On nonassociative fear emergence

Poulton and Menzies have articulated a nonassociative alternative to traditional conditioning theories of phobia emergence. Prompted by their essay, I address several issues including controversies about what counts as a conditioning event, difficulties establishing whether a fear functioned as an adaptation throughout evolutionary history, hazards of attempting to recover conditioning events in the histories of patients, and problems with the contingency view of associative learning.     

面向隐喻计算的语料库研究和建设

汉语隐喻计算化研究是中文自然语言处理领域的一个前沿课题,然而研究所需要的隐喻语料资源却极其有限,对隐喻计算研究的发展形成了一定的对影响。本文主要研究了面向隐喻计算的语料库的设计和构建方法,并设计构建了一个具有一万句规模62万字的汉语隐喻标注句库以及一个面向隐喻识别的汉语常用动词搭配库。这些资源的构建建立在对隐喻现象的深入分析基础之上,是隐喻计算模型研究的基础性资源,对汉语隐喻的认知计算有着积极意义。     

Thyme to touch: Infants possess strategies that protect them from dangers posed by plants

Plants have been central to human life as sources of food and raw materials for artifact construction over evolutionary time. But plants also have chemical and physical defenses (such as harmful toxins and thorns) that provide protection from herbivores. The presence of these defenses has shaped the behavioral strategies of non-human animals. Here we report evidence that human infants possess strategies that would serve to protect them from dangers posed by plants. Across two experiments, infants as young as eight months exhibit greater reluctance to manually explore plants compared to other entities. These results expand the growing literature showing that infants are sensitive to certain ancestrally recurrent dangers, and provide a basis for further exploration.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Conceptual Structure and the Emergence of the Language Faculty: Much Ado about Knotting

Abstract

One perspective in contemporary linguistic theory defends the idea that the language faculty may result from the combinations of diverse systems and principles. As a case study, I critique a recent proposal by Juan Uriagereka and colleagues according to which the evolutionary emergence of the language faculty can be identified through studying the computational structure of knots as present within the fossil record. I here argue that the ability to conceptualize and, thereby, create knots is not parasitic on the ability to conceptualize and create language. On the contrary, these two domains are entirely distinct, unrelatable in terms of their computational complexity, expressive power or, most importantly, in terms of their requisite mental operations and principles. The overall approach defended here can profitably be employed in the study of the relationship between language and thought, as I briefly discuss in the case of the role of language in spatial reorientation.     

Prosocial behavior in families: Moderators of resource sharing

Archival studies of within-family prosocial behavior (Judge & Hrdy, 1992; Smith, Kish, & Crawford, 1987) have shown that inheritance patterns support Hamilton’s (1964) theory of inclusive fitness, such that people will more of their estates to relatives of closer genetic relatedness. In a survey-based simulation of these studies, students allocated one of three lotteries to their blood relatives. As expected, participants allocated greater proportions of their lotteries to relatives of greater genetic relatedness. This effect became stronger with decreasing lottery amounts. Relatives of certain relatedness were favored over relatives of uncertain relatedness (via paternal uncertainty), and this effect was stronger among those with less money to allocate. Male participants tended to favor their young female relatives over their young male relatives when given the smallest lottery, but this sex preference reversed when male participants were given the largest lottery. In general, scarcer resources led to more evolutionarily conservative investment strategies.     

Taking old ideas seriously: Evolution, development, and human behavior

I argue that the roots of an adequate integration of evolution into psychology are not to be found in evolutionary psychology, but rather in evolutionary developmental biology (evo–devo). To this end, I provide an overview of evo–devo and explore the limited role that behavioral sciences have played in its genesis. I then motivate an evo–devo approach to psychobiology, and sketch desiderata for the success of this enterprise. In particular, I elucidate what it means to take both development and evolution seriously, and argue for the primacy of developmental analysis in the exploration of (human) behavior and its evolution.     

The growth of developmental thought: Implications for a new evolutionary psychology

Evolution has come to be increasingly discussed in terms of changes in developmental processes rather than simply in terms of changes in gene frequencies. This shift is based in large part on the recognition that since all phenotypic traits arise during ontogeny as products of individual development, a primary basis for evolutionary change must be variations in the patterns and processes of development. Further, the products of development are epigenetic, not just genetic, and this is the case even when considering the evolutionary process. These insights have led investigators to reconsider the established notion of genes as the primary cause of development, opening the door to research programs focused on identifying how genetic and non-genetic factors coact to guide and constrain the process of development and its outcomes. I explore this growth of developmental thought and its implications for the achievement of a unified theory of heredity, development, and evolution and consider its implications for the realization of a new, developmentally based evolutionary psychology.