Repeated checking causes memory distrust

This paper attempts to explain why in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) checkers distrust in memory persists despite extensive checking. It is argued that: (1) repeated checking increases familiarity with the issues checked; (2) increased familiarity promotes conceptual processing which inhibits perceptual processing; (3) inhibited perceptual processing makes recollections less vivid and detailed and finally; (4) reduction in vividness and detail promotes distrust in memory. An interactive computer animation was developed in which participants had to perform checking rituals on a virtual gas stove. Two separate experiments were carried out with n=39 (Experiment I) and n=40 (Experiment II) healthy participants. In both studies, the control group and the experimental group were given the same pre-test and post-test on the virtual gas stove. In between, the experimental group engaged in 'relevant checking', i.e. checking the gas stove, while the control group engaged in 'irrelevant checking', i.e. checking virtual light bulbs. In both experiments there were powerful effects of repeated 'relevant checking': while actual memory accuracy remained unaffected, the vividness and detail of the recollections were greatly reduced. Most pertinently, in both experiments relevant checking undermined confidence in memory. No such effects were observed in the control group. One might argue that the pre-test/post-test design may have made the control group anticipate a memory assessment at the post-test and that this artifact made them relatively alert producing memory confidence at post test that was artificially high. A third experiment was carried out (n=2 x 20) in which no pre-test was given while, other than that, Experiment III was identical to the first two experiments. Results confirmed earlier findings: compared to the irrelevant checking control group, recollections in the relevant checking group were non-vivid, non-detailed while confidence in memory was low. The theory and data suggest an answer to the question 'why memory distrust persists despite repetitive checking'. In people who check extensively, memory distrust may persist as a result of repetitive checking. OCD checking may be motivated by the wish to reduce uncertainty, but checking appears to be a counter-productive safety strategy. Rather than reducing doubt, checking fosters doubt and ironically increases meta-memory problems.     

Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction

In earlier experiments using interactive computer animation with healthy subjects, it was found that displaying compulsive-like repeated checking behavior affects memory. That is, checking does not alter actual memory accuracy, but it does affect 'meta-memory': as checking continues, recollections are experienced as less vivid and less detailed while confidence in memory is undermined. This procedure provides a model of OCD checking and suggests that checking is a counterproductive strategy to reduce memory distrust. The present experiment was carried out to specify the phenomenological quality of memory distrust after checking and to see if repeated checking produces a shift in the memory source that is used to decide about the outcome of checking: from 'remembering' to 'knowing' (Tulving, 1985). Using the same interactive computer-animation, the earlier findings on vividness, detail and confidence were replicated. In addition, it was found that checking made participants endorse quotations from OCD patients (Reed, 1985) expressing a specific ambivalence about memory: 'It is as though the memory is there, but is isn't definite enough', 'I remember doing it in a way, but it's all fuzzy....' And 'I can remember that I've done it. But the memory isn't clear somehow'. This finding adds to the validity of the experimental model. Furthermore, after checking subjects' beliefs about the outcome of checking became based on (general) knowing instead of (specific) remembering. It is suggested that OCD checkers feel a general and relatively strong need to be certain about the veracity of recollections and that they have high standards for memory performance. This may explain earlier findings that OCD checkers have a general tendency to distrust their episodic memory. A need for certainty and a critical attitude towards memory performance may not be problematic or abnormal. It is suggested that clinical problems arise when the patient tries to fight memory distrust by repeated checking. The latter does not reduce distrust but rather increases distrust and the patient may get trapped in a spiral of mutually reinforcing checking behavior and memory distrust.     

Are obsessive-compulsive tendencies related to reliance on external proxies for internal states? Evidence from biofeedback-aided relaxation studies

This article presents two studies that examine the hypothesis that obsessive-compulsive (OC) tendencies are associated with a general deficiency in subjective conviction, which leads to seeking and reliance on external proxies to compensate for that deficiency. We examined this hypothesis using a biofeedback-aided relaxation procedure. In Study 1 low OC participants performed better on a relaxation task than high OC participants. More importantly, viewing the biofeedback monitor (an external proxy for the internal state of relaxation) had a different effect on the two groups: Whereas high OC participants performed better, low OC participants did not. In addition, when given the opportunity, high OC participants requested the biofeedback monitor more than did the low OC participants. In Study 2 high OC participants were more affected by false biofeedback when judging their level of relaxation compared to low OC participants. Real relaxation level differences between the two false biofeedback phases among the two groups were not found. These results provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that obsessive-compulsive disorder is associated with deficient subjective conviction in internal states and increased reliance on external proxies. Implications for the understanding of OCD-related rules and rituals as well as for cognitive therapy for OCD are discussed.     

