Functional measurement approach to self-estimation in multiattribute evaluation

Multiattribute analysis depends on measurement of values and weights. Unless these measures reflect the decision maker's true values and weights, the multiattribute formula may put a less-preferred alternative in first place. To avoid such disordinality requires stringent measurement conditions: First, the values and weights must be on linear (equal interval) or ratio (known zero) scales. Second, these scales must satisfy a condition of common unit across disparate attribute dimensions. Most methods of range adjustment beg both of these measurement questions. Functional measurement theory can solve both problems and so can be useful in multiattribute analysis. Past work has established the operation of a general cognitive algebra as an empirical reality. The averaging model, in particular, makes possible the definition and estimation of weights and values as distinct psychological parameters. It can also solve the problem of common unit. Cognitive algebra thus provides a grounded theoretical foundation on which to develop self-estimation methodology, in which decision makers provide direct estimates of their values and weights. The logic is straightforward. Functional measurement can analyze global judgments to obtain validated psychological scales. These scales may then be used as validational criteria for the self-estimates. Procedures to eliminate biases in the self-estimates can thus be tested and refined in well-learned multiattribute tasks, such as judgments of meals, in which global judgments are trustworthy. Once developed, such self-estimation procedures may be used with some confidence for general multiattribute analysis. A number of studies from 20-odd years of work on the theory of information integration are summarized to show good, although not unmixed promise for self-estimation.     

Les théories implicites de l’intelligence : une question de perspectives ?

IntroductionImplicit theories of intelligence are beliefs that people form regarding the malleability of intelligence. The so-called “growth” and “fixed” mindsets respectively view intelligence as a characteristic that can or cannot be changed. Psychology, as a science, also offers diverging responses. The developmental and differential traditions in the study of intelligence merely provide different answers because they do not focus on the same sources of variability nor on the same dimensions of intelligence.ObjectivesThe research question that guided the present studies was: Are people's naïve theories influenced by the same factors that drive developmental and differential psychologists to different conclusions?MethodIn Study 1, we first assessed participants’ (n = 509) reference norm orientation (i.e. whether they tend to focus on individual or social comparison), using a task in which they had to predict the school results of an hypothetical child. Then we administered a French version of Dweck's (2007) mindset scale. In study 2, we first asked participants (n = 530) to choose between two definitions of intelligence focusing either on its fluid or crystalized dimensions. Then we administered the French Mindset Scale and asked participants to justify their conclusion.ResultsBoth variables of interest (reference norm orientation and preferred definition of intelligence) had a significant effect on the participant's incremental beliefs.ConclusionThe results of the two studies as well as the qualitative analysis of participants’ arguments suggest that mindsets, like scientific theories, partly stem from the fact that the same question regarding intelligence malleability can be approached with two different perspectives.     

HOW CULTURE MADE US UNIQUELY HUMAN

This article argues that understanding human uniqueness requires recognizing that we are a cultural species whose evolution has been driven by the interaction among genes and culture for over a million years. Here, I review the basic argument, incorporate recent findings, and highlight ongoing efforts to apply this approach to more deeply understand both the universal aspects of our cognition as well as the variation across societies. This article will cover (1) the origins and evolution of our capacities for culture, (2) examples of specialized mental abilities such as those related to mechanical causality, prestige, and cooperation, and (3) recent efforts to apprehend our capacities for abstraction. I close by discussing common canards that generate confusion in mapping what makes us human.     

Ordinance influences individuals' perceptions towards prospects of social circumstance but not the status quo: An experimental field study on sexual minorities issues in Japan

Scientific evidence shows that institutional decisions can change individuals' private attitudes towards relevant issues. However, little is known about their effect on individuals' perceptions of social norms. This intriguing question has gained the attention of scholars. Nonetheless, the findings are primarily observed only in samples of the Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic countries, leading to doubts about their generalisability. This study experimentally tested residents' (N = 411) reactions to the new Tokyo ordinance prohibiting discrimination against sexual minorities enacted on October 5, 2018, and tested whether it dispelled self–other discrepancies regarding tolerance towards sexual minorities (i.e., pluralistic ignorance). The results showed that exposure to information about enactment increased future perceptions of support and understanding of sexual minorities. By contrast, private attitudes, perceptions of current social norms, and willingness to speak out did not change. Willingness to speak out was indirectly enhanced through increased perceptions of gaining future support. Furthermore, Tokyo residents overestimated other residents' negative attitudes towards sexual minorities. However, even when informed of the new ordinance, this self–other discrepancy in intolerance towards sexual minorities was not corrected. These findings suggest that institutional decisions can shape the perception of social norm change in the future beyond Western countries.     

