Multiple group membership influences face-recognition: Recall and neurological evidence

The limited face-recognition research involving targets categorizable on multiple dimensions has provided contradictory evidence as to how partial-ingroup members are processed and recognized. This research demonstrates that partial-ingroup members are recognized in a manner distinct from double-ingroup and double-outgroup targets. Specifically, when race and university-affiliation are crossed, university-affiliation does not influence recognition for own-race targets, but does for other-race targets, in that other-race/own-university targets are recalled more accurately than other-race/other-university targets. The neurological mechanisms involved in the effect are explored through the inclusion of electroencephalography.     

Categorisation salience and ingroup bias: The buffering role of a multicultural ideology

The current work sought to test the moderating role of a multicultural ideology on the relationship between categorisation salience and ingroup bias. Accordingly, in one experimental study, we manipulated categorisation salience and the accessibility of a multicultural ideology, and measured intergroup attitudes. Results show that categorisation salience only leads to ingroup bias when a multiculturalism (MC) ideology is not made salient. Thus, MC ideology attenuates the negative effects of categorisation salience on ingroup bias. These results pertain to social psychology in general showing that the cognitive processes should be construed within the framework of ideological contexts.     

The effectiveness of feedback in multiple-cue probability learning

How effective are different types of feedback in helping us to learn multiple contingencies? This article attempts to resolve a paradox whereby, in comparison to simple outcome feedback, additional feedback either fails to enhance or is actually detrimental to performance in nonmetric multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL), while in contrast the majority of studies of metric MCPL reveal improvements at least with some forms of feedback. In three experiments we demonstrate that if feedback assists participants to infer cue polarity then it can in fact be effective in nonmetric MCPL. Participants appeared to use cue polarity information to adopt a linear judgement strategy, even though the environment was nonlinear. The results reconcile the paradoxical contrast between metric and nonmetric MCPL and support previous findings of people's tendency to assume linearity and additivity in probabilistic cue learning.     

Spatial distinctiveness effect in categorisation

The aim of the present study was to show that the probability of an item being retrieved is proportional to its spatial distinctiveness, and that this distinctiveness effect can be obtained in an implicit memory task. The participants were presented with two phases in which they had to categorise pictures of objects as either “kitchen utensils” or “do-it-yourself tools”. In our encoding phase, the pictures were successively presented in different positions on the screen. The positions were arranged in one of two different configurations: a “distinctive condition” in which the pictures were placed in two circles, one central and one peripheral, such that the distance between the pictures was greater when they were in a peripheral position than in a central position, and a “nondistinctive” condition, in which the distance between the pictures was constant irrespective of their central or peripheral position. In the test phase, the same pictures were presented for categorisation, mixed with new pictures at the centre of the screen. The results clearly confirmed our expectations.     

Similarity chains in the transformational paradigm

Rips’ (1989) results with the transformational paradigm have often been cited as supporting accounts of categorisation not based on similarity, such as involving necessary or sufficient features (or a belief in such features), which guarantee a categorisation outcome once their presence has been established. We discuss a similarity account of the transformational paradigm based on similarity chains, which predicts that when the transformation is more gradual the identity of the transformed object is less likely to change. Conversely, we suggest that an essentialist approach to categorisation predicts that essences are more likely to change in gradual transformations, across generations, as is the case with evolutionary change of species. In two experiments we examined the scope of the similarity versus the essentialist account in the transformational paradigm. With space aliens, the similarity account was superior to the essentialist one, but the converse was true with earth creatures. We suggest that an essentialist mode of categorisation is more likely than a similarity one for stimuli that are in better correspondence with our naïve understanding of the world.     

