Save It for God: Confession and the Irrelevance of the Judicial System with Special Attention to Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov

Confession is essential for spiritual growth, but the judicial system provides little room for it. The judiciary is particularly unequipped to help convicts grapple with their guilt. Dostoevsky was the first to raise this critique in The Brothers Karamazov.     

Dostoevsky’s enigmas: An analysis of violent men

For the calculating male adult criminal, violent acts would appear largely counterproductive. Scholarly disagreements about these behaviors are substantial, although recent ethnographic reports emphasize the subjective sense of the experience. These reports have an existential aspect, focusing on the meaning of violent, anarchic acts to the identities of perpetrators. The earliest and best known existentialist writer on criminality is Fyodor Dostoevsky whose violent characters Smerdiakov, Svidrigailov, and Stavrogin, are enigmas to their fictional counterparts, much as violent American contemporaries are to authorities and the general public. Dostoevsky’s three enigmatic characters are reckless publicity seekers; like aliens in their own land, they habitually deceive, intimidate, and exploit while still considering themselves to be decent individuals. These depictions are congruent with Yochelson and Samenow’s much more recent forensic observations and reinforce an antisocial prototype. Bogg (1994) offers a behavioral communality for this class of violent men: patterns of self-aggrandizing gaming developed in childhood. The game player derives extraordinary pleasure from victories, although this orientation effectively counters socialization. From Dostoevsky’s views an existential nihilistic construct can be derived. This construct depicts the persona of an inveterate violent game player and is consistent with Durkheimian theory and with ethnographic and forensic/clinical observations. The prevention of a gaming orientation is feasible but appears to require parental skills and community resources.     

TRANSCENDENTAL GUILT: On an Emotional Condition of Moral Experience

This article considers a central ethically relevant interpersonal emotion, guilt. It is argued that guilt, as an irreducible moral category, has a constitutive role to play in our ways of conceptualizing our relations to other people. Without experiencing guilt, or being able to do so, we would not be capable of employing the moral concepts and judgments we do employ. Elaborating on this argument, the paper deals with what may be described as the “metaphysics of guilt.” More generally, it is suggested, through a case study on the concept of guilt, that a moral theory avoiding naïve emotivism yet emphasizing the role of emotions in morality can and should pay attention to the transcendental status of emotions such as guilt—emotions constitutive of our concept of moral seriousness. Instead of psychologizing moral emotions, the paper employs Raimond Gaita's Wittgenstein‐inspired way of examining the place of the concepts of guilt and remorse in our ethical language‐use. Finally, some methodological remarks on the possibility of transcendental reflection in moral philosophy are presented. While it is not necessary to commit oneself to any specific religious tradition in order to emphasize the constitutive role of guilt in the way suggested in the paper, it turns out that the moral depth of this concept requires that one is at least open to religiously relevant ways of using moral language. In the fundamental metaphysical sense examined in the paper, guilt is a concept whose home language‐game is religious rather than secular ethics.     

Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil,or Part of the Problem?

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them.

Giving Sense to Generosity-Ethics: A Philosophical Reading of Dostoevsky’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Idiot</Emphasis>

This paper presents a philosophical reading of “The Idiot”, which perceives its main protagonist, Prince Myshkin, as a literary hero who chooses the path of generosity. The paper exposes Dostoevsky’s generosity-ethics against the background of Christian ethics, virtue ethics, and the Nietzschean notion of generosity; it further analyzes the problematic aspects of Myshkin’s version of generosity-ethics, and discusses several possible explanations of its catastrophic outcomes in the novel. The paper consists of three parts. The first part presents the rich and profound sense that Dostoevsky gives to generosity-ethics in the novel, while showing the good it may bring to one’s life. The second part exposes the dangers and the limits of generosity-ethics, because of which the Prince may be referred to as “an idiot”. The third and final part reevaluates generosity-ethics, discusses its relation to reason, and puts forth another version of generosity-ethics that may overcome most of the flaws in Myshkin’s generosity. Offering such a philosophical reading of this great literary work of art, the paper also says some things about the relation between philosophy and literature, and aims at a fruitful dialogue between the two.