The decision to check in multialternative choices and limited sensitivity to default

Given the rapid proliferation of smartphone applications and data aggregation websites, in many situations people can use decision aids to guide their choices. For example, they may consider whether to use a navigation device to check the fastest route or whether to use a price comparison website to find the cheapest deal. In what circumstances will subjects use a costly comparison decision aid (which I refer to as “checking”) to choose for them? In six studies, I investigate the impact of the number of available alternatives and checking's attractiveness on the decision to check. While at first increasing the attractiveness of checking led to higher checking rates, a further increase in the number of available alternatives (and thus checking's attractiveness) did not increase the checking rate. Surprisingly, even when checking had a 40% higher expected value compared with not checking, the observed checking rate was below 45%, contrary to risk and ambiguity aversion predictions. Furthermore, labeling the checking alternative as the default had no impact on its choice rate. I find large individual differences in decisions to check. Surprisingly, subjects' initial decisions had high predictive power over their subsequent checking rates, even after 100 trials with full feedback. I propose two simple learning models that capture well the aggregated results.     

Peer review: Selecting the best science

The major challenge facing today’s biomedical researchers is the increasing competition for available funds. The competitive review process, through which the National Institutes of Health (NIH) awards grants, is built upon review by a committee of expert scientists. The NIH is firmly committed to ensuring that its peer review system is fair and objective. Wendy Baldwin, Ph.D., is Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National Institutes of Health. This paper is based on a presentation at a workshop, “Advances in Peer Review Research”, American Association for the Advancement of Science Meeting, Baltimore, MD, February 9, 1996.     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

A compensatory approach to optimal selection with mastery scores

A Bayesian approach for simultaneous optimization of test-based decisions is presented using the example of a selection decision for a treatment followed by a mastery decision. A distinction is made between weak and strong rules where, as opposed to strong rules, weak rules use prior test scores as collateral data. Conditions for monotonicity of optimal weak and strong rules are presented. It is shown that under mild conditions on the test score distributions and utility functions, weak rules are always compensatory by nature. The authors are indebted to Wilbert Kallenberg for his valuable comments and to Jan Gulmans for providing the data for the empirical example. The names of the authors are alphabetical; they are equally responsible for the contents of this paper.     

New assessment systems for residential treatment,management, research,and evaluation: A symposium

An introduction and overview are presented to new observational assessment systems for ongoing assessment and monitoring of both staff and resident (client or patient) functioning in residential treatment programs for emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded adults.Preparation of articles and the research and development on which the articles are based was supported, in part, by Public Health Service Grants MH-15553 and MH-25464 from the National Institute of Mental Health, and by grants from the Joyce Foundation and the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.A symposium presented at the 87th Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, New York City, September 1979.     

Systems use to objectify program evaluation,clinical, and management decisions

The utility of the observational assessment systems at different levels — from local clinical to systemwide management — is outlined. An overview is provided of TSBC information applied to individualized problem identification and programming/monitoring, discharge and competency determinations, and both absolute and comparative program evaluation. The utility of SRIC information for prgoramming/monitoring and for staff training and evaluation is outlined in addition to the applied uses of the information of the assessment systems in combination. Once implemented, the continuous data from the systems allow for empirically based self-corrective improvements in the quality of mental health services while automatically providing a basis for legal documentation and accurate cost/effectiveness comparisons of mental health programs.Preparation of this article and the research and development on which the article is based were supported, in part, by Public Health Service Grants MH-15553 and MH-25464 from the National Institute of Mental Health, and by grants from The Joyce Foundation and the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.Presented at the 87th Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, New York City, September 1979, as part of a symposium on New assessment systems for residential treatment, management, research, and evaluation.     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

Termination of information evaluation in auditing

A screening decision is about whether a candidate fails to meet a decision maker's criteria and must be rejected, or whether it meets the criteria and can be accepted. Image theory contends that screening decisions are based on a simple, noncompensatory process that focuses solely upon the candidate's negative attributes. This contention has received empirical support in a job screening context in which students role-played a hypothetical person seeking a job. But how robust is image theory's prediction? The present work was done in the context of professional auditors screening prospective clients. The client screening context is a particularly interesting setting to test the implications of image theory. If auditors reject clients with negative attributes, as predicted by image theory, this will indicate that some clients are being denied access to a socially useful service. Further, auditors can accept prospective clients with negative attributes and simply adjust the audit plan and fees to compensate for the client's riskiness. Thus, it is not clear that the preliminary findings obtained in a job screening context will generalize to the audit context. On the other hand, results consistent with the image theory prediction would suggest a robust theory. Even in the client screening context, where auditors used their own criteria to screen prospective clients, we found overwhelming support for image theory's view of screening. The results indicate the potential payoffs of image theory as a robust framework to address audit and other substantive problems. Implications of a noncompensatory, negative oriented, client screening strategy are discussed.     

The influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes

After making decisions, we often get feedback concerning forgone outcomes (what would have happened had we chosen differently). Yet, many times, our exposure to such feedback is systematically biased. For example, your friends are more likely to tell you about a party you missed if it was fun than if it was boring. Despite its prevalence, the effects of biased exposure to forgone outcomes on future choice have not been directly studied. In three studies (five experiments) using a simplified learning task, we study the basic influence of biased exposure to forgone outcomes in the extreme case in which decision makers can easily infer the missing information such that the biased exposure carries almost no informational value. The results in all studies suggest that nevertheless, the biased exposure to forgone outcomes affected choice. Exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were better than the obtained outcomes (Only-Better-Forgone) increased selections of the forgone option compared with exposure to forgone outcomes only when they were worse than the obtained outcome (Only-Worse-Forgone). Moreover, relative to an unbiased exposure to all forgone outcomes, the effect of exposure to Only-Worse-Forgone was larger than the effect of exposure to Only-Better-Forgone feedback. However, these effects were not universal: In environments that include rare negative events (“disasters”), biased exposure to forgone outcomes had very little effect. We raise potential explanations and further discuss implications for marketing and risk awareness.