Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

Aging drivers and post delineated express lanes: Threading the needle at 70 miles per hour

Post-delineated express lanes represent a combination of driving complexities that are particularly difficult for older drivers to navigate. The narrow geometry and high speeds that are common to this treatment reflect a critical test for drivers whose depth perception, contrast sensitivity, and visual processing speed are reduced. The present study was designed to empirically examine the effects of age and color of express lane delineators on driver behavior. Three groups of participants (aged 18–39, 40–64, and 65 + years old) were required to complete a series of simulated driving scenarios consisting of combinations of single and dual lane configurations, with speed and lane position measured at the beginning and midpoint of each express lane. All drivers were pre-screened on various visual functioning abilities. Drivers in the 65 and older group show significant age-related declines in depth perception, contrast sensitivity, and phoria which were subsequently correlated with a wide range of driving measures including deceleration rate, brake time, jerk, speed, and lane position. Age related perceptual declines were statistically correlated with slower driving speed and wider lane deviations, including a statistically significant increase in the number of excursions beyond the typical 12-foot lane width. Based on these findings, the behavior of senior drivers was identified as a distinct design condition that should govern the design of high-speed, narrow geometric conditions. This age group requires wider lane widths, particularly at the beginning of single-lane post delimited sections, wider buffer areas around the post markers, and dual lane configurations wherever possible.     

Color charts, esthetics, and subjective randomness

Color charts, or grids of evenly spaced multicolored dots or squares, appear in the work of modern artists and designers. Often the artist/designer distributes the many colors in a way that could be described as "random," that is, without an obvious pattern. We conduct a statistical analysis of 125 "random-looking" art and design color charts and show that they differ significantly from truly random color charts in the average distance between adjacent colors. We argue that this attribute generalizes results in subjective randomness in a black/white setting and gives further evidence supporting a connection between subjective randomness and what is esthetically pleasing.     

Color-object interference: Further tests of an executive control account

Young children are slower in naming the color of a meaningful picture than in naming the color of an abstract form (Stroop-like color-object interference). The current experiments tested an executive control account of this phenomenon. First, color-object interference was observed in 6- and 8-year-olds but not in 12- and 16-year-olds (Experiment 1). Second, meaningful pictures did not interfere in 5- to 7-year-olds’ manual sorting of objects on the basis of color (Experiment 2) or in their naming the number of colored objects in the display, that is, subitizing (Experiment 3). These findings provide support for the view that color-object interference results from the children’s immature inhibition of the prepotent but irrelevant task of object naming.     

The impact of uniform color on judging tackles in association football

ObjectivesThe aim of the study was to question whether uniform color had any impact on judging tackles in football.DesignFifty-two videos showing the tackles of an achromatic and a chromatic team were individually presented in random order. The chromatic team's uniform color was changed to blue, green, red and yellow.MethodsFootball referees and participants with a high and minor level of understanding of the rules of football judged the roughness of each tackle.ResultsBy analyzing all four colors, results did not reveal any impact of uniform color. Restricting analysis to blue and red showed that referees and participants with a high level of understanding of the rules judged tackles from behind more harshly for players wearing red.ConclusionsThe study found some empirical support for associating red with aggression and emphasized a differential impact of blue versus red uniforms for tackles committed from behind.     

The relation between children's conceptual functioning with color and color term acquisition

Young children experience considerable difficulty in learning their first few color terms. One explanation for this difficulty is that initially they lack a conceptual representation of color sufficiently abstract to support word meaning. This hypothesis, that prior to learning color terms children do not represent color as an abstraction, was tested in two experiments using samples of 25- to 39-month-olds and 20- to 32-month-olds. Children's ability to conceptually represent color and their knowledge of color terms were assessed, and a strong association was found between the ability to make inferences based on color and the comprehension of color words. Children who did not comprehend color terms were unsuccessful at a conceptual task that required them to represent color as a property independent of the particular objects that displayed it. The results suggest that the initial absence of an abstract representation of color contributes to the difficulty that young children encounter when first learning color words.     

Taking the task seriously: reflections on measures of color acquisition

The experiments described in the lead articles by Kowalski and Zimiles and by O'Hanlon and Roberson examine factors that lead to color term acquisition. These experiments touch on the debate regarding the relative contributions of language and concepts in word learning. In this reflection, we examine how conclusions concerning the debate depend deeply on the particular task presented to children, and we propose an alternative approach to studying color term acquisition.     

Infants’ recognition of objects using canonical color

We explored infants’ ability to recognize the canonical colors of daily objects, including two color-specific objects (human face and fruit) and a non-color-specific object (flower), by using a preferential looking technique. A total of 58 infants between 5 and 8 months of age were tested with a stimulus composed of two color pictures of an object placed side by side: a correctly colored picture (e.g., red strawberry) and an inappropriately colored picture (e.g., green-blue strawberry). The results showed that, overall, the 6- to 8-month-olds showed preference for the correctly colored pictures for color-specific objects, whereas they did not show preference for the correctly colored pictures for the non-color-specific object. The 5-month-olds showed no significant preference for the correctly colored pictures for all object conditions. These findings imply that the recognition of canonical color for objects emerges at 6 months of age.     

A normative study of the Children’s Color Trails Test (CCTT) in the Cypriot population

Background: The Children’s Color Trails Test (CCTT) is a neuropsychological test that measures attention, divided attention, and speed of mental processing. It has been increasingly used in the assessment of children in cross-cultural environments for neurological and psychiatric disorders such as seizures and closed head injuries, learning and/or language disabilities, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, children with manganese exposure, and children diagnosed with HIV virus. However, there is a paucity of studies presenting normative data. The aim of the present study was to provide normative data for the CCTT in the Cypriot population. Methods: A total of 709 native Cypriot children aged 7–16 years, recruited from various public schools across the island, took part in the study. Exclusion criteria involved the existence of neurological, psychiatric, cardiological, and metabolic diseases, premature birth, history of maternal alcohol and drug abuse during pregnancy, low birth weight, hearing loss, visual problems, native language other than Greek, and abnormality in fine-motor movements. Results: Age and gender were found to be important factors for the interpretation of scores in all CCTT variables. Older children required less time and exhibited fewer errors, near misses, and prompts compared to younger children. There was a consistent pattern of a 3–4 seconds improvement (less time in seconds) in the CCTT completion time as age increased. Conclusions: CCTT is a promising tool for the measurement of attention in the native Cypriot population. Further research is needed in children diagnosed with various neurological and psychiatric diseases in order to estimate validity of the CCTT in clinical populations.     

When Subjectivism Matters

Abstract: In this article I consider when the question of whether entities exist subjectively (only in the minds of subjects) or objectively (in themselves, independently of the minds of subjects) is important, both theoretically and practically. I argue that when it comes to the metaphysics underlying three types of moral questions, broadly conceived, the subjectivity question does not matter practically, although it is widely thought to matter. Subjectivism does not matter in these moral questions in the same way(s) it matters in some nonmoral metaphysical issues. The moral questions I consider are the meaning of life, normative ethics, and the free‐will problem. The nonmoral issues I address are the existence of God, the traditional mind/body problem, and personal identity. I explain the difference by noting that certain metaphysical issues on the fact side of the fact/value distinction impinge on persons' lives more prominently than do the metaphysics behind the three moral questions.