排序方式: 共有4条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Matthew Simpson 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2018,48(3-4):510-531
AbstractIn this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally. 相似文献
2.
Jon Tresan 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(1):51-72
‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive
way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological.
The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between
two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the
items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two
I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That
is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you
believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism
support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has
shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation
distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James
Dreier, David Brink, and others.
相似文献
Jon TresanEmail: |
3.
Christian Basil Miller 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):233-255
Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness,
and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though,
internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of
those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer a
new set of counterexamples to motivational internalism, examples which are effective both against traditional formulations
of the thesis as well as against many of these more recent restricted proposals.
相似文献
Christian Basil MillerEmail: |
4.
Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox
presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts
of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications
for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential
for a Carroll-style regress just shows us that since instrumental rationality involves a higher-order commitment to combine
our willing an end with our taking the necessary means, it therefore cannot, on pain of regress, itself be added as a conjunct
to one of the elements to be combined. This view does not support instrumentalism. 相似文献
1