontology that may take the types view at least a step further: When do musical works cease to exist? I then propound my view about musical works as types, which is somewhat like the Aristotelian Realist position concerning universals. Next, I address some objections to that view. Finally, I provide some grounds for rejecting alternative views that see Western classical musical works before 1950 (the sorts of musical works the discussion here is restricted to) either as classes or else as kinds.