Sartre and Bergson: A Disagreement about Nothingness

Abstract

Henri Bergson's philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre's central argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre's argument is in part a response to Bergson's dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in Creative Evolution (1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are precisely those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre's account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful.

My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre's and Bergson's discussion of nothingness: here I point to some important aspects of Sartre's early philosophy, including some features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson's positive influence on his thought.     

Sequential remembering and lived remembering in the flow of experience: a videographic study / Recuerdo secuencial y recuerdo vivido en el curso de la experiencia: un estudio videográfico

Abstract

During the last 30 years the discussion on memory and remembering has advanced from a strictly cognitive perspective to a broader view, involving the body in these processes. Thus, the present article aims to recover Henri Bergson’s main ideas — published more than a century ago — emphasizing the tight relation between immediate experience, memory and bodily movements. First, contemporary perspectives on memory are reviewed. Afterwards, the results from a videographic study are presented, showing how deeply the body is engaged in the act of remembering. These results evidence the presence of two different ways of remembering: sequential and lively-experienced.     

The controversy around the concept of archetypes

The paper reviews the course of the controversy surrounding Jung's theory of archetypes beginning in the mid 1990s and continuing to the present. Much of this controversy was concerned with the debate between the essentialism of the evolutionary position of Anthony Stevens as found in his 1983 book Archetypes: A Natural History of the Self, and the emergence model of the archetypes proposed in various publications by Hogenson, Knox and Merchant, among others. The paper then moves on to a consideration of more recent developments in theory, particularly as derived from an examination of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who introduces Bergson's somnambulistic unconscious into the discussion of Jung's theories. It is suggested that this largely unexamined influence on Jung may provide answers to some of the unanswered questions surrounding his theorizing. The paper concludes by suggesting that the notion of the somnambulistic unconscious may resemble Atmanspacher's argument for a dual‐aspect monism interpretation of Jung.     

论柏格森对现代新儒学思潮的影响

20世纪20年代,柏格森哲学曾在中国思想界人为流行,此时也恰好是现代新儒学思潮开始萌芽和兴起的时候,梁漱溟和熊十力均受到了柏格森思想的深刻影响。梁漱溟试图融合佛教唯识学和柏格森生命哲学的观点,用以阐释和发挥儒家“生”之哲学的精义,以重建儒家的理想人格。熊十力则通过反省和比照柏格森哲学的生命观与自然观,提出了他对于生命本体的独特看法,从而创立“翕辟成变”的大化流行论和“默识证会”的直觉说。     

Habit and time in nineteenth-century French philosophy: Albert Lemoine between Bergson and Ravaisson

This paper shows how reflection on habit leads in nineteenth-century French philosophy to Henri Bergson’s idea of duration in 1888 as a non-quantifiable dimension irreducible to time as measured by clocks. Historically, I show how Albert Lemoine’s 1875 L’habitude et l’instinct was crucial, since he holds – in a way that is both Ravaissonian and Bergsonian avant la lettre – that for the being capable of habit, the three elements of time are fused together. For that habituated being, Lemoine claims, it is not true to say that the past is no longer, nor even that the future is not yet. This historical link between Ravaisson and Bergson, however, only sharpens the philosophical question of how a dynamic conception of habit involves and requires a conception of real duration, of a temporality more original than clock-time, and, conversely, of how reflection on duration prior to clock-time involves a notion of habit. With reference to the work of Gilles Deleuze, the paper concludes by showing that there is an internal connection between these two grand philosophical themes of nineteenth- and then twentieth-century French thought: habit and time.     

Inheritance,Originality and the Will: Bergson and Heidegger on Creation

Abstract

In the work of Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger we find different responses to traditional ideas of ‘creation’. Bergson advances a philosophy of creation, wherein ‘creation’ is presented as the production of a ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ novelty, not only in art, but in all forms of human experience and biological life. Heidegger, in contrast, comes to criticise ideas of ‘creation’ in art as the expression of an alienated ‘humanism’ and ‘subjectivism’ essential to the modern age. This paper illuminates this divergence by showing how Bergson and Heidegger, despite appearances, grapple with the question of art-production – and with the attendant issues of inheritance and originality – in similar ways. It is only in recognising this proximity, I argue, that it is possible to perceive adequately what essentially distinguishes their approaches: Bergson’s conception of creation as a function of the will.     

