Functional measurement approach to self-estimation in multiattribute evaluation

Multiattribute analysis depends on measurement of values and weights. Unless these measures reflect the decision maker's true values and weights, the multiattribute formula may put a less-preferred alternative in first place. To avoid such disordinality requires stringent measurement conditions: First, the values and weights must be on linear (equal interval) or ratio (known zero) scales. Second, these scales must satisfy a condition of common unit across disparate attribute dimensions. Most methods of range adjustment beg both of these measurement questions. Functional measurement theory can solve both problems and so can be useful in multiattribute analysis. Past work has established the operation of a general cognitive algebra as an empirical reality. The averaging model, in particular, makes possible the definition and estimation of weights and values as distinct psychological parameters. It can also solve the problem of common unit. Cognitive algebra thus provides a grounded theoretical foundation on which to develop self-estimation methodology, in which decision makers provide direct estimates of their values and weights. The logic is straightforward. Functional measurement can analyze global judgments to obtain validated psychological scales. These scales may then be used as validational criteria for the self-estimates. Procedures to eliminate biases in the self-estimates can thus be tested and refined in well-learned multiattribute tasks, such as judgments of meals, in which global judgments are trustworthy. Once developed, such self-estimation procedures may be used with some confidence for general multiattribute analysis. A number of studies from 20-odd years of work on the theory of information integration are summarized to show good, although not unmixed promise for self-estimation.     

Science and politics: Dangerous liaisons

In contrast to the opinion of numerous authors (e.g. R. Rudner, P. Kitcher, L. R. Graham, M. Dummett, N. Chomsky, R. Lewontin, etc.) it is argued here that the formation of opinion in science should be greatly insulated from political considerations. Special attention is devoted to the view that methodological standards for evaluation of scientific theories ought to vary according to the envisaged political uses of these theories.I wish to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for having supported the work on this paper.     

Theory change in immunology part II: The clonal selection theory

This two-part article examines the competition between the clonal selection theory and the instructive theory of the immune response from 1957–1967. In Part I the concept of a temporally extended theory is introduced, which requires attention to the hitherto largely ignored issue of theory individuation. Factors which influence the acceptability of such an extended theory at different temporal points are also embedded in a Bayesian framework, which is shown to provide a rational account of belief change in science. In Part II these factors, as elaborated in the Bayesian framework, are applied to the case of the success of the clonal selection theory and the failure of the instructive theory.     

Les théories implicites de l’intelligence : une question de perspectives ?

IntroductionImplicit theories of intelligence are beliefs that people form regarding the malleability of intelligence. The so-called “growth” and “fixed” mindsets respectively view intelligence as a characteristic that can or cannot be changed. Psychology, as a science, also offers diverging responses. The developmental and differential traditions in the study of intelligence merely provide different answers because they do not focus on the same sources of variability nor on the same dimensions of intelligence.ObjectivesThe research question that guided the present studies was: Are people's naïve theories influenced by the same factors that drive developmental and differential psychologists to different conclusions?MethodIn Study 1, we first assessed participants’ (n = 509) reference norm orientation (i.e. whether they tend to focus on individual or social comparison), using a task in which they had to predict the school results of an hypothetical child. Then we administered a French version of Dweck's (2007) mindset scale. In study 2, we first asked participants (n = 530) to choose between two definitions of intelligence focusing either on its fluid or crystalized dimensions. Then we administered the French Mindset Scale and asked participants to justify their conclusion.ResultsBoth variables of interest (reference norm orientation and preferred definition of intelligence) had a significant effect on the participant's incremental beliefs.ConclusionThe results of the two studies as well as the qualitative analysis of participants’ arguments suggest that mindsets, like scientific theories, partly stem from the fact that the same question regarding intelligence malleability can be approached with two different perspectives.     

How do conspiratorial explanations differ from non-conspiratorial explanations? A content analysis of real-world online articles

The present research aims to identify unique characteristics of written conspiracy theories. In two pre-registered quantitative human-coded content analyses, we compared 36 pairs of conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial online articles about various events. As predicted, conspiratorial articles—compared to non-conspiratorial articles—contained less factual, more emotional and more threat-related information. Also, we predicted and found that conspiratorial articles presented more argumentation against the opposing standpoint and that they provided explanations that were more dispositional and less falsifiable. Contrary to our predictions, we did not consistently observe that conspiratorial articles presented less argumentation for their own standpoint. Also, we did not find consistent support that conspiratorial articles provided less information about the specific process or more information about the underlying goals of the respective events, or that conspiratorial explanations attributed the events to a lesser extent to situational factors. We discuss the relevance of our findings for the understanding of conspiracy theories.     

