The effects of polydrug use with and without cocaine on mother-infant interaction at 3 and 6 months

The face-to-face interactions of 43 polydrug-with-cocaine-using mothers and their infants at 3 and 6 months were compared to 17 non-cocaine-but other-drug-using mothers and 21 mothers who used no drugs during their pregnancy. Coders blind to mothers' drug use status scored 3 min of face-to-face interactions for 16 measures of maternal and infant interactive behaviors. A principal component of 7 behaviors formed a measure of maternal attentiveness; a principal component of 5 behaviors formed a measure of mother-infant dyadic organization; and a principal component of 4 behaviors formed a measure of infant readiness to interact. A measure of maternal interruption was computed as the mean standard score of 3 additional interruptive behaviors. At 3 and 6 months, polydrug-with-cocaine-using mothers were less attentive to interactions, and polydrug-with-cocaine-using mothers and their infants engaged in fewer dyadic interactions than either non-cocaine or non-drug-using mothers. Compared to 3 months, polydrug-with-cocaine-using mothers at 6 months were less attentive to interactions and more frequently interrupted interactions by looking away, redirecting the infant, or withdrawing, whereas non-cocaine-using and non-drug- using mothers showed no change or an improvement in attentiveness to interactions and a decrease in interruptions. No differences emerged in the interactive behaviors of the infants of polydrug- with-cocaine-using, non-cocaine-using, or non-drug-using mothers. Cocaine use represents a significant risk for diminished parental attentiveness and responsiveness to infants and for diminished interactiveness in infants.     

寻找镜中的自我：精神分裂症患者的视觉观点采择

精神分裂症患者的视觉观点采择影响其必要的社交活动和生活质量。本文通过对精神分裂症患者视觉观点采择的研究进行梳理,总结出相关的心理特点：精神分裂症患者的视觉观点采择过程受损,表现出自我中心性和他人中心性。在神经生理上表现出与视觉观点采择相关的脑区激活减弱。可能的原因是患者认知功能中反应抑制能力和心理旋转能力的受损所致,建议采用认知干预疗法可能会改善患者的视觉观点采择能力。目前的研究论证了精神分裂症患者视觉观点采择过程的损伤,对于不同水平的视觉观点采择下精神分裂症患者的认知模式还未有明确的定论,未来的研究可以从该角度入手,更加明确精神分裂症患者不同水平视觉观点采择的特点和神经生理活动。     

The use of strategies and messages to alter aggressive interactions

Male and female college students were instigated to aggression by a confederate's shocks during a preliminary task. The confederate informed half of the treatment subjects of the response strategy which he intended to adopt. The other half received an irrelevant message. All subjects then competed against the confederate, who employed one of the following five response consequence strategies: a) set a maximum shock on all trials; b) set a minimum shock on all trials; c) set shocks identical to the subject's response on the preceding trial; d) set shocks two settings below the subject's response; or e) set shocks two settings above the subject's. The subject's latency to setting a shock, the intensities of the shocks set, the durations of the shock settings, and the subject's reaction times were recorded. When an irrelevant message was delivered, passive responses, well below those of the opponent, resulted in the lowest level of retaliation. In the presence of a relevant message, the match-same strategy emerged as an effective deterrent to aggressive behavior. The results were found to be consistent with predictions derived from an application of the norm of reciprocity and research demonstrating the enhancing effects achieved through the communication of existing contingencies.     

Love: self-propagation,self-preservation,or ekstasis?

My title refers to three accounts of interpersonal love: the rationalist (and ultimately rational egoist) account that Terence Irwin ascribes to Plato; the anti-rationalist but strikingly similar account that Harry Frankfurt endorses in his own voice; and the ‘ekstatic’ account that I – following the lead of Martha Nussbaum – find in Plato's Phaedrus. My claim is that the ekstatic account points to important features of interpersonal love to which the other accounts fail to do justice, especially reciprocity and a regulative ideal of equality.     

