On the psychology of ‘if only’: Regret and the comparison between factual and counterfactual outcomes

People experience regret when they realize that they would have been better off had they decided differently. Hence, a central element in regret is the comparability of a decision outcome with the outcomes forgone. Up to now, however, the comparison process that is so essential to the experience of regret has not been the subject of psychological research. In this article, we tune in on the comparison dependency of regret. We argue that factors that reduce the tendency to compare attenuate regret, and demonstrate that uncertainty about counterfactual outcomes (Experiment 1), and incomparability of counterfactual and factual outcomes (Experiments 2 and 3) produce such effects.     

The monadic second-order logic of graphs XV: On a conjecture by D. Seese

A conjecture by D. Seese states that if a set of graphs has a decidable monadic second-order theory, then it is the image of a set of trees under a transformation of relational structures defined by monadic second-order formulas, or equivalently, has bounded clique-width. We prove that this conjecture is true if and only if it is true for the particular cases of bipartite undirected graphs, of directed graphs, of partial orders and of comparability graphs. We also prove that it is true for line graphs, for interval graphs and for partial orders of dimension 2. Our treatment of certain countably infinite graphs uses a representation of countable linear orders by binary trees that can be constructed by monadic second-order formulas. By using a counting argument, we show the intrinsic limits of the methods used here to handle this conjecture.     

The impact of different product formats on inaction inertia

ABSTRACT

The inaction inertia effect describes situations in which a person rejects an opportunity after having forgone a relatively superior opportunity. This study explores whether product format (hedonic vs. utilitarian) affects the inaction inertia effect. The authors build on previous findings that show comparisons of utilitarian benefits are easier than hedonic benefits, and hedonic consumption (vs. utilitarian consumption) usually generates greater pleasure. The authors propose that people show higher inaction inertia after they have missed a superior utilitarian consumption opportunity than after they have missed a superior hedonic consumption opportunity. This prediction was tested and supported in three different experiments. Moreover, the authors found that differences in comparability between products, rather than the hedonic pleasure, explain differences in inaction inertia effects. These findings contribute to the inaction inertia literature and marketing practice.     

The Subjectivity Inherent in Objective Measures of Well-Being

Claims abound that GDP accounting ignores social and ecological problems and misrepresents social well-being. While GDP growth continues to be a policy priority in most countries, it is at best one objective among many in achieving humanity’s “ultimate purpose.” Yet revisions to the income accounts and alternative well-being indicators are also problematic, since they reinforce the illusion that social and ecological impacts on well-being are objectively measurable. Future policy must not only be informed to a greater extent by qualitative and multi-dimensional assessments, but must recognize that any rank-ordering of society’s ultimate ends cannot but be subjective.