The facts and fictions of religion: make believe on Avatar Forums

Recent scholars of religion have begun to explore the relationship between religion and fiction. Within this context, Johan Huizinga’s theory of religion as make believe or play has received considerable attention. James Cameron’s film Avatar (2009) has inspired behaviour that can be thought of as religious, despite the film’s clear foundations in fiction. Scholarship on fan communities has debated whether such groups can be considered religions. This article develops Huizinga’s account using Kendall Walton’s theory of make believe. Walton’s theory enables the interpretation of fiction into overlapping games of make believe in fan communities. The conversational threads on Avatar Forums show how norms of discourse that preclude disagreement allow the frames of reality and fiction to blur. These norms of discourse provide a means of understanding the process by which media myths can become the basis of fiction-based value structures within the cultic milieu. However, the theory also presents significant problems for theorists of religion in terms of the structure of religious belief and religious experience.     

Trials per problem and age as factors in learning set formation of children

Discrimination learning set performance was examined in preschool children as a function of age and number of trials per problem. Subjects 3, 4, 5, and 6 years old were trained over three 72-trial sessions. Half of the children at each age were given problems three trials in length, and half received 12-trial problems. As predicted, younger children (3 and 4-year-olds) performed significantly better for 12 than for three trials per problem, whereas no differences in performance were evident for older children. Response pattern analyses revealed that younger children, especially those receiving less exposure within problems, produced a higher proportion of stimulus alternation and position determined response sequences than did older children. These results contradict the commonly held assumption that learning set acquisition is simply a function of the total number of trials presented and indicate that the amount of exposure to individual problems is a factor in problem solution for young human subjects.     

The methodology of genuine modal realism

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.     

Response

Abstract

The panelists in the foregoing discussion raise questions and possibilities for which the author is profoundly grateful. This brief response considers just a few of the ways in which questions of location, including those related to immanence vs. transcendence, panentheism, the opening of wounds, and the shattering of secure foundations might play out in relation to one another.     

The Causal Principle

There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelow's (1996) Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial defense of Lucretianism.     

Interference effects on preschool children's learning sets

Four experiments investigated interference in 5-year-olds' learning sets. Experiment 1 manipulated intertrial and interproblem intervals, showing that increased intertrial intervals retarded performance. Long interproblem intervals interacted with short intertrial intervals to produce performance facilitation. Experiment 2 investigated interpolations within problems with either similar or dissimilar stimulus presentations. Similar stimuli caused greater performance decrements than dissimilar. Experiment 3 hypothesized that the within-subjects design of Experiment 1 masked interproblem interval effects. Testing between-subjects established that increased interproblem delays facilitate performance. In Experiment 4 interproblem delays were further tested in a series of shifts within and between dimensions. Increased delays more greatly benefited shifts within dimensions. It is concluded that intertrial and interproblem intervals affect learning set performance differentially. Intertrial delays result in performance deterioration due in part to interference. Interproblem delays facilitate performance at least in part by providing the opportunity for suppression of proactive interference, and perhaps in part by providing the opportunity for constructive cognitive processing.