共情对广义互惠的影响：自我-他人重叠的中介作用

与“我帮你,你帮我”的直接互惠相比,“我帮你,你帮他”的积极广义互惠,促使受助者转变为助人者帮助更多的人。与之相反,“我伤你,你伤他”的消极广义互惠,易导致受害者转变为伤害者波及无辜他人。以往研究未探寻到既能促进积极广义互惠,又能抑制消极广义互惠的因素。采用两阶段独裁者博弈任务范式,通过两项实验发现,共情是一个能够起到扩大积极广义互惠传递效应并削弱消极广义互惠传递效应双重作用的特殊变量,其机制在于自我-他人重叠,支持了自我扩张模型。这一研究为营造良好社会道德氛围,加强公民道德建设,保障公正和谐的社会环境提供了思路。     

Spatial encoding by bumblebees (Bombus impatiens) of a reward within an artificial flower array

We presented bumblebees a spatial memory task similar to that used with other species (e.g., cats, dogs, and pigeons). In some conditions we allowed for presence of scent marks in addition to placing local and global spatial cues in conflict. Bumblebees (Bombus impatiens) were presented an array of artificial flowers within a flight cage, one flower offering reward (S+), while the others were empty (S−). Bees were tested with empty flowers. In Experiment 1, flowers were either moved at the time of testing or not. Bees returned to the flower in the same absolute position of the S+ (the flower-array-independent (FAI) position), even if it was in the wrong position relative to the S− and even when new flower covers prevented the use of possible scent marks. New flower covers (i.e., without possible scent marks) had the effect of lowering the frequency of probing behavior. In Experiment 2, the colony was moved between training and testing. Again, bees chose the flower in the FAI position of the S+, and not the flower that would be chosen using strictly memory for a flight vector. Together, these experiments show that to locate the S+ bees did not rely on scent marks nor the positions of the S−, though the S− were prominent objects close to the goal. Also, bees selected environmental features to remember the position of the S+ instead of relying upon a purely egocentric point of view. Similarities with honeybees and vertebrates are discussed, as well as possible encoding mechanisms.     

Egocentric search for disappearing objects in domestic dogs: evidence for a geometric hypothesis of direction

In several species, the ability to locate a disappearing object is an adaptive component of predatory and social behaviour. In domestic dogs, spatial memory for hidden objects is primarily based on an egocentric frame of reference. We investigated the geometric components of egocentric spatial information used by domestic dogs to locate an object they saw move and disappear. In experiment 1, the distance and the direction between the position of the animal and the hiding location were put in conflict. Results showed that the dogs primarily used the directional information between their own spatial coordinates and the target position. In experiment 2, the accuracy of the dogs in finding a hidden object by using directional information was estimated by manipulating the angular deviation between adjacent hiding locations and the position of the animal. Four angular deviations were tested: 5, 7.5, 10 and 15°. Results showed that the performance of the dogs decreased as a function of the angular deviations but it clearly remained well above chance, revealing that the representation of the dogs for direction is precise. In the discussion, we examine how and why domestic dogs determine the direction in which they saw an object disappear.     

Differential developmental trajectories for egocentric, environmental and intrinsic frames of reference in spatial memory

We studied the development of spatial frames of reference in children aged 3-6 years, who retrieved hidden toys from an array of identical containers bordered by landmarks under four conditions. By moving the child and/or the array between presentation and test, we varied the consistency of the hidden toy with (i) the body, and (ii) the testing room. The toy's position always remained consistent with (iii) the array and bordering landmarks. We found separate, additive performance advantages for consistency with body and room. These effects were already present at 3 years. A striking finding was that the room effect, which implies allocentric representations of the room and/or egocentric representations updated by self-motion, was much stronger in the youngest children than the body effect, which implies purely egocentric representations. Children as young as 3 years therefore had, and greatly favoured, spatial representations that were not purely egocentric. Viewpoint-independent recall based only on the array and bordering landmarks emerged at 5 years. There was no evidence that this later-developing ability, which implies object-referenced (intrinsic) representations, depended on verbal encodings. These findings indicate that core components of adult spatial competence, including parallel egocentric and nonegocentric representations of space, are present as early as 3 years. These are supplemented by later-developing object-referenced representations.     

Gratitude and Good Government

I attempt to show that it is notphilosophically incompetent to ground politicalobligation in feelings of gratitude. But theargument needs to be stated carefully.Gratitude must be distinguished fromreciprocity. It applies only to good governmentwhich provides benefits to citizens for whichthey ought to feel grateful. It applies only tocitizens who accept that their feelings ofgratitude are properly demonstrated by anacceptance on their part of the duties ofcitizenship. It does not apply to citizenswhose benefits are purchased at the expense ofthe unjust treatment of fellow citizens.     

A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism

Those who subscribe to aprudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he calls‘metaphysical egoism’. Metaphysical egoism requires that we modify our pre-theoretical understandings of self-interest on metaphysical grounds. I critically assess Brink’s argument and claim that metaphysical egoism does not adequately function as a motive or guide for action. It is susceptible to many of the same problems which strategic egoism faces. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.