How checking breeds doubt: Reduced performance in a simple workingmemory task

A paradox of memory research is that repeated checking results in a decrease in memory certainty, memory vividness and confidence [van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003a). Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 369-378; van den Hout, M. A., & Kindt, M. (2003b). Repeated checking causes memory distrust. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 301-316]. Although these findings have been mainly attributed to changes in episodic long-term memory, it has been suggested [Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 313-323] that representations in working memory could already suffer from detrimental checking. In two experiments we set out to test this hypothesis by employing a delayed-match-to-sample working memory task. Letters had to be remembered in their correct locations, a task that was designed to engage the episodic short-term buffer of working memory [Baddeley, A. D. (2000). The episodic buffer: a new component in working memory? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4, 417-423]. Of most importance, we introduced an intermediate distractor question that was prone to induce frustrating and unnecessary checking on trials where no correct answer was possible. Reaction times and confidence ratings on the actual memory test of these trials confirmed the success of this manipulation. Most importantly, high checkers [cf. VOCI; Thordarson, D. S., Radomsky, A. S., Rachman, S., Shafran, R, Sawchuk, C. N., & Hakstian, A. R. (2004). The Vancouver obsessional compulsive inventory (VOCI). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(11), 1289-1314] were less accurate than low checkers when frustrating checking was induced, especially if the experimental context actually emphasized the irrelevance of the misleading question. The clinical relevance of this result was substantiated by means of an extreme groups comparison across the two studies. The findings are discussed in the context of detrimental checking and lack of distractor inhibition as a way of weakening fragile bindings within the episodic short-term buffer of Baddeley's (2000) model. Clinical implications, limitations and future research are considered.     

Manipulation of responsibility in non-clinical subjects: does expectation of failure exacerbate obsessive-compulsive behaviors?

An exaggerated sense of responsibility is currently considered as the ground for the obsessive-compulsive disorder. Obsessive-like behaviors, such as hesitations and checks, may be induced in non-clinical subjects by increasing perceived responsibility (i.e., perceived personal influence on negative outcomes). In line with Salkovskis' proposal [The cognitive approach to anxiety: threat beliefs, safety-seeking behavior, and the special case of health anxiety and obsessions, in: P.M. Salkovskis (Ed.), Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy, Guilford, New York], we tested the hypothesis that reduced coping abilities (i.e., an exaggerated expectation of failure) are another effectual factor contributing to obsessive-like behaviors. We examined 47 normal volunteers in a visuo-spatial memory task, and manipulated their perceived personal influence and expectation of failure by giving differential instructions and feedback about their performance. Increase of perceived personal influence induced slowness, hesitations and checks without enhancing performance. Expectation of failure exacerbated obsessive-like behaviors, again without affecting performance. These results confirm the role of responsibility in obsessive-like behavior and indicate that reduced coping abilities may contribute to worsen dysfunctional strategies.     

Exploring the boundaries of memory distrust from repeated checking: increasing external validity and examining thresholds

Checking behavior is among the most common forms of compulsions in OCD. Recent research suggests that repeated checking decreases memory confidence, and supports theoretical models of how repeated checking is maintained. The current paper presents findings from two studies exploring the boundaries of memory distrust from repeated checking. Results of study 1 show that repeated checking of a real stove decreases memory confidence, vividness, and detail (i.e., metamemory), and leads to a greater reliance on knowing as a source of memory, without meaningfully altering memory accuracy. Results of study 2 suggest that these changes in metamemory are observed after performing a relatively low number of checks on one occasion. The findings are considered within the context of theoretical models of checking and future directions are delineated.     

Believe in yourself: Manipulating beliefs about memory causes checking

One of the most common compulsions in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) is repeated checking. Although individuals often report that they check to become more certain, checking has been shown to have the opposite effect – increased checking causes increased uncertainty. However, checking may also be thought of as beginning because of memory uncertainty. Beliefs about responsibility, over-estimation of threat, intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism, and importance of and control of thoughts are already known to affect different aspects of OCD symptomatology. Beliefs about memory, however, are not currently considered to influence compulsive behaviour. In the current study, beliefs about memory were manipulated to test whether or not they affected urges to check. Ninety-one undergraduate participants received (positive or negative) false feedback about their performance on aspects of a standardized memory test, and then completed two additional memory tasks. Their urges to check following these tasks were assessed. Consistent with our hypotheses, individuals in the low memory confidence condition had greater urges to check following the memory tasks than those in the high memory confidence condition, demonstrating that manipulations of beliefs about memory can influence checking. Results and implications are discussed in terms of cognitive-behavioural models of and treatments for OCD.