Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

The relationship between disgust sensitivity, anxiety and obsessions

Three hundred participants, including volunteers from an obsessional support group, filled in questionnaires relating to disgust sensitivity, health anxiety, anxiety, fear of death, fear of contamination and obsessionality as part of an investigation into the involvement of disgust sensitivity in types of obsessions. Overall, the data supported the hypothesis that a relationship does exist between disgust sensitivity and the targeted variables. A significant predictive relationship was found between disgust sensitivity and total scores on the obsessive compulsive inventory (OCI; Psychological Assessment 10 (1998) 206) for both frequency and distress of symptomatology. Disgust sensitivity scores were significantly related to health anxiety scores and general anxiety scores and to all the obsessional subscales, with the exception of hoarding. Additionally, multiple regression analyses revealed that disgust sensitivity may be more specifically related to washing compulsions: frequency of washing behaviour was best predicted by disgust sensitivity scores. Washing distress scores were best predicted by health anxiety scores, though disgust sensitivity entered in the second model. It is suggested that further research on the relationship between disgust sensitivity and obsessionality could be helpful in refining the theoretical understanding of obsessions.     

Disgusting clusters: trypophobia as an overgeneralised disease avoidance response

Individuals with trypophobia have an aversion towards clusters of roughly circular shapes, such as those on a sponge or the bubbles on a cup of coffee. It is unclear why the condition exists, given the harmless nature of typical eliciting stimuli. We suggest that aversion to clusters is an evolutionarily prepared response towards a class of stimuli that resemble cues to the presence of parasites and infectious disease. Trypophobia may be an exaggerated and overgeneralised version of this normally adaptive response. Consistent with this explanation, individuals with trypophobia, as well as comparison individuals, reported aversion towards disease-relevant cluster stimuli, but only the trypophobic group reported aversion towards objectively harmless cluster stimuli that had no relevance to disease. For both groups the level of aversion reported was predicted uniquely by a measure of disgust sensitivity. Scaled emotion ratings and open-ended responses revealed that the aversive response was predominantly based on the disease avoidance emotion, disgust. Many open-ended responses also described skin sensations (e.g. skin itching or skin crawling). These findings support the proposal that individuals with trypophobia primarily perceive cluster stimuli as cues to ectoparasites and skin-transmitted pathogens.     

The mediating role of disgust sensitivity and thought‐action fusion between religiosity and obsessive compulsive symptoms

Psychological theories of obsessions and compulsions have long recognised that strict religious codes and moral standards might promote thought‐action fusion (TAF) appraisals. These appraisals have been implicated in the transformation of normally occurring intrusions into clinically distressing obsessions. Furthermore, increased disgust sensitivity has also been reported to be associated with obsessive compulsive (OC) symptoms. No research, however, has investigated the mediating roles of TAF and disgust sensitivity between religiosity and OC symptoms. This study was composed of 244 undergraduate students who completed measures of OC symptoms, TAF, disgust sensitivity, religiosity and negative effect. Analyses revealed that the relationship between religiosity and OC symptoms was mediated by TAF and disgust sensitivity. More importantly, the mediating role of TAF was not different across OC symptom subtypes, whereas the mediating role of disgust sensitivity showed different patterns across OC symptom subtypes. These findings indicate that the tendency for highly religious Muslims to experience greater OC symptoms is related to their heightened beliefs about disgust sensitivity and the importance of thoughts.     

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

Is it disgusting to be reminded that you are an animal?

Six studies (Ns?=?65, 96, 120, 129, 40, 200) tested the hypothesis that being reminded of our animal nature makes us feel disgust. Participants from three cultural groups indicated the intensity of their disgust reactions to pleasant and unpleasant animal reminder stories and pictures as well as to a statement directly reminding them of their animal nature. Findings did not support the hypothesis: Pleasant animal reminders reminded respondents of their animal nature (even more powerfully than did unpleasant ones), but were not disgusting. The direct reminder of our animal nature was not disgusting. There was no significant correlation between disgust and being reminded of animal nature for disgusting (unpleasant) animal reminders. Thus, some disgusting events remind us of our animal nature, but they are not disgusting because they remind us of our animal nature. Animal reminders per se are not disgusting.     

Moral judgment in adults with autism spectrum disorders

The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent’s intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.     

When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains

A key factor in legal and moral judgments is intent. Intent differentiates, for instance, murder from manslaughter. Is this true for all moral judgments? People deliver moral judgments of many kinds of actions, including harmful actions (e.g., assault) and purity violations (e.g., incest, consuming taboo substances). We show that intent is a key factor for moral judgments of harm, but less of a factor for purity violations. Based on the agent’s innocent intent, participants judged accidental harms less morally wrong than accidental incest; based on the agent’s guilty intent, participants judged failed attempts to harm more morally wrong than failed attempts to commit incest. These patterns were specific to moral judgments versus judgments of the agent’s control, knowledge, or intent, the action’s overall emotional salience, or participants’ ratings of disgust. The current results therefore reveal distinct cognitive signatures of distinct moral domains, and may inform the distinct functional roles of moral norms.     

Multimodal assessment of disgust in contamination-related obsessive-compulsive disorder

The present study utilizes multiple methods to examine the relationship between disgust and contamination-related obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms in an analogue sample. Questionnaire findings revealed that participants with high OCD contamination concerns showed stronger disgust sensitivity than did participants with low OCD contamination symptoms after controlling for negative affect. High OCD participants (N=30) also reported significantly more disgust than did low OCD participants (N=30) when exposed to a disgust-inducing video, whereas no significant between-group differences were detected on other negative emotional dimensions. Results from a series of disgust-specific behavioral avoidance tasks (BATs) revealed that high OCD participants demonstrated both less compliance and less approach behavior. Subsequent analysis also revealed that disgust sensitivity generally mediated avoidance on the BATs among high OCD subjects. High OCD participants also rated the BATs as more fearful and disgusting than did low OCD participants, with disgust generally emerging as the dominant emotional response. The results are consistent with a disgust-based, disease-avoidance approach in understanding contamination-related OCD themes.     

Mechanisms of change in ERP treatment of compulsive hand washing: does primary threat make a difference?

The present study sought to examine patterns of habituation in exposure and response prevention (ERP) treatment of compulsive hand washing. Sub-clinical compulsive washers (n=27) with illness or non-illness primary threats were compared in order to detect potential differences in response to a single session of ERP. Changes in anxiety, disgust, and urge to wash were analyzed, and significant reductions in both anxiety and disgust were noted. Urge to wash significantly declined among washers primarily concerned with illness; among those concerned with non-illness threats, urge to wash did not significantly decline. Moreover, anxiety was found to decline when controlling for disgust and vice versa. Lastly, when both anxiety and disgust were entered into a model predicting changes in urge to wash, anxiety but not disgust predicted urge to wash for those with illness-related threats; for washers with non-illness threats, the findings were the reverse. Several clinical and theoretical implications are discussed.