Christian Ethics,Religious Ethics,and Secular Ethics: A Contemporary Reappraisal

In this essay, I argue that Christian ethicists should not think of themselves as religious ethicists. I defend this claim by arguing that the concept of religious ethics, as it has come to be understood as a discipline that is distinct from secular ethics, is incoherent. In part one, I describe the fraught attempts by theologians in the 20th century to identify the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. In part two, I argue that certain accounts of natural law unwittingly reinforce a problematic conception of secular ethics. Part three examines some trends in religious studies and comparative religious ethics to highlight problematic conceptions of religion. Drawing together these strands of inquiry, I contend that that the secular-religious dichotomy in contemporary ethics should be rejected, but by the same token, I suggest that comparative ethics remains a worthwhile enterprise.     

Momentary maximizing in concurrent schedules with a minimum interchangeover interval

Eight pigeons were trained on concurrent variable-interval variable-interval schedules with a minimum interchangeover time programmed as a consequence of changeovers. In Experiment 1 the reinforcement schedules remained constant while the minimum interchangeover time varied from 0 to 200 s. Relative response rates and relative time deviated from relative reinforcement rates toward indifference with long minimum interchangeover times. In Experiment 2 different reinforcement ratios were scheduled in successive experimental conditions with the minimum interchangeover time constant at 0, 2, 10, or 120 s. The exponent of the generalized matching equation was close to 1.0 when the minimum interchangeover time was 0 s (the typical procedure for concurrent schedules without a changeover delay) and decreased as that duration was increased. The data support the momentary maximizing theory and contradict molar maximizing theories and the melioration theory.     

Interactive effects of dispositional mindfulness and PETTLEP imagery training on basketball shooting performance: A randomized controlled trial

The purpose of this study was to examine the interactive effects of dispositional mindfulness and visualized PETTLEP imagery training on basketball mid-range shooting performance and retention. Seventy-three participants (M age = 20.32 ± 1.09) with high/low dispositional mindfulness (high n = 35; low n = 38) selected out of 302 college students were randomly assigned into the following six groups: (a) high mindfulness internal imagery (H-II, n = 13); (b) high mindfulness external imagery (H-EI, n = 11); (c) high mindfulness control (H–CO, n = 11); (d) low mindfulness internal imagery (L-II, n = 13); (e) low mindfulness external imagery (L-EI, n = 12); and (f) low mindfulness control (L-CO, n = 13). Participants engaged in a pretest to measure their basketball shooting performance, then participated in a 6-week (3 times/per-week) intervention, plus a posttest and retention test. A three-way 2 (high/low mindfulness) X 3 (treatments: internal-, external imagery, and control) X 3 (measurement time: pretest, posttest, and retention) mixed ANOVA statistical analysis found dispositional mindfulness interacted with treatments and measurement time. The main effects showed high dispositional mindfulness performed better than low dispositional mindfulness, and internal imagery training performed better than external imagery training on mid-range basketball performance at retention. The 3–way interaction indicated that when using either internal or external imagery, high dispositional mindfulness performed better than low mindfulness on retention but not posttest. For 2-way interaction, high dispositional mindfulness performed better than low dispositional mindfulness on retention but not posttest. Our results extended current knowledge on sport imagery and dispositional mindfulness and gained several theoretical implications for researchers. The limitations, future research directions, and practical implications were also discussed.     

When More is Better than Less; Three Theories of Psychosis—Projection, Double Bind, and Possession

Three psychological theories of psychosis are described, each of which has standing in psychiatry. Defined by the terms projection, double bind, and possession, they initially appear to have little or nothing in common to explain psychosis, but converge at four points: (1) A high degree of anxiety precipitated by a dilemma or conflict perceived to be unsolvable by the person; (2) the anxiety triggers a shift from one thought or motive in the direction of its opposite, because the original was believed too antagonistic to the wishes of significant others; (3) the opposite, in order to remain opposite, requires that the original thought or motive be forgotten, (4) a singular means to produce and reinforce forgetting is the interposition of psychiatric symptoms. In psychiatry today treatment would fit more consistently with the three theories taken as a whole rather than any one, and a rationale for this viewpoint is elaborated.