Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Instrumentalism and the Normative Authority of Desire

This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly Humean versions of instrumentalism that are among the most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary naturalistic position. It first offers a taxonomy of reasons for action and, in that light, formulates a plausible version of instrumentalism. It then raises difficulties for the view, some of them concerning the nature of desire. It also develops an epistemologically significant comparison of desires with beliefs. Given the magnitude of the difficulties, it outlines an alternative account of practical reason.     

DESIRE AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE ETHICS OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE EXPERIENCE

The analyst's desire expressed in impactful wishes and intentions is foundational to countertransference experience, yet undertheorized in the literature. The “wider” countertransference view, associated with neo‐Kleinian theory, obscures the nature of countertransference and the analyst's contribution to it. A systematic analysis of the logic of desire as an intentional mental state is presented. Racker's (1957) talion law and Lacan's (1992) theory of the dual relation illustrate the problems that obtain with a wholesale embrace of the wider countertransference perspective. The ethical burden placed on the analyst in light of the role played by desire in countertransference is substantial. Lacan's ethics of desire and Benjamin's (2004) concept of the moral third are discussed.     

Active desire

Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by behavioral and neural data which indicate that imagining can either strengthen or weaken our existing desires. Arguably, this influence is made possible by our capacity to imaginatively elaborate on the content of our desires. This gives a reason to think that what we desire is partially under our control. It is under our control only partially because we can influence our desires insofar as their content appears appealing to us in imagination.     

Aging: I don’t want to be a cyborg!

Examination is made of a range of cyborg solutions to bodily problems due to damage, but here with particular reference to aging. Both technological and animal implants, transplants and prosthetic devices are phenomenologically analyzed. The resultant trade-off phenomena are compared to popular culture technofantasies and desires and finally to human attitudes toward mortality and contingency. The parallelism of resistance to contingent existence and to becoming a cyborg is noted.     

“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires

In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development.     

Realism,Rational Action,and the Humean Theory of Motivation

Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in turn motivates the action. I argue that the realist who adopts a Humean model for explaining rational action will have a difficult time giving a plausible account of the role that desire plays in this explanation. I explore four interpretations of this role and argue that none allows a Humean theory to explain rational action as convincingly as an anti-Humean theory does. The first two models, in different ways, make acting on a reason impossible. The third allows this possibility, but only by positing a reason-sensitive desire that itself demands an explanation. The fourth avoids this explanatory challenge only by retreating to an empty form of the Humean view. In contrast, an anti-Humean theory can provide an intuitively plausible explanation of rational action. I conclude that the realist about reasons should adopt an anti-Humean theory to explain rational action.

Mortality salience and namesaking: Does thinking about death make people want to name their children after themselves?

According to terror management theory, people cope with the awareness of death by investing in practices that lead to symbolic immortality. The purpose of the present research was to investigate whether naming children after oneself stems from a desire to symbolically extend one’s life. Participants were primed with thoughts of death or a control topic and then asked the likelihood that they would name future offspring after themselves or relatives. Results showed that people in the mortality salience condition reported a greater likelihood of naming their children after themselves, but not after relatives. Attachment orientation moderated this effect in that anxious individuals in the mortality salience condition expressed an even greater desire to name their children after themselves.     

In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire

Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the actual complexity of the roles played by belief and desire and forces us to look for a single, fundamental contrast between these two that is unlikely to be found.

No Means Yes? Perpetuating Myths in the Sexological Construction of Women's Desire

The diagnosis and treatment of desire disorders are contentious issues within sexual medicine today. The issue of women's sexual desire (or rather lack of sexual desire) in particular, has highlighted a variety of problems within the current diagnostic framework for sexual dysfunctions. In an effort to rectify some of these problems, the concept of receptivity has been put forward by a number of clinicians with the suggestion that this better reflects women's experiences of desire. It is argued here, however, that he concept of receptivity presents serious problems for women in heterosexual relationships. Rather than helping women, furthering this concept may simply reinforce male sexual demands, curtail women's sexual autonomy, and promote coercive sex as an acceptable norm. It should therefore not be adopted by therapists.     

An Ethics for the Psychoanalyst in the Postmodern Age

Abstract

Paul Roazen, How Freud worked. First-hand accounts of patients Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1995.