Random error in additive decompositions of multiattribute utility

Decomposition is a common strategy for dealing with the complexity of multiattribute decision problems. A cognitively demanding task is broken down into tasks requiring simpler, perhaps easier, judgments which can then be aggregated. But individual judgments can be inconsistent in systematic or random fashion and when aggregated there is the possibility of propagation of this inconsistency. In this paper inconsistency in the form of random error is investigated in the context of additive decomposition of multiattribute utility. The process of aggregation of random error is studied and a comparison made with random error in holistic estimates of multiattribute utility. Conditions under which decomposition improves the consistency of the multiattribute utility estimate are presented and discussed.     

Are errors detected before they occur? Early error sensations revealed by metacognitive judgments on the timing of error awareness

Errors in choice tasks are not only detected fast and reliably, participants often report that they knew that an error occurred already before a response was produced. These early error sensations stand in contrast with evidence suggesting that the earliest neural correlates of error awareness emerge around 300 ms after erroneous responses. The present study aimed to investigate whether anecdotal evidence for early error sensations can be corroborated in a controlled study in which participants provide metacognitive judgments on the subjective timing of error awareness. In Experiment 1, participants had to report whether they became aware of their errors before or after the response. In Experiment 2, we measured confidence in these metacognitive judgments. Our data show that participants report early error sensations with high confidence in the majority of error trials across paradigms and experiments. These results provide first evidence for early error sensations, informing theories of error awareness.     

Collaborative recall of details of an emotional film

Collaborative inhibition refers to the phenomenon that when several people work together to produce a single memory report, they typically produce fewer items than when the unique items in the individual reports of the same number of participants are combined (i.e., nominal recall). Yet, apart from this negative effect, collaboration may be beneficial in that group members remove errors from a collaborative report. Collaborative inhibition studies on memory for emotional stimuli are scarce. Therefore, the present study examined both collaborative inhibition and collaborative error reduction in the recall of the details of emotional material in a laboratory setting. Female undergraduates (n = 111) viewed a film clip of a fatal accident and subsequently engaged in either collaborative (n = 57) or individual recall (n = 54) in groups of three. The results show that, across several detail categories, collaborating groups recalled fewer details than nominal groups. However, overall, nominal recall produced more errors than collaborative recall. The present results extend earlier findings on both collaborative inhibition and error reduction to the recall of affectively laden material. These findings may have implications for the applied fields of forensic and clinical psychology.     

Hans Jonas's diagnosis of nihilism: The case of Heidegger

This paper is concerned with the implications of Husserl's phenomenological reformulation of the problem of error. Following Husserl, I argue that the phenomenon of error should not be understood as the accidental failure of a fully constituted cogito, but that it is itself constitutive of the cogito's formation. I thus show that the phenomenon of error plays a crucial role in our self-understanding as unified subjects of experience. In order to unpack this 'hermeneutical function' of error, I focus on three inter-related notions which are recurrently used by Husserl to refer to the central aspects of error apprehension: explosion (Explosion), replacement (Ersatz), and cancellation (Durchstreichung). My discussion, however, does not remain committed to the Husserlian framework as such. This is not only because Husserl's notion of explosion proves itself untenable, but because the Husserlian paradigm does not make room for a linguistic dimension intrinsic, in my view, to the realization of error. Hence, I proceed by reconstructing the Husserlian terms as tropes of realization, as narratological devices in the 'language game' of error. I argue that these hermeneutical devices are necessary for maintaining what Nietzsche would call the self's 'semblance of unity'. The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis for our thought and our consciousness in general? (Nietzsche, The Will to Power #490)     

The distressed (Type D) and Five-Factor Models of personality in young,healthy adults and their association with emotional inhibition and distress

