Science and politics: Dangerous liaisons

In contrast to the opinion of numerous authors (e.g. R. Rudner, P. Kitcher, L. R. Graham, M. Dummett, N. Chomsky, R. Lewontin, etc.) it is argued here that the formation of opinion in science should be greatly insulated from political considerations. Special attention is devoted to the view that methodological standards for evaluation of scientific theories ought to vary according to the envisaged political uses of these theories.I wish to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for having supported the work on this paper.     

Comments on Hughes and Sussman''s time-sharing study of cerebral laterality in language-disordered and normal children

M. Hughes and H. M. Sussman (1983, Brain and Language, 19, 48-64) suggest that the time-sharing paradigm "does not serve as an adequate behavioral index for language lateralization in children." The merits of this conclusion are considered and general interpretative issues regarding manual interference in dual-task/time-sharing studies are discussed.     

A maximum likelihood hierarchical disaggregate model for predicting choices of individuals

The absence of operational disaggregate lexicographic decision models and Tversky's observation that choice behavior is often inconsistent, hierarchical, and context dependent motivate the development of a maximum likelihood hierarchical (MLH) choice model. This new disaggregate choice model requires few assumptions and accommodates the three aspects of choice behavior noted by A. Tversky (1972, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 9, 341–367). The model has its foundation in a prototype model developed by the authors. Unlike the deterministic prototype, however, MLH is a probabilistic model which generates maximum likelihood estimators of the aggregate “cutoff values.” The model is formulated as a concave programming problem whose solutions are therefore globally optimal. Finally, the model is applied to data from three separate studies where it is demonstrated to have superior performance over the prototype model in its predictive performance.     

Food anticipation and lever-directed activities in rats

Three experiments are described which elaborate some of the conditions under which rats will contact and manipulate a periodically presented retractable lever. Experiment 1 demonstrated that (i) initial manipulative oral and manual contact with the lever was facilitated if the rat had previous experience of food delivery in the experimental chamber; (ii) persistence in contacting the lever on successive presentations was a function of whether food continued to be presented in the experimental environment; and (iii) food satiation significantly reduced the tendency of the rat to contact the lever even though an expectancy of food had previously been established under conditions of food deprivation. Experiment 2 suggested that the tendency to approach and contact the lever was in part a function of the local moment-to-moment conditional probability of food delivery. Experiment 3 found that the probability of contacting the lever was higher during presentation of an auditory CS signaling a high rate of food delivery than during stimuli signaling no food at all. These results are interpreted as suggesting that the food-signaling aspects of an appetitive CS and that CS's ability to generate signal-directed behaviors are experimentall separable properties.     

Création de l’Échelle de Distorsions Cognitives pour adultes (EDC-A) : étude des propriétés psychométriques en population générale et association avec l’anxiété et la dépression

IntroductionCognitive distortions contribute to the maintenance of inappropriate cognitive schemas and play a role in the emergence of pathologies such as anxiety and depression. We developed the Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults in order to identify distortions in individuals’ reasoning. The main objectives of this study were: (1) to study the psychometric properties of the Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults, (2) to identify cognitive distortions associated with anxiety and depression in the general population.MethodThe study involved 916 participants (151 men and 765 women) aged 18 to 85-years. The participants completed the Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults. The tool presents 42 mini scenarios with a daily life situation and a proposition concerning a cognitive distortion. Participants must give their degree of agreement (0 to 10) with this one. Seven cognitive distortions are operationalized (dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one of the poles, arbitrary focusing, omission of the neutral, requalification in the other pole, maximization and minimization). They also completed the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Both scales were available online on the Internet. The total duration of the test was approximately 10 minutes. A group of 35 participants completed the two scale 15 days apart.ResultsThe sub-dimensions of EDC-A obtain Cronbach alphas higher than .65 and EDC-A has a coherent factor structure. The scale has good temporal stability. Anxiety is predicted by dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one of the poles, arbitrary focusing and maximization. Depression is predicted by dichotomous reasoning, arbitrary focusing, omission of the neutral and requalification in the other pole. Anxiety and depression are associated with negative cognitive distortions in reasoning. However, depression is also associated with positive cognitive distortions. Subjects with depression produce more varied cognitive distortions than subjects with anxiety.DiscussionThe Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults shows promising psychometric properties. Further studies will need to be conducted to confirm these results. Anxiety would be related to biased information treatment of negative information, whereas depression would be related to more comprehensive biased information treatment, both negative and positive information. Anxiety would be related to suboptimal functioning of reasoning abilities; depression would be more characterized by a structural deficit of reasoning abilities.     

Does Analytic Thinking Insulate Against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation? Evidence From Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have long targeted Ukraine. We investigate susceptibility to this pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective. Is greater analytic thinking associated with less belief in disinformation, as per classical theories of reasoning? Or does analytic thinking amplify motivated system 2 reasoning (or “cultural cognition”), such that analytic thinking is associated with more polarized beliefs (and thus more belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation among pro-Russia Ukrainians)? In online (N = 1,974) and face-to-face representative (N = 9,474) samples of Ukrainians, we find support for the classical reasoning account. Analytic thinking, as measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test, was associated with greater ability to discern truth from disinformation—even for Ukrainians who are strongly oriented towards Russia. We find similar, albeit weaker, results when operationalizing analytic thinking using the self-report Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale. These results demonstrate a similar pattern to prior work using American participants. Thus, the positive association between analytic thinking and the ability to discern truth versus falsehood generalizes to the qualitatively different information environment of postcommunist Ukraine. Despite low trust in government and media, weak journalistic standards, and years of exposure to Russian disinformation, Ukrainians who engage in more analytic thinking are better able to tell truth from falsehood.     

Examining the roles of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion on the effects from mindfulness to athlete burnout: A longitudinal study

ObjectivesAthlete burnout is a maladaptive outcome that is potentially detrimental for performance and wellbeing. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that mindfulness might be associated with athlete burnout via experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion. In the current study, we extend knowledge of these hypothesized mediational pathways using a longitudinal design.MethodsData was collected at three occasions with a three-month interval. A final sample of 280 elite Chinese athletes aged 15–32 years (M_age = 19.13; SD = 2.92; Female = 130) reported their mindfulness at Time 1, experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion at Time 2, and athlete burnout at Time 3. Structural equation modelling was adopted to examine the mediating roles of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion on the effects from mindfulness to athlete burnout.ResultsWe found statistically meaningful directs effects from mindfulness (Time 1) to experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion (Time 2), which in turn influenced athlete burnout (Time 3). However, the direct effect from mindfulness at Time 1 to athlete burnout at Time 3 was non-significant. The indirect effects of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion on the effects from mindfulness to athlete burnout were significant, providing longitudinal evidence that these two variables contribute meaningfully to the mindfulness-burnout pathway.ConclusionWith initial evidence for the mediating effects of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion, future studies could consider using experimental designs to examine the potential changing mechanisms of mindfulness on reducing athlete burnout.     

Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.