排序方式: 共有6条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Anthony F. Beavers 《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(1&2):70-82
2.
Evan Selinger 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):301-308
Harry Collins interprets Hubert Dreyfus’s philosophy of embodiment as a criticism of all possible forms of artificial intelligence.
I argue that this characterization is inaccurate and predicated upon a misunderstanding of the relevance of phenomenology
for empirical scientific research.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |
3.
Donnchadh O’Conaill 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2014,22(3):440-455
AbstractThe distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law captures two familiar ways of making events intelligible, by reference to reasons or to natural laws, respectively. I describe a third way of making events intelligible, by explaining them in terms of an agent’s being motivated to do certain things. Explanations of this sort do not involve appealing to reasons for which the agent acts, nor to natural laws under which the event falls. To explain an event in this way is to place it in the space of motivations. I outline the relation between the space of motivations and the space of reasons, and suggest that the space of motivations may serve as a common ground between the positions defended by McDowell and Dreyfus in their recent debate. 相似文献
4.
Harry M. Collins 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):309-311
My claim is clear and unambiguous: no machine will pass a well-designed Turing Test unless we find some means of embedding
it in lived social life. We have no idea how to do this but my argument, and all our evidence, suggests that it will not be
a necessary condition that the machine have more than a minimal body. Exactly how minimal is still being worked out.
相似文献
Harry M. CollinsEmail: |
5.
Jack Reynolds 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):539-559
Abstract One of the more important and under‐thematized philosophical disputes in contemporary European philosophy pertains to the significance that is given to the inter‐related phenomena of habituality, skilful coping, and learning. This paper examines this dispute by focusing on the work of the Merleau‐Ponty and Heidegger‐inspired phenomenologist Hubert Dreyfus, and contrasting his analyses with those of Gilles Deleuze, particularly in Difference and Repetition. Both Deleuze and Dreyfus pay a lot of attention to learning and coping, while arriving at distinct conclusions about these phenomena with a quite different ethico‐political force. By getting to the bottom of the former, my hope is to problematize aspects of the latter in both philosophers’ work. In Deleuze’s case, it will be argued that he adopts a problematic position on learning that is aptly termed ‘empirico‐romanticism’. While I will agree with the general thrust of Dreyfus’ foregrounding of habit and skilful coping, even in the political realm, it will also be argued that there are some risks associated with his view, notably of devolving into a conservative communitarianism. 相似文献
6.
Leslie A. MacAvoy 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2019,50(1):68-86
Most scholars agree that meaning and intelligibility are central to Heidegger’s account of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, but there is some confusion about the nature of this intelligibility. In his debate with McDowell, Dreyfus draws on phenomenologists like Heidegger to argue that there are two kinds of intelligibility: a basic, nonconceptual, practical intelligibility found in practical comportment and a conceptual, discursive intelligibility. I explore two possible ways that Dreyfus might ground this twofold account of intelligibility in Heidegger: first in the distinction between the hermeneutic and apophantic “as”, and second in the presence and absence of the as-structure. I argue that neither approach succeeds because practical intelligibility is always already discursive and discursive articulation is a condition of practical comportment. 相似文献
1