A non-Bergsonian Bachelard

In this essay, Perraudin sets out to contrast the competing philosophies of time and imagination of two major French thinkers of the twentieth century: Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962). Despite Bachelard’s polemical approach vis-à-vis philosophical tradition in his works on epistemology and poetics, his accounts of time and imagination have been shown by several critics to be significantly influenced and inspired by his predecessor. Perraudin nonetheless argues that Bachelard’s critique of Bergson’s theory of continuous temporality opens the way—through the subtle dialectics of his “philosophy of no”—to more prolific, and as yet untapped, therapeutic possibilities in our understanding of time and imagination than Bergson’s accounts of continuum of the élan vital had managed to reveal. This translated text is a revised version of Jean Francois Perraudin’s “Un Bachelard Non-Bergsonien,” published in Gaston Bachelard: Du rêveur ironiste au pédagogue inspiré (Gaston Bachelard: From Ironic Dreamer to Inspired Educator). Ed. Jean Libis. Dijon: Centre Regional de Documentation Pédagogique, 1984, pp. 61–76. Passages cited from Bergson’s and Bachelard’s works are here drawn from published English translations (with an occasional amendment noted, and key French phrases inserted parenthetically). In the case of citations from French texts not yet available in English, all translations are mine. Translated by Eileen Rizo-Patron Philosophy, Interpretation, and Culture Program, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA e-mail: erizopatron@stny.rr.com

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The COST of explicit memory

Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time – a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piaget’s stages as the natural bifurcations of a self-organizing dynamic system. The elements of a theoretical framework required to support explicit memory are developed, to include, (1) the complex developmental trajectory supporting the emergence of the explicit in Piaget, (2) the concrete dynamical system and the concept of a non-differentiable time contained in Bergson’s theory required to support a conscious, as opposed to an implicit remembrance, (3) the relation to current theories of amnesia, difficulties posed by certain retrograde amnesic phenomena, the role of the hippocampus and limitations of connectionist models, (4) the fact that nowhere in this overall framework does the loss of explicit memory imply or require the destruction of experience “stored in the brain.”     

Bergson and Athleticism

The work of Henri Bergson has gone almost completely unnoticed in philosophy of sport literature. This in no way indicates the level of relevance his programme may carry for the subject. Many of the entrenched debates that have historically helped to shape the field are mirrored by Bergson's own concerns regarding perception and skill acquisition. As such, a thorough study of how the Bergsonian programme might approach the topic of athletic action is in no wise an idle pursuit – in fact, very much the opposite. My intention in this paper is twofold: first, to indicate the natural commerce that exists between Bergson's philosophy and the philosophy of sport; second, and perhaps more ambitiously, to demonstrate that his approach to perception and action not only anticipates, but in some cases may help to edify, certain unresolved issues within the field. The paper develops in three parts. In part I, I provide a brief summary of Bergson's theory of perception as it is developed in Matter and Memory (1896). Parts II and III will apply that theory to two of the central aspects of human motor activity: in part II, I investigate what it is to be in possession of skilled motor behaviour – to make that behaviour ‘automatic’, as it were; in part III, the controversial subject of what it is to acquire and modify skilled motor behaviour will be examined.     

LIFE AS EMERGENT AGENTIAL SYSTEMS: TENDENCIES WITHOUT TELEOLOGY IN AN OPEN UNIVERSE

Life is a relationship among various kinds of agents interacting at different scales in ways that are multifarious, complex, and emergent. Life is always a part of an ecological embedding in communities of interaction, which in turn structure and influence how life evolves. Evolution is essential for understanding life and biodiversity. Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution suggests a way of examining “tendencies” without “teleology.” In this paper I reexamine that work in light of recent concepts in evolutionary ecology, and explore how agential aspects of life are essential for understanding how emergence provides a basis for a process‐based metaphysics of life. In support of this project, I will explore how the major transitions of life on Earth have proceeded through increasing levels of cooperation among agents (e.g., mitochondria in animal cells forming a mutualistic relationship), which have allowed further emergences and complexity to evolve. This complexity always, however, emerges in the context of ecological relationships and a nonteleological evolutionary process. Yet, while nonteleological, the progression of life thus far on this planet seems to hold the promise of certain tendencies that seem inherent in life itself.