Clustering colors

Regier, Kay, and Khetarpal report the results of computer simulations that cluster color stimuli on the basis of their coordinates in CIELAB space, one of two commonly used perceptual color spaces. Regier and coauthors find partitions of those stimuli that are strikingly similar to the way actual color lexicons partition color space. They do not argue for the custom-made clustering method used in their simulations, nor for the assumption of CIELAB space. The present paper aims to answer the question to what extent their computational results depend on these assumptions. It does this by applying a great variety of known clustering methods to Regier et al.’s stimuli, and by assuming not only CIELAB space but also CIELUV space, the other main color space.     

More is more: The relationship between vocabulary size and word extension

This study experimentally tested the relationship between children’s lexicon size and their ability to learn new words within the domain of color. We manipulated the size of 25 20-month-olds’ color lexicons by training them with two, four, or six different color words over the course of eight training sessions. We subsequently tested children’s ability to extend new color words to new instances. We found that training with a broader number of color words led to increased extension of new words. The results suggest that children’s learning history predicts their ability to learn new words within domains.     

The impact of uniform color on judging tackles in association football

ObjectivesThe aim of the study was to question whether uniform color had any impact on judging tackles in football.DesignFifty-two videos showing the tackles of an achromatic and a chromatic team were individually presented in random order. The chromatic team's uniform color was changed to blue, green, red and yellow.MethodsFootball referees and participants with a high and minor level of understanding of the rules of football judged the roughness of each tackle.ResultsBy analyzing all four colors, results did not reveal any impact of uniform color. Restricting analysis to blue and red showed that referees and participants with a high level of understanding of the rules judged tackles from behind more harshly for players wearing red.ConclusionsThe study found some empirical support for associating red with aggression and emphasized a differential impact of blue versus red uniforms for tackles committed from behind.     

Objective Explanations of Individual Well-being

Empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being is informed by the researchers' philosophical conception of the nature of well-being and, consequently, the adequacy of such research is partly determined by the plausibility of this conception. Philosophical theories of human well-being divide into subjective and objective. Subjective theories make our well-being dependent on our attitudes of favour and disfavour. Objective theories deny this dependency. This article discusses objective theories of individual well-being from the point of view of their explanatory power and argues that these theories are unable to provide an acceptable account of the prudential goodness of what they consider to be good for human beings. The article concludes by discussing some implications of its main argument to empirical research on questions pertaining to individual well-being. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.