The distressed (Type D) personality (the combination of negative affectivity and social inhibition traits) has been associated with adverse health outcomes. This study investigated the validity of the Type D construct against the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality, and its association with emotional control and distress. In total 498 university students (mean age 28.9 ± 8.4 years) completed the Type D scale (DS14), and measurements for the FFM of personality, emotional control, anxiety, depression and stress. The construct validity of the Icelandic DS14 was confirmed. The Type D components negative affectivity and social inhibition were strongly associated with neuroticism and extraversion of the FFM (r = 0.82 and r = −0.67, respectively). Negative affectivity also correlated with rehearsal/rumination (r = 0.58) and social inhibition with emotional inhibition (r = 0.54), indicative of emotional control. Type D personality (40% of sample) was associated with higher levels of anxiety, depression and stress. The Type D personality components were associated with the FFM of personality, emotional control and emotional distress. Importantly, social and emotional inhibition were closely related, providing novel information about the presence of emotional inhibition within the social inhibition trait.     

Anxiety and expectancy violations: Neural response to false feedback is exaggerated in worriers

This study investigated how individual differences in anxiety modulate the neural response to errors and performance feedback. The design included false feedback on some trials in order to test the hypothesis that anxious people show stronger neural reactions to feedback that is worse than expected. Participants completed a trial-and-error learning task that required learning the correct key to press in response to face images. EEG was recorded during the task, and the response-locked error-related negativity (ERN) and feedback-locked ERN were computed to measure neural responses to error commission and feedback. As expected, errors produced a response-locked ERN and false feedback produced a feedback-locked ERN in the group as a whole. High levels of trait worry predicted a disproportionately larger ERN following false feedback, but did not predict the magnitude of the response-locked ERN following errors. These results imply that worry-prone people react more strongly to violations of expectations, rather than to errors themselves.     

The effect of stress on the suppression of erroneous competing responses

Abstract

Evidence exists that the intention to perform certain cognitive tasks activates, unintentionally, competing responses and computations that intrude on the performance of the intended tasks. For the intended task to be performed effectively, such intrusions must be controlled. Two experiments were carried out to test the hypothesis that stress heightens the difficulty of exercising effective control over erroneous competing responses, a possible explanation of decrements in the performance of cognitive tasks under stress. Participants performed four tasks, which contained features that could potentially prime or activate erroneous responses. The results demonstrated that the interference of these features with performance was more pronounced among stressed than among less-stressed participants. The need for a more comprehensive theory of the effects of stress on information processing is discussed.     

The hypercorrection effect in younger and older adults

ABSTRACT

The hypercorrection effect, which refers to the finding that errors committed with high confidence are more likely to be corrected than are low confidence errors, has been replicated many times, and with both young adults and children. In the present study, we contrasted older with younger adults. Participants answered general-information questions, made confidence ratings about their answers, were given corrective feedback, and then were retested on questions that they had gotten wrong. While younger adults showed the hypercorrection effect, older adults, despite higher overall accuracy on the general-information questions and excellent basic metacognitive ability, showed a diminished hypercorrection effect. Indeed, the correspondence between their confidence in their errors and the probability of correction was not significantly greater than zero, showing, for the first time, that a particular participant population is selectively impaired on this error correction task. These results potentially offer leverage both on the mechanisms underlying the hypercorrection effect and on reasons for older adults’ memory impairments, as well as on memory functions that are spared.     

Are phonological influences on lexical (mis)selection the result of a monitoring bias?

A monitoring bias account is often used to explain speech error patterns that seem to be the result of an interactive language production system, like phonological influences on lexical selection errors. A biased monitor is suggested to detect and covertly correct certain errors more often than others. For instance, this account predicts that errors that are phonologically similar to intended words are harder to detect than those that are phonologically dissimilar. To test this, we tried to elicit phonological errors under the same conditions as those that show other kinds of lexical selection errors. In five experiments, we presented participants with high cloze probability sentence fragments followed by a picture that was semantically related, a homophone of a semantically related word, or phonologically related to the (implicit) last word of the sentence. All experiments elicited semantic completions or homophones of semantic completions, but none elicited phonological completions. This finding is hard to reconcile with a monitoring bias account and is better explained with an interactive production system. Additionally, this finding constrains the amount of bottom-up information flow in interactive models.