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Derek Henry Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):377-394
I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
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Derek Henry BrownEmail: |
2.
Daniel Kolak 《Synthese》2008,162(3):341-372
Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians”
such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that
abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake
on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity.
Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either
completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that
relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity,
leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications,
is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity
of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic
way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness
clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism
with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal
identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry,
provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,”
“self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself. 相似文献
3.
Christopher Gauker 《Synthese》2008,165(3):359-371
The proposition expressed by a sentence is relative to a context. But what determines the content of the context? Many theorists would include among these determinants aspects of the speaker’s intention in speaking. My thesis is that, on the contrary, the determinants of the context never include the speaker’s intention. My argument for this thesis turns on a consideration of the role that the concept of proposition expressed in context is supposed to play in a theory of linguistic communication. To illustrate an alternative approach, I present an original theory of the reference of demonstratives according to which the referent of a demonstrative is the object that adequately and best satisfies certain accessibility criteria. Although I call my thesis zero tolerance for pragmatics, it is not an expression of intolerance for everything that might be called “pragmatics.” 相似文献
4.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):209-242
In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives
are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication
of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work,
I lay out these objections and respond to them.
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Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
5.
Allyson Mount 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):193-209
Within the class of indexicals, a distinction is often made between “pure” or “automatic” indexicals on one hand, and demonstratives
or “discretionary” indexicals on the other. The idea is supposed to be that certain indexicals refer automatically and invariably
to a particular feature of the utterance context: ‘I’ refers to the speaker, ‘now’ to the time of utterance, ‘here’ to the
place of utterance, etc. Against this view, I present cases where reference shifts from the speaker, time, or place of utterance
to some other object, time, or place. I consider and reject the claim that these counterexamples to the automatic indexical
theory all involve non-literal uses of indexicals and argue that they cannot be explained away on the grounds that they involve
conversational implicature or pretense. 相似文献
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