Rich interpretation vs. deflationary accounts in cognitive development: the case of means-end skills in 7-month-old infants

Seven-month-old infants appear to learn means-end skills, such as pushing a button to retrieve a distant toy (Psychological Review 104 (1997) 686). The present studies tested whether such apparent means-end behaviors are genuine, or simply the repetition of trained behaviors under conditions of greatest arousal, as suggested by a dynamic systems reinterpretation. When infants were trained to repeat behaviors that did not serve as means to retrieving toys (pushing a button to light a set of distant lights), their button-pushing differed significantly from infants for whom button-pushing served as a means for retrieving toys. Further, infants demonstrated means-end skills with behaviors that they had not been trained to repeat. Implications for early means-end abilities and for debates surrounding the interpretation of infant behavior are discussed.     

DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.     

How people think “if only …” about reasons for actions

When people think about how a situation might have turned out differently, they tend to imagine counterfactual alternatives to their actions. We report the results of three experiments which show that people imagine alternatives to actions differently when they know about a reason for the action. The first experiment (n = 36) compared reason – action sequences to cause – effect sequences. It showed that people do not imagine alternatives to reasons in the way they imagine alternatives to causes: they imagine an alternative to an action more than an effect, and to a cause more than a reason. The second experiment (n = 214) and the third experiment (n = 190) both show that different sorts of reasons have different sorts of effects on how people imagine alternatives to actions. People imagine an alternative to an action (the protagonist went to a ball) less often when they know the reason for the action was an obligation (he had to participate in fundraising) compared to when they know about a weaker reason (he wanted to meet a famous violinist) or no reason. The second experiment shows the effect for a social obligation and the third experiment replicates and extends it to a health obligation. We interpret the results in terms of the possibilities that people keep in mind about actions and their reasons.     

Assessing volunteer motives: a comparison of an open‐ended probe and Likert rating scales

The purpose of the present study was to compare the motives of volunteers (career, esteem, protective, social, understanding, and value) as assessed by an open‐ended probe and the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) which employs a Likert rating scale. One‐hundred‐and‐twenty‐nine individuals, who volunteered for an organization that focuses on episodic volunteering in the community, completed both measures of volunteer motives and reported their frequency of volunteering for the organization. The Spearman rank correlation between the rankings of the six volunteer motives in the two distributions was 0.71. The maximum variance shared between the same motive as assessed by the two methods was 0.14. Frequency of volunteering for the organization was predicted by the value (positive predictor) and social (negative predictor) VFI scale scores. A post hoc analysis of the data from the open‐ended probe revealed three additional motives for volunteering—enjoyment, religiosity, and team building. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hope as empowerment model: A client-based perspective on the process of hope development

Abstract

Research on the relationship of client hope to successful therapy outcome underlines the need to discover the processes and conditions when hope flourishes. Snyder’s Hope Theory has been applied to psychotherapy but client subjective experiences are needed to illuminate nuances in the process. The present study examined the trajectory of hope development in psychotherapy using interviews with 18 counseling clients, analyzed using grounded theory methodology. Findings were synthesized into a dynamic model titled hope as empowerment model (HEM) that shares features of Snyder’s Hope Theory. HEM introduces patterns of particular salience to psychotherapy. The compatibility of client preferences with therapist input raised faith in the process of counseling and, in turn, hope in a positive outcome. A number of conditions, including the flexibility of client role preferences and the directiveness of hope-inspiring therapeutic strategies, influenced the nature and strength of client hope. Implications for therapy and positive psychology are considered.     

Making sense of male rape: constructions of gender,sexuality and experience of rape victims

This study reports a preliminary investigation into accounting practices for male rape in conversation. Thirty men and women, in dyads, were asked to discuss an incident of male rape presented to them in a vignette. The findings showed that two main issues were discussed: the experience of the rape act and societal responses to male victims. In addition, participants established a ‘hierarchy of suffering’, where rape was judged to be worse for ‘heterosexual’ men than it is for ‘women’ or ‘gay’ men. Hegemonic, phallocentric representations of heterosexuality were mobilized to argue that acts of rape and consensual intercourse are the same for ‘gay’ men and ‘women’ and therefore less traumatic than for ‘heterosexual’ men. This obscures the violence of rape for gay men and women and exonerates perpetrators by minimizing injury sustained. Participants also argued that heterosexual victims are likely to experience ridicule for having departed from hegemonic masculinity. Arguments were constructed to avoid charges of being dismissive towards women and gay men and of victim blaming in relation to heterosexual men. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When apologies work: How matching apology components to victims’ self-construals facilitates forgiveness

Apologies are useful social tools that can act as catalysts in the resolution of conflict and inspire forgiveness. Yet as numerous real-world blunders attest, apologies are not always effective. Whereas many lead to forgiveness and reconciliation, others simply fall on deaf ears. Despite the fact that apologies differ in their effectiveness, most research has focused on apologies as dichotomous phenomena wherein a victim either (a) receives an apology or (b) does not. Psychological research has yet to elucidate which components of apologies are most effective, and for whom. The present research begins to address this gap by testing the theory that perpetrators’ apologies are most likely to inspire victim forgiveness when their components align with victims’ self-construals. Regression and hierarchical linear modeling analyses from two studies support the primary hypotheses. As predicted, victims reacted most positively to apologies that were congruent with their self-construals.     

Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory

Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.

词汇判断中汉语多义词识别的优势效应

运用词汇判断任务,考察了汉语双字词识别中的多义性效应。实验一运用2个真字任意组合构成的假词（如：镜社）作填充材料,发现多义词识别的优势效应仅仅存在于错误率中。实验二运用与源真词（如：冲锋）同音形似的假词（如：冲烽）作填充材料,促使被试更多地在语义水平上做出判断,结果发现很强的多义词识别的优势效应,这种效应主要表现在低频词上。两个实验结果表明,在词汇判断中用不同的假词作填充词会影响被试的词汇判断策略,从而在不同水平上通达词义。最后,用反馈模型对实验结果进行了解释。     

What counts as an acceptable reason for not communicating emotional support?

This study investigated assessments of the acceptability of and negative relational implications for the reasons given for someone not providing emotional support. A representative sample of U.S. adults (N = 1598) participated in a survey experiment that included thinking of a person from whom they would expect such support, imagining that they did not receive support from this person, and being shown one of 16 reasons to explain the nonsupport. Participants evaluated that reason for its acceptability and its negative relational ramifications. As predicted, some nonsupport reasons were judged as more acceptable than were others, and they generated fewer negative relational ramifications. Participants who experienced nonsupport by a friend viewed their reasons as more acceptable than those experiencing nonsupport from family members. Despite this, greater negative relational ramifications were reported when friends compared to family members did not communicate support. Women's nonsupport was viewed as less acceptable compared to men's; however, there were no gender differences in the negative relational ramifications of nonsupport. When tested in a mediation model, acceptability mediated the relationship between expectations and negative relational ramifications, but there was also an unexpected direct negative effect between expectations and negative relational ramifications.