Apoyo social en universitarios españoles de primer año: propiedades psicométricas del Social Support Questionnaire-Short Form y el Social Provisions Scale

Perceived social support is a multifaceted construct conceptualized as one's cognitive appraisal as to the existence of a connection to others, based on trust, on whom one can rely on when necessary. The aim of this paper is to examine the psychometric properties of perceived social support, using the following scales: Social Support Questionnaire-Short Form (SSQ6) and Social Provisions Scale (SPS), on a sample of 855 first year university students – 575 females and 280 males – enrolled in 16 professional degrees at the University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain). The SSQ6 Scale assesses the dimensions of perceived support availability and satisfaction, whilst the SPS Scale assesses its social support functions. The factor analysis conducted confirms the SSQ6 Scale's two-dimensional model and the SPS Scale's six-factor structure. Internal consistency of both scales is satisfactory, as is the evidence of validity obtained from the correlations between the two scales and their subscales. The results reveal that the Spanish version of the SSQ6 and SPS scales are reliable and valid measurements for assessing perceived social support amongst university students.     

Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument

Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the argument have failed to show that the identity thesis provides a satisfactory explanation for the correlations between physical and phenomenal properties. Hence, the explanatory argument, as it stands, does not provide new grounds for accepting the type identity theory.     

The relation between children's conceptual functioning with color and color term acquisition

Young children experience considerable difficulty in learning their first few color terms. One explanation for this difficulty is that initially they lack a conceptual representation of color sufficiently abstract to support word meaning. This hypothesis, that prior to learning color terms children do not represent color as an abstraction, was tested in two experiments using samples of 25- to 39-month-olds and 20- to 32-month-olds. Children's ability to conceptually represent color and their knowledge of color terms were assessed, and a strong association was found between the ability to make inferences based on color and the comprehension of color words. Children who did not comprehend color terms were unsuccessful at a conceptual task that required them to represent color as a property independent of the particular objects that displayed it. The results suggest that the initial absence of an abstract representation of color contributes to the difficulty that young children encounter when first learning color words.     

Learning letter names and sounds: Effects of instruction, letter type, and phonological processing skill

Preschool-age children (N = 58) were randomly assigned to receive instruction in letter names and sounds, letter sounds only, or numbers (control). Multilevel modeling was used to examine letter name and sound learning as a function of instructional condition and characteristics of both letters and children. Specifically, learning was examined in light of letter name structure, whether letter names included cues to their respective sounds, and children’s phonological processing skills. Consistent with past research, children receiving letter name and sound instruction were most likely to learn the sounds of letters whose names included cues to their sounds regardless of phonological processing skills. Only children with higher phonological skills showed a similar effect in the control condition. Practical implications are discussed.     

The distinction between tapping and circle drawing with and without tactile feedback: An examination of the sources of timing variance

An internal clock-like process has been implicated in the control of rhythmic movements performed for short (250–2,000 ms) time scales. However, in the past decade, it has been claimed that a clock-like central timing mechanism is not required for smooth cyclical movements. The distinguishing characteristic delineating clock-like (event) from non-clock-like (emergent) timing is thought to be the kinematic differences between tapping (discrete-like) and circle drawing (smooth). In the archetypal event-timed task (tapping), presence of perceptual events is confounded with the discrete kinematics of movement (table contact). Recently, it has been suggested that discrete perceptual events help participants synchronize with a metronome. However, whether discrete tactile events directly elicit event timing has yet to be determined. In the present study, we examined whether a tactile event inserted into the circle drawing timing task could elicit event timing in a self-paced (continuation) timing task. For a majority of participants, inserting an event into the circle drawing task elicited timing behaviour consistent with the idea that an internal timekeeper was employed (a correlation of circle drawing with tapping). Additionally, some participants exhibited characteristics of event timing in the typically emergently timed circle drawing task. We conclude that the use of event timing can be influenced by the insertion of perceptual events, and it also exhibits persistence over time and over tasks within certain individuals.     

The early Russell on the metaphysics of substance in Leibniz and Bradley

While considerable ink has been spilt over the rejection of idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the end of the 19th Century, relatively little attention has been directed at Russell’s A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, a work written in the early stages of Russell’s philosophical struggles with the metaphysics of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others. Though a sustained investigation of that work would be one of considerable scope, here I reconstruct and develop a two-pronged argument from the Philosophy of Leibniz that Russell fancied—as late as 1907—to be the downfall of the traditional category of substance. Here, I suggest, one can begin to see Russell’s own reasons—arguments largely independent of Moore—for the abandonment of idealism. Leibniz, no less than Bradley, adhered to an antiquated variety of logic: what Russell refers to as the subject-predicate doctrine of logic. Uniting this doctrine with a metaphysical principle of independence—that a substance is prior to and distinct from its properties—Russell is able to demonstrate that neither a substance pluralism nor a substance monism can be consistently maintained. As a result, Russell alleges that the metaphysics of both Leibniz and Bradley has been undermined as ultimately incoherent. Russell’s remedy for this incoherence is the postulation of a bundle theory of substance, such that the category of “substance” reduces to the most basic entities—properties.     

The ontology of meanings

In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of mental events.

Van Inwagen and the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument

In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however, that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.

Emergence

Here I offer a precise analysis of what it takes for a property to count as emergent. The features widely considered crucial to emergence include novelty, unpredictability, supervenience, relationality, and downward causal influence. By acknowledging each of these distinctive features, the definition provided below captures an important sense in which the whole can be more than the sum of its parts.

What in the world are the ways things might have been?

Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis, P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.