Soames on Russell’s logic: a reply

In “What is History For?,” Scott Soames responds to criticisms of his treatment of Russell’s logic in volume 1 of his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. This note rebuts two of Soames’s replies, showing that a first-order presentation of Russell’s logic does not fit the argument of the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, and that Soames’s contextual definition of classes does not match Russell’s contextual definition of classes. In consequence, Soames’s presentation of Russell’s logic misrepresents what Russell took to be its technical achievement and its philosophical significance.     

No class: Russell on contextual definition and the elimination of sets

The article rebutts Michael Kremer’s contention that Russell’s contextual definition of set-theoretic language in Principia Mathematica constituted the ontological achievement of eliminating commitment to classes. Although Russell’s higher-order quantifiers, used in the definition, need not range over classes, none of the plausible substitutes provide a solid basis for eliminating them. This point is used to defend the presentation, in The Dawn of Analysis, of Russell’s logicist reduction, using a first-order version of naive set theory.

Apprentissage de concepts perceptuels, associationnels et relationnels chez le pigeon

The study of concepts in cognitive psychology has generally been anthropocentric with respect to both content and theory. A broader comparative perspective on the various forms of concept learning would provide a more inclusive view of conceptual behavior. It would also provide a more objective perspective from which to identify underlying processes. Several of the major varieties of conceptual classes claimed for humans alone also appear to be represented in nonhuman animals and young children: perceptual classes involving classification according to the shared attributes of objects, associative classes or functional equivalences in which stimuli form a class based on common associations and relational classes, in which the conceptual relationship between stimuli defines the class.