Aligning confidence with accuracy: revisiting the role of feedback

Evaluation point feedback was used to align confidence judgments with accurate/inaccurate responding to general knowledge questions. Rehearsal of item-answer pairs and three evaluation systems based on a scoring rule had different effects on confidence, accuracy and their relationship. Using standard calibration measures (Yates, J.F., (1990). Judgment and Decision Making. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall) we found that a point system comprising of both rewarding (positive) and punishing (negative) consequences produced the best performance across levels of knowledge in comparison to all-rewarding and all-penalty rules.     

The benefits of knowing what you know (and what you don’t): How calibration affects credibility

People tend to believe, and take advice from, informants who are highly confident. However, people use more than a mere “confidence heuristic.” We believe that confidence is influential because—in the absence of other information—people assume it is a valid cue to an informant’s likelihood of being correct. However, when people get evidence about an informant’s calibration (i.e., her confidence-accuracy relationship) they override reliance on confidence or accuracy alone. Two experiments in which participants choose between two opposing witnesses to a car accident show that neither confidence nor accuracy alone explains judgments of credibility; rather, whether a person is seen as credible ultimately depends on whether the person demonstrates good calibration. Credibility depends on whether sources were justified in believing what they believed.     

Confidence and accuracy of lineup selections and rejections: Postdicting rejection accuracy with confidence

Correlation and calibration approaches show meaningful, positive confidence-accuracy relations for witnesses making selections from lineups, but rarely for rejections (Brewer and Wells, 2006, Sauerland and Sporer, 2009). This disparity may reflect the difference between selecting a single photo versus rejecting a set of photos. Participants (N = 101) in two experiments made selections from and rejections of lineups in situations requiring either a single confidence rating about a single face (typical of “choosers”) or a single confidence rating about multiple faces (typical of “nonchoosers”). Mean confidence ratings were significantly higher for accurate versus inaccurate decisions for both selections and rejections when decisions were based on single faces. Single decisions about multiple faces produced no significant difference in confidence between correct and incorrect rejections but a significant difference for selections.     

Children's metacognitive judgments in an eyewitness identification task

Two experiments examined children's metacognitive monitoring of recognition judgments within an eyewitness identification paradigm. A confidence-accuracy (CA) calibration approach was used to examine patterns of calibration, over-/underconfidence, and resolution. In Experiment 1, children (n=619, mean age=11 years 10 months) and adults (n=600) viewed a simulated crime and attempted two separate identifications from 8-person target-present or target-absent lineups given lineup instructions that manipulated witnesses choosing patterns by varying the degree of social pressure. For choosers, but not nonchoosers, meaningful CA relations were observed for adults but not for children. Experiment 2 tested a guided hypothesis disconfirmation manipulation designed to improve the realism of children's metacognitive judgments. Children (N=796, mean age=11 years 11 months) in experimental and control conditions viewed a crime and attempted two separate identifications. The manipulation had minimal impact on the CA relation for choosers and nonchoosers. In contrast to adults, children's identification confidence provides no useful guide for investigators about the likely guilt or innocence of a suspect. These experiments revealed limitations in children's metacognitive monitoring processes that have not been apparent in previous research on recall and recognition with younger children.