The myth of regaining control: Ostracism increases superstitious tendencies

Whether and how interpersonal experiences predispose people to show superstitious tendencies have been largely unexamined by past studies. By adopting a multimethod approach, three studies tested (a) whether ostracism increases superstitious tendencies through thwarted perceived control, (b) whether the dispositional need for closure moderates the effect of ostracism on superstitious tendencies and (c) whether restoring ostracized people's thwarted control weakens their superstitious tendencies. The results revealed that ostracized participants had higher superstitious tendencies than nonostracized participants did (Studies 1–3). Moreover, thwarted control mediated the effect of ostracism on superstitious tendencies (Study 2). In addition, the dispositional need for closure moderated the effect of ostracism on superstitious tendencies, such that the effect was stronger among participants with a high need for closure (Studies 1–2). Finally, restoring ostracized participants' perceived control weakened the effect of ostracism on superstitious tendencies (Study 3). Altogether, these findings feature the essential role of thwarted perceived control in understanding the link between ostracism and superstitious tendencies and the implication of control restoration in weakening the link. They also highlight the importance of dispositional characteristics in moderating people's responses to superstitions following ostracism and related forms of interpersonal maltreatment.     

Effects of containment and closure policies on controlling the COVID‐19 pandemic in East Asia

Growing efforts have been made to pool coronavirus data and control measures from countries and regions to compare the effectiveness of government policies. We examine whether these strategies can explain East Asia’s effective control of the COVID‐19 pandemic based on time‐series data with cross‐correlations between the Stringency Index and number of confirmed cases during the early period of outbreaks. We suggest that multidisciplinary empirical research in healthcare and social sciences, personality, and social psychology is needed for a clear understanding of how cultural values, social norms, and individual predispositions interact with policy to affect life‐saving behavioural changes in different societies.     

Does inconsistency always lead to negative affect? The influence of need for closure on affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency

We present an experiment showing that need for closure (NFC)—defined as the epistemic desire for certainty—can moderate individuals' affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency. Informed by Kruglanski and colleagues' new theory, that cognitive inconsistency elicits negative affect particularly under certain circumstances, we find that NFC (i.e. the desire for certain, stable and unambiguous knowledge) influences the strength of consistency effects and resulting negative affect. More specifically, we find that individuals who are high on NFC experience more negative affect upon encountering an inconsistent (vs. consistent) cognition. However, when individuals are low on NFC, inconsistency is irrelevant, and their affect depends on whether the ultimate outcome of the cognition is positive or negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research.     

Avoiding negative vs. achieving positive outcomes in hard and prosperous economic times

Three studies suggest that business cycle fluctuations trigger distinct motivational orientations that selectively affect economic judgment and decision making. Economic contractions induce avoidance motivation and affect negative economic sentiment, but leave approach motivation and positive economic sentiment unaffected. In contrast, economic expansions induce approach motivation and positive economic sentiment, but do not affect avoidance motivation or negative economic sentiment (study 1). Moreover, economic contractions induce risk aversion for negative outcomes, but not for positive outcomes, while economic expansions instigate risk seeking for positive outcomes, but not for negative outcomes (study 2). A time-series study based on consumer spending over eight decades mirrors the findings of the experimental studies: The consumption of products associated with avoiding negative outcomes increases during economic contractions, but not during expansions. In contrast, the consumption of products associated with achieving positive outcomes increases in expansions, but is unaffected by contractions (study 3).     

Bridging the gap between joint and individual decisions: Deconstructing preferences in relationships

Most choice research has studied how people make decisions within a narrowly defined choice context and has not paid sufficient attention to the role of social context. We commend Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman for directing the attention of choice researchers to the study of joint decision making and current theories on relationships. Building on SGR, we propose that a relationship partner's influence varies with the type of decision at hand and with situational factors. We propose four possible types of decision episodes, defined by whether the decision stage and the consumption stage each occur singly or jointly, and explore how the decision type impacts the extent to which a decision maker will take a partner's preferences into account. We further discuss how situational factors, such as the environment in which the decision is made, as well as the mindset and cognitive resources of the decision maker, are likely to influence decision outcomes.     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.     