Infants perceive human point-light displays as solid forms

While five-month-old infants show orientation-specific sensitivity to changes in the motion and occlusion patterns of human point-light displays, it is not known whether infants are capable of binding a human representation to these displays. Furthermore, it has been suggested that infants do not encode the same physical properties for humans and material objects. To explore these issues we tested whether infants would selectively apply the principle of solidity to upright human displays. In the first experiment infants aged six and nine months were repeatedly shown a human point-light display walking across a computer screen up to 10 times or until habituated. Next, they were repeatedly shown the walking display passing behind an in-depth representation of a table, and finally they were shown the human display appearing to pass through the table top in violation of the solidity of the hidden human form. Both six- and nine-month-old infants showed significantly greater recovery of attention to this final phase. This suggests that infants are able to bind a solid vertical form to human motion. In two further control experiments we presented displays that contained similar patterns of motion but were not perceived by adults as human. Six- and nine-month-old infants did not show recovery of attention when a scrambled display or an inverted human display passed through the table. Thus, the binding of a solid human form to a display in only seems to occur for upright human motion. The paper considers the implications of these findings in relation to theories of infants' developing conceptions of objects, humans and animals.     

Further attempts to clarify the importance of category variability for categorisation

The issue of how category variability affects classification of novel instances is an important one for assessing theories of categorisation, yet previous research cannot provide a compelling conclusion. In five experiments we reexamine some of the factors thought to affect participant performance. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants almost always classified the test item as belonging to the high variability category. By contrast, in Experiment 3 we employed an alternative experimental paradigm, where the difference in variability of the two categories was less salient. In that case, participants tended to classify a test item as belonging to the low variability category. Two additional experiments (4 and 5) explored in detail the differences between Experiments 1, 2 on the one hand, and 3 on the other. Some insight into the underlying psychological processes can be provided by computational models of categorisation, and we focus on the continuous version of Anderson's (1991) Rational Model, which has not been explored before in this context. The model predicts that test instances exactly halfway between the prototypes of two categories should be classified into the more variable category, consistent with the bulk of empirical findings. We also provided a comparison with a slightly reduced version of the Generalised Context Model (GCM) to show that its predictions are consistent with those from the Rational Model, for our stimulus sets.     

A perceptual account of definitions

The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and a type as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’. This paper is based on my master’s thesis at Monash University (2003). I thank Keith Allan for commenting on an earlier draft—any remaining infelicities are mine only.     

Ultra-rapid categorisation in non-human primates

The visual system of primates is remarkably efficient for analysing information about objects present in complex natural scenes. Recent work has demonstrated that they perform this at very high speeds. In a choice saccade task, human subjects can initiate a first reliable saccadic eye movement response to a target (the image containing an animal) in only 120 ms after image onset. Such fast responses impose severe time constraints if one considers neuronal responses latencies in high-level ventral areas of the macaque monkey. The question then arises: are non-human primates able to perform the task? Two rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained to perform the same forced-choice categorization task as the one used in humans. Both animals performed the task with a high accuracy and generalized to new stimuli that were introduced everyday: accuracy levels were comparable both with new and well-known images (84% vs. 94%). More importantly, reaction times were extremely fast (minimum reaction time 100 ms and median reaction time 152 ms). Given that typical single units onset times in Inferotemporal cortex (IT) are about as long as the shortest behavioural responses measured here, we conclude that visual processing involved in ultra rapid categorisations might be based on rather simple shape cue analysis that can be achieved in areas such as extrastriate cortical area V4. The present paper demonstrates for the first time, that rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are able to match human performance in a forced-choice saccadic categorisation task of animals in natural scenes.     

Redundancy gain in semantic categorisation

Redundancy gain refers to the performance enhancements often associated with the presentation of redundant versus single targets (for example, faster, more accurate, or more forceful responses). Though predominantly observed in relatively simple tasks (e.g., stimulus detection), there have been some efforts to investigate similar phenomena in tasks involving higher level processing. We conducted three experiments aimed at determining (a) whether a redundancy gain would be evident in a task unambiguously requiring higher level processing (the semantic categorisation of visually-presented lexical stimuli), and (b) if so, what accounts might be appropriate to explain such findings. We found that redundancy gains are observed in such tasks, and we conclude that both coactivation and race models can account for these gains.