Critical reflections on second-generation mindfulness-based interventions

ObjectivesThe purpose of this paper is to provide a critical introduction on Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based Interventions (SG-MBIs) to sport and performance psychology scholars and practitioners.MethodThis essay is written as a commentary on Roychowdhury et al.’s, (2021, this issue) article in this issue. Specifically, I apply theoretical insights from Roychowdhury et al., (2021, this issue) to the practical model of SG-MBIs.ResultsI find that SG-MBIs attempt to respond to ethical concerns with the ways that mindfulness has been commodified, secularized, and universalized through appeals to cultural authenticity.DiscussionWhile acknowledging the cultural contexts from which practices like mindfulness have been taken is important, appeals to cultural authenticity often reproduce fixed and essentializing constructions of culture and are easily coopted by neoliberal multiculturalism.ConclusionAs sport and performance psychology professionals reflect on the next generation of mindfulness-based interventions, it will be important to attend to the contextual flexibility of neoliberalism to universalize and essentialize.     

Depiction and plastic perception. A critique of Husserl’s theory of picture consciousness

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).