Towards structural systematicity in distributed,statically bound visual representations

The problem of representing the spatial structure of images, which arises in visual object processing, is commonly described using terminology borrowed from propositional theories of cognition, notably, the concept of compositionality. The classical propositional stance mandates representations composed of symbols, which stand for atomic or composite entities and enter into arbitrarily nested relationships. We argue that the main desiderata of a representational system—productivity and systematicity—can (indeed, for a number of reasons, should) be achieved without recourse to the classical, proposition‐like compositionality. We show how this can be done, by describing a systematic and productive model of the representation of visual structure, which relies on static rather than dynamic binding and uses coarsely coded rather than atomic shape primitives.     

Individual differences in reverse Hindsight bias: I never thought something like chernobyl would happen. Did I?

Hindsight bias was studied in the context of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which took place on April 26th 1986. An individual difference factor which relates to the motivation to process information, need for cognition, was expected to moderate the occurrence of hindsight bias. Probability estimates of many casualties due to the use of nuclear power in The Netherlands were obtained from 212 individuals two months before the accident in Chernobyl. These estimates were compared with similar estimates made in hindsight by the same individuals five months after the accident. Loglinear Analyses reveal a systematic hindsight bias. However, the direction of the bias was contrary to expectations. In hindsight, individuals gave lower probabilities than they actually did two months before the Chernobyl accident. These results reveal a reverse hindsight bias. As hypothesized, need for cognition moderates hindsight bias: individuals low and medium in need for cognition express a systematic reverse hindsight bias, while individuals high in need for cognition do not. High need for cognition individuals also show higher literal consistency between the two measurements, which supports a memory explanation of the moderating effect of need for cognition.     

Purposive behaviour in cognition and perception: Considerations of awareness in memory

The responses to the original article by Rönnberg (1990a) provoked interesting and thoughtful points of view that are covered by Gärling (1990), Hjelmquist (1990), Montgomery (1991), and Runeson (1990). These articles do not merely present a different outlook but also provide concepts that are certainly worthy of consideration and add more substance to the general topic under discussion. The purpose of this commentary is to seek an understanding of the ideas presented by the above authors within a synthesis of our views of current conceptualizations in cognition and perception. Each of the original criteria (Rönnberg, 1990a) will be treated in turn.     

A French validation of the short Need For Affect scale

IntroductionThe way we interact with our environment depends on our spontaneous tendency to approach or to avoid emotional experiences triggered by that environment. This dimension of the emotional experience is called the need for affect, that is, the tendency of individuals to adopt approaching or avoidance behaviour with regard to emotional stimuli.MethodsThe Need For Affect (NFA) Scale has been the subject of numerous studies since the validation of the original version (Maio & Esses, 2001) and its short version (Appel et al., 2012). However, no validation of the latter scale has been conducted in French. We propose a French version of the short NFA scale on a student sample and a sample from the general population.ResultsWe found the structure of the original scale in a French translation (of the English version). In addition, invariance tests showed that this structure remained the same for both samples.ConclusionWe recommend the use of this version of the short NFA scale for studies conducted on French-speaking samples.     

Effects of acute endurance,strength, and coordination exercise interventions on attention in adolescents: A randomized controlled study

ObjectivesThe aim of this study was to compare three different modes of an acute bout of exercise – endurance, strength, and coordination – in their effects on adolescents' attention.DesignThis was a preregistered, prospective, randomized intervention study with four groups and two distinct measurement occasions.MethodEighty adolescent students aged 15–18 years were randomized to one of three exercise intervention groups (endurance, strength, coordination) or to a non-exercise, control group. The exercise interventions lasted for 25 min. The random assignment to the study groups was stratified according to participants' age and gender. Before and after the exercise intervention, all participants completed the revised d2-test of attention. A 4 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with contrast-coded test was used as the main analysis method.ResultsAttentional test performance increased from before to after the exercise intervention for all exercise groups, as compared with the control group. The three exercise groups improved equally and did not differ in their attentional scores after the intervention.ConclusionsAn acute bout of exercise was in general beneficial for adolescent students' attention, while the mode of the provided exercise training was not decisive. School directors and teachers are encouraged to incorporate exercise-related breaks into their school plan.     

Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.     

Exploring the mediating role of integrative self-knowledge in the relationship between mindfulness and well-being in the context of a mindfulness-based stress reduction program

Mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) is an effective program for improving well-being. A growing body of studies is exploring the mechanisms mediating its beneficial effects. Integrative self-knowledge (ISK) is the construct of focus in this study. The primary goal of the current study was to investigate the mediating role of ISK in the relationship between improved mindful observing (MO), non-judging inner experience (NJ), and well-being following an MBSR program with an Iranian sample. Participants (n = 118) enrolled in MBSR and completed depression, anxiety, stress (DASS), Bartone Symptoms Checklist (BSC), Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, and ISK scale before and after the program. Results showed significant reductions in BSC, DASS, and improvements in MO, NJ, and ISK at the end of the program. Mediation analyses revealed that changes in ISK significantly mediated the relationship between changes in MO and NJ and symptoms (MO indirect effect on DASS: β = 0.11, confidence interval [CI] [0.003, 0.29]; NJ indirect effect on DASS: β = 0.12, CI [−0.16, 0.45]; MO indirect effect on BSC: β = 0.08, CI [0.001, 0.27]; NJ indirect effect on BSC: β = 0.09, CI [0.01, 0.22]). Improvements in MO and NJ may provide a pathway to cultivating ISK in MBSR, which may lead to enhanced well-being.     

Cognitive Evaluation of Machine Learning Agents

Advances in applying statistical Machine Learning (ML) led to several claims of human-level or near-human performance in tasks such as image classification & speech recognition. Such claims are unscientific primarily for two reasons, (1) They incorrectly enforce the notion that task-specific performance can be treated as manifestation of General Intelligence and (2) They are not verifiable as currently there is no set benchmark for measuring human-like cognition in a machine learning agent. Moreover, ML agent’s performance is influenced by knowledge ingested in it by its human designers. Therefore, agent’s performance may not necessarily reflect its true cognition. In this paper, we propose a framework that draws parallels from human cognition to measure machine’s cognition. Human cognitive learning is quite well studied in developmental psychology with frameworks and metrics in place to measure actual learning. To either believe or refute the claims of human-level performance of machine learning agent, we need scientific methodology to measure its cognition. Our framework formalizes incremental implementation of human-like cognitive processes in ML agents with an implicit goal to measure it. The framework offers guiding principles for measuring, (1) Task-specific machine cognition and (2) General machine cognition that spans across tasks. The framework also provides guidelines for building domain-specific task taxonomies to cognitively profile tasks. We demonstrate application of the framework with a case study where two ML agents that perform Vision and NLP tasks are cognitively evaluated.     

The impact of cognitive functioning on driving performance of older persons in comparison to younger age groups: A systematic review

Older drivers are at a severely higher risk for motor vehicle crash involvement. Due to the global aging of the population, this increased crash risk has a significant impact on society, as well as on an older individual’s quality of life. For this reason, there is a need for understanding how normal age-related changes in cognition and underlying brain dynamics impact driving performance to identify the functional and neurophysiological biomarkers that could be used to design strategies to preserve or improve safe driving behavior in older persons. This review provides an overview of the literature on age-related changes in cognitive functioning and brain dynamics that impact driving simulator performance of healthy persons. A systematic literature search spanning the last ten years was conducted, resulting in 22 eligible studies. Results indicated that various aspects of cognition, most importantly executive function, complex attention, and dual tasking, were associated with driving performance, irrespective of age. However, there was a distinct age-related decline in cognitive and driving performance. Older persons had a more variable, less consistent driving simulator performance, such as more variable speed adaptation or less consistent lane keeping behavior. Only a limited number of studies evaluated the underlying brain dynamics in driving performance. Therefore, future studies should focus on implementing neuroimaging techniques to further unravel the neural correlates of driving performance.