潜变量建模的贝叶斯方法

贝叶斯统计是统计学的两大流派之一,近年来贝叶斯统计在社会及行为科学领域日益流行。鉴于国内心理学界对贝叶斯统计应用仍不广泛,本文尝试从非技术性的角度对贝叶斯统计用于潜变量建模的过程进行简要介绍。主要涉及贝叶斯与频率论在统计学基本概念上的对比;贝叶斯统计的基本原理和分析过程。最后以一个验证性因子分析为例,简要介绍贝叶斯统计用于潜变量建模的分析过程。希望本文能为国内心理学者进行潜变量建模提供新的视角。     

贝叶斯因子及其在JASP中的实现

统计推断在科学研究中起到关键作用, 然而当前科研中最常用的经典统计方法——零假设检验(Null hypothesis significance test, NHST)却因难以理解而被部分研究者误用或滥用。有研究者提出使用贝叶斯因子(Bayes factor)作为一种替代和(或)补充的统计方法。贝叶斯因子是贝叶斯统计中用来进行模型比较和假设检验的重要方法, 其可以解读为对零假设H₀或者备择假设H₁的支持程度。其与NHST相比有如下优势：同时考虑H₀和H₁并可以用来支持H₀、不“严重”地倾向于反对H₀、可以监控证据强度的变化以及不受抽样计划的影响。目前, 贝叶斯因子能够很便捷地通过开放的统计软件JASP实现, 本文以贝叶斯t检验进行示范。贝叶斯因子的使用对心理学研究者来说具有重要的意义, 但使用时需要注意先验分布选择的合理性以及保持数据分析过程的透明与公开。     

Statisticism in personality psychologists’ use of trait constructs: What is it? How was it contracted? Is there a cure?

‘Statisticism’ is meant to characterize a way of thinking in psychology that invests virtually boundless trust in the aptness of statistical concepts and methods to reveal the ‘lawfulness’ of human psychological functioning and behavior. In the article, I discuss how statisticism came to infect the thinking of mainstream 20th century personality investigators and how – if at all – the discipline might be cured. Unfortunately, mainstream thinking within the sub-discipline of personality psychology has long sanctioned an understanding of the statistical findings issuing from studies of individual differences in personality traits that is faithful to neither of the so-called ‘frequentist’ or ‘subjectivist’ traditions. Instead, such findings are widely regarded as a scientifically acceptable warrant for claims to knowledge about objective states of affairs existing for individuals within the samples one has studied. I suggest that the prospects for eradicating dubious fruits of this form of statisticism will hinge importantly on (a) the ability of theoretically and philosophically-oriented psychologists to re-instill within the discipline a healthy respect for the power of conceptual analysis more generally, and, following this, (b) concern within the discipline for the fact that the deep and abiding conceptual problem described above in fact does exist.     

The reference class problem is your problem too

The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference class problem. Other versions of these interpretations apparently evade the problem. But I contend that they are all “no-theory” theories of probability - accounts that leave quite obscure why probability should function as a guide to life, a suitable basis for rational inference and action. The reference class problem besets those theories that are genuinely informative and that plausibly constrain our inductive reasonings and decisions. I distinguish a “metaphysical” and an “epistemological” reference class problem. I submit that we can dissolve the former problem by recognizing that probability is fundamentally a two-place notion: conditional probability is the proper primitive of probability theory. However, I concede that the epistemological problem remains.