Behavioral consequences of intergroup sensitivity

Communication of criticism between groups is important to productive societal discourse, but may serve to inflame conflict. The defensive rejection of intergroup, relative to intragroup, criticism (intergroup sensitivity effect [ISE]) may contribute to such divides. The ISE has been observed in self-report measures, but such measures are weak and biased predictors of actual (divisive) behavior. We review recent research demonstrating that the ISE does have costly behavioral consequences. We next consider the debate concerning whether the ISE reflects defense of a valued social identity or enforcement of a conversational norm. We therefore review recent evidence for an ISE among individuals lacking identification with the target of the criticism. Third, we examine how the ISE may affect a variety of behaviors relevant to societal divisions, including political reconciliation, environmental sustainability, and vaccination. Lastly, we outline future research that can clarify the underlying mechanisms of the ISE and promote conciliatory intergroup behavior.     

Argument as a formulation-decision-decision... sequence

Problems with regard to the analysis of argumentative partly discourse arise from definitorial disconformity. In this article, Informal argument is taken as the primary definition to study the basic structure of argument from a fragment of an Agatha Christie novel. Bilmes' account of the notions of Formulation (F) and Decision (D+/D-) are adapted to describe the relations of opposition which are displayed in informal argument. The minimal structure of argument is represented by the formula F/D-/D-, in which F is a speaker's personal composition of a fact, the first D- is the disconfirming uptake of it by another speaker and the second D- is the completing disconfirming uptake by the initial speaker. Some of the speaker's possibilities to initiate an argument by expressing a Formulation are explored, as well as the social and cultural norms which play a role in argument-initiation and the concepts of win and loss.     

Interactive effects of dispositional mindfulness and PETTLEP imagery training on basketball shooting performance: A randomized controlled trial

The purpose of this study was to examine the interactive effects of dispositional mindfulness and visualized PETTLEP imagery training on basketball mid-range shooting performance and retention. Seventy-three participants (M age = 20.32 ± 1.09) with high/low dispositional mindfulness (high n = 35; low n = 38) selected out of 302 college students were randomly assigned into the following six groups: (a) high mindfulness internal imagery (H-II, n = 13); (b) high mindfulness external imagery (H-EI, n = 11); (c) high mindfulness control (H–CO, n = 11); (d) low mindfulness internal imagery (L-II, n = 13); (e) low mindfulness external imagery (L-EI, n = 12); and (f) low mindfulness control (L-CO, n = 13). Participants engaged in a pretest to measure their basketball shooting performance, then participated in a 6-week (3 times/per-week) intervention, plus a posttest and retention test. A three-way 2 (high/low mindfulness) X 3 (treatments: internal-, external imagery, and control) X 3 (measurement time: pretest, posttest, and retention) mixed ANOVA statistical analysis found dispositional mindfulness interacted with treatments and measurement time. The main effects showed high dispositional mindfulness performed better than low dispositional mindfulness, and internal imagery training performed better than external imagery training on mid-range basketball performance at retention. The 3–way interaction indicated that when using either internal or external imagery, high dispositional mindfulness performed better than low mindfulness on retention but not posttest. For 2-way interaction, high dispositional mindfulness performed better than low dispositional mindfulness on retention but not posttest. Our results extended current knowledge on sport imagery and dispositional mindfulness and gained several theoretical implications for researchers. The limitations, future research directions, and practical implications were also discussed.     

Contrary-to-duty obligations

We investigate under what conditions contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures lacking temporal and action elements can be given a coherent reading. We argue, contrary to some recent proposals, that CTD is not an instance of defeasible reasoning, and that methods of nonmonotonic logics are inadequate since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violation of primary obligations. We propose a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and CTD obligations are obligations of different kinds: a CTD obligation pertains to, or pre-supposes, a certain context in which a primary obligation is already violated. This framework is presented initially as an extension of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), a normal modal logic of type KD, and is illustrated by application to a series of examples. The concluding section is concerned with some resemblances between CTD and defeasible reasoning. We show first that the SDL-based framework contains a flaw and must be adjusted. A discussion of possible adjustments, including an alternative treatment in terms of a preference-based semantics, reveals difficulties that are reminiscent of problems in defeasible reasoning and intensional accounts of defeasible conditionals.