Differentiating intolerance of uncertainty from three related but distinct constructs

Individual differences in uncertainty have been associated with heightened anxiety, stress and approach-oriented coping. Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a trait characteristic that arises from negative beliefs about uncertainty and its consequences. Researchers have established the central role of IU in the development of problematic worry and maladaptive coping, highlighting the importance of this construct to anxiety disorders. However, there is a need to improve our understanding of the phenomenology of IU. The goal of this paper was to present hypotheses regarding the similarities and differences between IU and three related constructs – intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty orientation, and need for cognitive closure – and to call for future empirical studies to substantiate these hypotheses. To assist with achieving this goal, we conducted a systematic review of the literature, which also served to identify current gaps in knowledge. This paper differentiates these constructs by outlining each definition and general approaches to assessment, reviewing the existing empirical relations, and proposing theoretical similarities and distinctions. Findings may assist researchers in selecting the appropriate construct to address their research questions. Future research directions for the application of these constructs, particularly within the field of clinical and health psychology, are discussed.     

Besoin de cognition,besoin d’évaluer,besoin de clôture : proposition d’échelles en langue française et approche socio-normative des besoins dits fondamentaux

Introduction and objectivesAfter leading a validation of questionnaires about three fundamental needs in French language (need for cognition, closing and evaluation), we tested in two studies that fundamental needs could be subjected to social constraints and could be considered differently than exclusively like stable personality characteristics and motivational drivers of action.MethodUsing the paradigm of judges (study 1) and the paradigm of identification (study 2), the results argue for a normative approach, at least as regards the need for cognition and assess.ResultsThe results of the first study show that individuals consider more favorably targets with strong need rather than low need and especially in social contexts with high social utility (that is to say, the professional context in comparison with the friendly context). The results of the second study show that when the questionnaires about needs “as would a person having been previously well or poorly assessed” participants get higher scores high on the need for cognition questionnaire in the first case than in the second. The results regarding the need for closure are more mixed.ConclusionThe results are discussed in a socio-normative perspective.     

Personal choice: A blessing or a burden,or both? A cross‐cultural investigation on need for closure effects in two Western and two East‐Asian societies

The present study investigates the role of dispositional need for closure (NFC) in how individuals within a particular culture perceive and appreciate choice. Data sets from the US (283 adults), Europe (263 adults and 427 students), China (218 adults and 309 students) and Singapore (258 students) were collected. The results showed that in Western cultures, people perceived choice in a linear way as either a burden or a blessing, whereas in Chinese culture, such opposition between perspectives did not appear, and individuals generally saw choice as both burden and blessing simultaneously. In Western cultures, high dispositional NFC was strongly associated with viewing choice‐as‐a‐burden, whereas Chinese respondents with a high NFC perceived choice as a blessing and a burden simultaneously. The Singaporean results were similar to the Western pattern. These findings are discussed in terms of the NFC literature and cultural differences in dialectic versus differentiation thinking styles.     

Disparate roads to certainty processing strategy choices under need for closure

This paper describes a programme of research addressing an intriguing inconsistency in research findings about cognitive processes under a high need for cognitive closure (NFC). While early studies demonstrated that individuals who seek closure opt for closed-minded cognitive strategies, a growing body of research has identified a number of circumstances in which individuals who are high in NFC engage in effortful, open-minded information processing to an even greater extent than their low NFC counterparts. This has posed the challenge of delineating the circumstances under which people motivated to reduce uncertainty (i.e., attain closure) engage in effortful and open-minded cognition from those situations in which they rely on simplistic, low-effort strategies. This also calls for theoretical advancement in NFC theory. We discuss our proposed solution to this puzzle and the implications of this model for real-world social phenomena.