What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

Double bind: An essay on counselling training

Gerard Egan's problem management and opportunity development model is currently in use training prospective counsellors, social workers, nurses, managers, etc. the skills of helping. This essay attempts, experimentally, to depict in three different ways Egan's work and its relationship to operations of power: (1) from a relatively uncritical stance, (2) from a personal experience stance, and (3) from a social constructionist perspective. The whole piece, taken together, attempts to tackle the issue of theory as practice — to ground/unmask/make present the ways in which we are socialised into a profession and the problems inherent in that process. Two themes run through the work: the double bind created for a student on a counselling course which makes some claim to train around Rogers' core conditions, and which is also assessed/accredited; the connections between theory, training and practices.