Diversity and unity of modularity

Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed different approaches to modularity and argued for the unity of modularity. Modularity is a multidimensional property consisting of features from several dimensions specifying different aspects of cognition. Among those, there are core features of modularity, and these core features form a cross-dimensional unity. Despite the diverse and liberal characterizations, modularity contributes to cognitive science because of the unity of the core features.     

Domain-specificity in perfectionism: Variations across domains of life

Perfectionism has been assessed in relation to salient or narrow domains within specific populations, yet little is understood across broader domains of life. The aim was to assess positive perfectionism (PP) and negative perfectionism (NP) in five broad domains; university/work, relationships, physical activity, domestic environment and appearance and to determine any gender differences within domains. One hundred and forty four university students (females n = 101; males n = 43) completed a modified perfectionism measure for each domain. Correlations within and between domains for PP and NP ranged from low to moderate with differential patterns by gender, supporting more domain specificity and less of a universal trait. Repeated measures ANOVAs revealed that, overall, PP and NP in the university/work domain was significantly higher than all other domains. Females reported greater PP in the university domain compared to other domains, and more PP in the relationship, domestic environment and appearance domains as compared to the physical activity domain. In contrast, males reported significantly higher PP in the physical activity domain. Females reported significantly higher NP in the university and appearance domains, while males had similar NP across all domains. These findings present a more complex picture of perfectionism with implications for domain-specificity in perfectionistic behavior.     

The personalisation method applied to a working memory task: Evidence of long-term working memory effects

Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) proposed that, in situations of expertise, individuals can overcome working memory limitations by using long-term working memory. It allows a greater capacity than working memory thanks to long-term memory encoding and retrieving. To test this characteristic, an adaptation of Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) reading span was used. To operationalise expertise, the personalisation method (Guida & Tardieu, 2005) was employed. In Experiment 1, a personalised group, which read reading span sentences that mentioned familiar locations, was compared to a nonpersonalised group, which read sentences with unfamiliar locations. In Experiment 2, a personalised group, which read reading span sentences with neutral locations, was encouraged to mentally personalise these locations by thinking about known locations. This group was compared to a nonpersonalised group, which was encouraged to think about unknown locations. The personalised groups were expected to store and retrieve information in long-term memory via long-term working memory more easily than the nonpersonalised groups, which had to count massively on working memory. The results showed that personalisation enhanced reading span and confirmed one implication of the long-term working memory theory: high- and low-reading-span differences could also be due to long-term memory retrieval. Finally, these results are interpreted in terms of interaction between working memory size and long-term memory knowledge, showing that participants with a lower reading span benefited more from high domain knowledge than participants with a higher reading span.     

Differences in preschoolers’ and adults’ use of generics about novel animals and artifacts: A window onto a conceptual divide

Children and adults commonly produce more generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) about animals than artifacts. This may reflect differences in participants’ generic knowledge about specific animals/artifacts (e.g., dogs/chairs), or it may reflect a more general distinction. To test this, the current experiments asked adults and preschoolers to generate properties about novel animals and artifacts (Experiment 1: real animals/artifacts; Experiments 2 and 3: matched pairs of maximally similar, novel animals/artifacts). Data demonstrate that even without prior knowledge about these items, the likelihood of producing a generic is significantly greater for animals than artifacts. These results leave open the question of whether this pattern is the product of experience and learned associations or instead a set of early-developing theories about animals and artifacts.     

Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, "reality-unknown" false belief and false photograph tasks

To test the domain-specificity of "theory of mind" abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning () and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems with existing false photograph methods. A strikingly similar pattern of performance was shown across the false belief and false photograph tests. Patients who were selectively impaired on false belief tasks were also impaired on false photograph tasks; patients spared on false belief tasks also showed preserved performance with false photographs. In some cases the impairment on false belief and false photograph tasks coincided with good performance on control tasks matched for executive demands. We discuss whether the patients have a domain-specific deficit in reasoning about representations common to both false belief and false photograph tasks.     

No face-like processing for objects-of-expertise in three behavioural tasks

In the debate between expertise and domain-specific explanations of "special" processing for faces, a common belief is that behavioural studies support the expertise hypothesis. The present article refutes this view, via a combination of new data and review. We tested dog experts with confirmed good individuation of exemplars of their breed-of-expertise. In all experiments, standard results were confirmed for faces. However, dog experts showed no face-like processing for dogs on three behavioural tasks (inversion; the composite paradigm; and sensitivity to contrast reversal). The lack of holistic/configural processing, indicated in the first two of these tests, is shown by review to be consistent rather than inconsistent with previous studies of objects-of-expertise.     

Combining versus analyzing multiple causes: how domain assumptions and task context affect integration rules

In everyday life, people typically observe fragments of causal networks. From this knowledge, people infer how novel combinations of causes they may never have observed together might behave. I report on 4 experiments that address the question of how people intuitively integrate multiple causes to predict a continuously varying effect. Most theories of causal induction in psychology and statistics assume a bias toward linearity and additivity. In contrast, these experiments show that people are sensitive to cues biasing various integration rules. Causes that refer to intensive quantities (e.g., taste) or to preferences (e.g., liking) bias people toward averaging the causal influences, whereas extensive quantities (e.g., strength of a drug) lead to a tendency to add. However, the knowledge underlying these processes is fallible and unstable. Therefore, people are easily influenced by additional task-related context factors. These additional factors include the way data are presented, the difficulty of the inference task, and transfer from previous tasks. The results of the experiments provide evidence for causal model and related theories, which postulate that domain-general representations of causal knowledge are influenced by abstract domain knowledge, data-driven task factors, and processing difficulty.     

The Chinese Version of the Revised Creativity Domain Questionnaire (CDQ‐R): First Evidence for its Factorial Validity and Systematic Association with the Big Five

The present study examines the factor structure of a Chinese version of the Revised Creativity Domain Questionnaire (CDQ‐R; Kaufman, Waterstreet, Ailaouni, Whitcomb, Roe, & Riggs, 2009) as well as its relation to Big Five personality traits within a Chinese sample (N = 787). Analyses indicate the appropriateness of the Chinese version of the CDQ‐R in terms of internal consistency, factorial validity as well as convergent and divergent validity concerning the Big Five personality factors. Revealing some culture‐specific variation, confirmatory factor analysis indicated a slight superiority of a five‐factor model for this Chinese sample over the existing four‐factor model established with American samples. This higher level of differentiation in terms of one factor of the creativity domain could be explained on the basis of the specific characteristics of the Chinese culture.     

Knowledge as a formative construct: A good alpha is not always better

Measurements of domain knowledge very often use and report Cronbach's alpha or similar indicators of internal consistency for test construction. In this short article, we argue that this approach is often at odds with the theoretical conception of knowledge underlying the measure. While domain knowledge is usually described as a formative construct (formed by the manifest observations) theoretically, the use of Cronbach's alpha to construct and evaluate an empirical measure implies a reflective model (the construct reflects in manifest behaviors). After illustrating the difference between reflective and formative models, we illustrate how this mismatch between theoretical conception and empirical operationalization can have substantial implications for the assessment and modeling of domain knowledge. Specifically, the construct may be operationalized too narrowly or even be misinterpreted by applying criteria for item selection that focus on homogeneity such as Cronbach's alpha. Rather than maximizing items internal consistency, researchers constructing measures of domain knowledge should, therefore, make strong arguments for the theoretical merit of their items even if they are not correlated to each other.